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IN T_HE 
·supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2649 
T. BRYAN TATE, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF 
THE ESTATE OF CECELIA. HAIJBERSTADT 
HA.IN, Complainant, 
11,er.sus 
CECELIA HALBERSTADT HAIN, ET ALS., Defendants. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Chief Jitstice and Justices of the 8up1·eme 
Court of Appeals of TTirginia-: 
·your petitioner, T. Bryan. Tate, Trustee in Bankruptcy of 
tl1e }]state of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, Complainant below, 
respectfully repre~ents unto Your Honors that he is aggrieved 
by final decree entered in the above styled declaratory judg-
ment proceeding by the Corporation Court of Danville, Vir-
ginia, on the 23r_d day of May, 1942, in which said Cecelia 
Halberstadt Hain, American National Bank and Trust Com-
pany of Danville, Danville, Virginia, and Metropolita.n Life 
Insurance Company were defendants. 
2* *Said Trustee in Bankruptcy, representing general 
creditors of said Bankrupt, claims the right to receive 
from lVIetropolitan $121.37 monthly, beginning with June, 
1940, until Mrs. Hain 's debts, allowed by the Bankruptcy 
Court, have been satisfied. 
The defendant, Mrs. Hain, contends that tl1e monthly pay-
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ments due her by l\Ietropolitan are not liable for her debts 
and that the voluntary assignment held by the Bank is in-
valid . 
.American National Bank and Trust Company asserts a 
prior lien on the instal~ent certificate issued by Metropolitan. 
It claims under an assignment of the certificate made to it 
bv Mrs. Hain as collateral securitv for loans made her. The 
Bank's assignment is dated July· 12, 1937 (R., p. 93), and 
antedates the bankruptcy adjudication. The Bank is not rep-
resented by counsel and has filed no answer, but through its 
President asserts the validity of its assignment. 
Metropolitan admits its liability to pay the monthly instal-
ments but has withheld payment of the amounts which have 
accrued since bankruptcy. While a stakeholder, it claims 
its indebtedness to Mrs. Hain is not liable for her debts un-
der the terms of its certificate and bee.a.use of certain insur-
imce contracts it issued on the life of Joseph Halberstadt, 
sometimes styled Joseph Halbert, the father of Cecelia Hal-
berstadt Hain, which were surrendered at his death and for. 
which the certificate was issued. 
Complainant's bill was dismissed by the learned chancellor 
below upon the theory that Metropolitan and Joseph Hal-
bersta.dt intended that the contracts of insurance issued on 
his life and the instalment certificate held by Mrs: Hain should 
be governed by the statute law of the Stat~ of New York 
a.nd that these statutes exempt the instalment payments from 
the debts of the payee. 
The questions involved in the appeal are the ref ore : 
l. What is the le,g,al relationship between llf.etropolitan aml 
'PM.Jee of its instalment certificate-is it. a debt.or or t.rustee 
of Mrs. Hain? -
3• •2. If this relat.iorJ,ship is that of debtor and creditor, 
did the debt have a legal situs in Virgini,a at t.he time of 
bankruptcy for purposes of succession by t.rustee? 
R If Virginia was the le.Qal situs of debt at time of bank-
'l"Uptcy and debt was oioed to batnkru,pt, a resident of Vir-
ginia, by a forei.<Jn corporation domesticated in Virginia, 
would the debt pass to the tritstee in bankruptcy as '' pro,p-
ertu" as defined in the Bnmkruptc'JI Aet1 
4. I.f the "debt" du.e Virginia bankrupt represents pro-
ceeds of life insitrance policies in which bankrupt was bene-
ficim·y which were left with comparvy upon dea.th of ins1.l.1te~ 
'}t:.e sitch proceeds exempt from legal process in Virginia; 
(a) Where original. policies and. supplementary cont.rµct 
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held by beneficiary expressly provide that instalment pay_-
niMits there1tnder shall be free from debts and legal,. liabili-
tie.i:; of beneficiary, · . 
(b) Where insurance policies conta.in no such provisions) 
if thet·c are statutes ip effect in the home office state of is.:. 
s11,i1ig compqny which· ea;empt s11,~h proceeds from debt.~ of 
beneficiary d9 such statutes have Ol(ty ex territorial effect 
against rights of cr,e4itors armed with legal procet~s who 
bri1i,q action in state 'Where beneficiary resides? 
5. If the evide~c~ of indebtedness claitned by the trustee., 
as property of the bankrupt, provides, · 
'' This certificate may not be assigned, set over or trmis-
ferred and no obUgation will be recognized by the compa'l'l·'!J. 
except to the extent and in the '»'W,wner as herein. set f ortli.'' 
l.r; this language appropriate to e,vidence the intention of. 
the contr{fcting parties that the debt payable 'Under the cer-
ti;/i.cate. shall not pass, upon bankrupfot!/. of payee to her tn,s-
tee in bankruptcy, as assets for creditors? · 
6. Could pr,yee make a valid volwntary pledge of the cer,-
tifica.te or the proceeds thereof?. · 
7. If payee's voluntary assignrn.,ent was not effective, 
4° what are ba.nk's r·ights at •death of bankrupt to payments. 
which have not then accrued1 
By stipµlation all original exhibits are filed as a part of 
the record. 
The following facts appear from the record in this case, 
a transcript of which is presented herewith and attached 
~~ . 
5* 
pecelia Halberstadt Hain filed voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy in the District Court of the United States for the 
"\Vestern District of Virginia at, Danville, Virginia (R., p. 
88), and was duly adjudged bankrupt on May 18, 1940 (R., p. 
72). Provable claims, made by general creditors amounted 
to $13,854.81 which, with $9,058.33 owed the Bank, made 1 otal 
indebtedness of $22,913.14 exclusive of priority claims total-
ing $919.11. The Trustee collected $4,166.39, paid priority_ 
~laims of $919.11 and a ten per cent dividend of $1,385 .. 49 to 
general creditors, other than the Bank, and has a cash re· 
~e~ve of $1,271.37. Th~ Baµk'~ iµd~btedness of $9,058.33 has 
. • •. L - • :: ~ • 
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been reduced bv credits from sale of collateral since bank-
ruptcy by $1,65i.47, leaving the Bank's claim $7,494.86. The 
Bank proved its claim as a secured creditor holding collater~l. 
If it does not have title to the certificate, it is entitleci to 
share as a general ereditor in the distribution of •Bankrupt's 
assets. In other words, the unpaid debts due general credi-
tors including the Bank, amount to $19,966.19, against which 
the only assets held by the Trustee are the cash reserve and 
the claim asserted in this proceeding· to the instalment debt 
due bankrupt by Metropolitan evidenced by its. instalment 
certific.ate (R., pp. 100-102). Bankrupt, in her Schedule of 
Assets attached to her bankruptcy petition, claims this instal-
ment certificate is non-assignable and non-transferable and 
is exempt from the claims of creditors (R., p. 92). 
· Checks in payment of monthly instalments for June, J" uly 
and August, 1940, were held by the Bank at the time of bank-
ruptcy (R., p. 66), and the monthly instalments w:hich have 
accrued sin~e September, 1940, are unpaid, checks not liav-
ing been issued by the Metropolitan pending a judicial de-
termination of the rights of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, tbe 
Tirustee in Bankruptcy, and the Bank (R., p. 66). 
Before bankruptcy, Mrs. Hain, as a. basis for credit, sup-
plied merchandise creditors with statement of assets and 
liabilities (R., pp. 105-107). In the statement furnished to 
J. W. Carter Company ( R., p. 105) she lists among her 
6* assets '' Trust •Fund Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany $26,350.00''. This statement was dated March 5, 
1939. Another financial statement (R., p. 107), dated An-
gust 8, 1936, furnished wholesalers, listed as an asset '' Trust 
Fnnd Sole Beneficiary $25,000.00''. 
The financial statement of March 5, 1939, showed liabilities 
of only $13,107.40 and a. total net worth of $64,9'42.63. The 
previous statement, dated August 8, 1936, showed total as-
. sets of $54,950.00 and total liabilities of $5,500.00, with .a net 
worth of $49,450.00. · 
When she testified before Referee at meeting of creditors 
(R.,. p. 77) she admitted signing the statements but explain~d 
that she did this on advice of her husband. The Bank claims 
the right to collect the monthly payments under an assign-
ment dated .July 12, 1937, made by Mrs. Hain before her mar-
riage (R., p. 93). 
There is a controversy as to the time Cecelia Halberstadt 
Hain b~ame domiciled in Virginia.. Her place of residence 
in January, 1936, is material because the certificate of in--
debtedness was then delivered to her. When she testified 
before the Referee in Bankruptcy she stated that her father 
died in Oeto ber, 1935, and that she came to Danville .a few 
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weeks later. (R., p. 80). On May 2, 1936, she applied for reg-
istration as a voter in the third ward in Danville and stated 
that she had been living· in Danville one year. (Original Ex-
hibit "A"). On the same day she filed with the Registrar 
her registration oath that she was then entitled to register 
under the Act of Assembly of Virginia extending· the right 
of suffrage to women. This required a year's residence in 
the State. When she was examined as a witness in this c-ase 
she stated that her father died on October 19, 1935 (R., p. 47), 
that she had never been in Danville before her father's death 
and that she did not know until the several shoe stores owned 
by her father were divided and she received her share of the 
stores just where she would have her home and that wasn't 
until April, 1936, and it was at that time she definitely made 
up her mind to live in Danville (R., pp. 52-5·3). However, it 
is conceded she l1as actually resided in Virginia since 
7* October, 1935, •and tlmt upori the division of the stores in 
.A.pril, 19·36, she decided to reside in Danville and ]1as 
been actually domiciled in Virginia since that date. The 
bankruptcy petitioh avers that she had had her domicile in 
and resided in the ,v estern District of Virginia for a lon~er 
portion of the six months immediately preceding the filing 
of her petition (R.., p. 88) than in any other judicial district. 
The certificate, with checks for the payments due in Octo-
ber, November and December, 1935, were delivered in Dan-
ville to Mrs. Hain, then Miss Halberstadt, by the manager 
of Metropolitan 's District Office in January, 1936, and all 
subsequent payments she received have been mailed to her 
a.t Danville (R., pp. 119-122). Hence Complainant claims de-
livery of contract in Virginia and this state as her domicile. 
certainly since her father's death in October, 1935, also that 
place of performance or payment is in this State. 
The instalment certificate (R., p. 23) is dated October 19, 
1935. For convenience it is here copied: 
''·EXHIBIT '' A'' 
''ME.TROPOLITAN 
LIB"'E INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
'' (herein called the company) 
'' First Instalment $121.37 
''239 MONTHLY 
. Instalments There-
after of $121.37 
Each 
''Total .Amo~mt of Instalment Payments $29,128.80 
"No. 18113-R Instalment Certificate 
6 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
''IN CONSIDERATION ·of the surrender of original Poli-
cies No. 830032-A, 5081321-A .& 5815807-A, 5927858-A issued 
by the Company on the life of JOSiJPH HALBERSTADT 
therein called the Insured, now deeeased, and in accordance 
with the conditions in said Policies. 
''DOTH PAY on the date hereof ONE HUNDRED 
T,VENTY-ON;E AND 37/100 Dollars, to CECELIA HAL-
BER.STADT the beneficiary of record under said Policies 
and designated herein as Payee. 
"AND DOTH AGREE FUR'l~HER to pay ONE HUN-
DRED TWENTY-ONE AND 37 /100 Dollars to *said 
s• Payee if living on the NINETEENTH day of EACH 
MONTH THEREAFTER beginning on the NINE-
TEENTH day of NOVEMBER., 1935, and ending with final 
payment, conditional on the surrender of this certificate, on 
the NINETEENTH day of September, 1955, such final pay-
ment completing a series of TWO HUNDRED FORTY such 
MONTHLY payments. 
''In the event of the death of the Payee herein named be-
fore reeeiving all of the instalments payable hereunder, the 
remaining payments shall be commuted at the rate of three 
and one-half per centum per annum compound interest and 
on legal surrender and release of this certificate shall be 
paid in one sum to the Executors or Administrators of the 
Pavee hereunder. 
''Vi'hen the Company so requires, satisfactory evidence 
must be furnished that the Payee is alive at the time an in-
stalment is payable hereunder, and if not living, the Com-
pany must be furnished '\\<ith satisfactory evidence of a 
claimant's authority to receive_ the commuted value of any 
Instalments remaining unpaid. 
'' This certificate may not be assigned, set over or trans-
ferred, and no obligation will be recognized by the Company 
except to the extent and in the manner as herein set forth. 
"This certificate shall; on each anniversary, participate in 
such distribution of surplus interest earnings, if any, as may 
be declared by the Company. 
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company has caused this certificate to be executed 
this NINETEENTH day of October, 1935·. 
W. C. Fletcher 
Secretary 
Examined 
Policy Registrar: President'' 
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It will be observed that the first instalment of $121.37 was 
payable as of date of issue of certiftcate. The remaining 239 
monthly payments of like am<?unt a~e payable beginning -with 
November 19, 1935, and endmg with September 19, 1·955. 
The instalment payments, including first payment made oo-
temporaneously with date of issue, aggregate $29,128.80. 
The certificate shows the consideration for i.ts *issue was 
9,a, the surrender to Metropolitan of four life. insurance 
policies which became a ·claim by reason of the death of 
its insured, Joseph Halberstadt. The certificate refers to 
their surrender and is issued ''in accordance with the con-
ditions in said policies"'. 
The certificate obligates the Metropolitan to pay the 
monthly instalments ''to said payee if living". The payee 
is Cecelia Halberstadt, who is the beneficiary of record un-
der said policies issued on the life of Joseph Halberstadt. 
It contains the following provision: 
'' In the event of the death of the Payee herein named be-
fore receiving all of the Instalments payable hereunder, the 
remaining payments shall be commuted at the· rate of three 
and one-half per centum per annum compound interest and 
on le~al surrender and release of this certificate shail be 
paid in one sum to the Executors or Administrators of the 
Payee hereunder.'' 
The provision against assignment reads: 
"This certificate may not be assigned, set over or trans-
ferred, and no obligation will be recognized by the Company 
except to the extent and in the manner as herein -set forth.'' 
The four policies were introduced in evidence over the 
objection of petitioner that they were irrelevant and imma-
terh1l to this issue (R.., p. 110). These policies each carry 
a provision that Metropolitan 
''promises to pay at its Home Office in the Qity of New York.'' 
T'.his applies to the proceeds payable when the original poli-
cies became a. claim. As stated no place :for payment of the 
instalments under the certificate is provided. 
The two policies issued in May and July, 1929, respec-
tively, contain a provision to the effect that "no beneficiary 
may assign or commute income payments unless the insured 
has so provided in writing and such provision has been en-
dorsed on the policy by the Company at its home office''. No 
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contrary provision was made by the insured or endorsed on 
.the policy. The otlier policies, one dated March 22, 1912, and 
· the other dated· September 28, 1927, do not contain pro-
10* visions "restricting beneficiary's right to assign inE-tal-
. ment payments but the insured, Joseph Halberstadt, in 
S,eptember, 1930, executed forms provided by the Company 
whereby he ~looted that the amounts payable under those 
,policies. upon his death should be retained by the Company 
and paid out in monthly payments instead of in one sum . 
. The form carries a provision signed by the insured, Joseph 
Halberstadt, 
'·that the beneficiary of record shall not have the riglit at 
any time to commute, assign or encumber any stipulated pay-
ments yet to be made.'' 
The form further provides that 
''In the event that the beneficiarv of record shall die be-
fore receiving all the payments as" stipulated above the re-
maining payments shall be commuted at three and one-half 
per centum (3%%) per annum compound interest to he paid 
at once and in one sum to the executors or administrators of 
the .beneficiary of record.'' 
The first polic.y of $2,000.00 dated March 22, 1912 (No. 
830032-A), was issued when Jose1lh Halberstadt was a resi-
dent of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The second policy, 
dated September 28, 1927 (No. 5081321-A), was issued after 
,Joseph Halberstadt had moved to Washington, . Beaufort 
County, North Carolina, and was there delivered to him. ThP, 
two policies issued May 16, 1929 (No. 5815807-A) and on 
;ruJy 8, 1929· (No. 5927858-A), were also issued after Joseph 
HalbP.rstadt moved to North Carolina. and were delivered at 
Washington, North Carolina. The record is clear that J oi:;eph 
Halberstadt was domiciled in Washington, Beaufort County, 
North Carolina, from about 1924 until the date of his death 
on October 19, 1935. His will was probated there and an 
exemplified I copv recorded at Danville, Virginia. 
When ·the attempted assfo:nment was made (R., p. 93), the 
Rank took manual pos8ession of the certificate (R., p. 64). 
Tlhe Bank did not · receive any of Metropolitan 's monthly 
checks until a few month:.; before bankruptcv (R., p. 65). It 
merely held the assig'Ilment of the certificate· as collateral se-
curity for Mrs. Hain 's indebtedness. The only che,~ks 
11 * the Bank received were for the months of *February, 
March and May, 1940, and these were delivered under 
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order of the Bankruptcy Court. They had been rece~vcd by 
Mrs. Hain and she in turn endorsed them and delivered them 
to the Bank (R., p. 66). Checks for June, July and August, 
1940, were also sent to Mrs. Hain, by the insurance company. 
She endorsed them and delivered them to the Bank through 
her husband. The payments which accrued begining with 
September 1, 19'40, are being withheld by Metropolitan. The 
April, -1940, check did not reach the Bank, but was endorsed 
by Mrs. Hain and cashed by her husband. The Bank never 
requested Metropolitan to send the checks direct to it and 
never received any checks direct frqm Metropolitan (R., p. 
69) . 
.An important fact is that Metropolitan's obligation under 
the contract was to be performed in Virginia or wherever 
payee happened to reside. The certificate was issued before 
Mrs. Hain's marriage in her maiden name, Cecelia Halber-· 
sta.dt Hain. After marriage, she requested Metropolitan to 
send cheeks made payable in her married name. In making 
this request she used a form provided by _the Company en-
closed with each monthly check, so that it could be notified 
of any change in her address. Checks for June, July and 
.Aug·nst, 1940, were produced; These were made payable to 
'' Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, 307 Main Street, Danville, Vir-
ginia, P. 0. Box 458". This arrangement shows that both 
Metropolitan and Mrs. Hain understood that the contract 
was to be performed or payments made in Virginia, and tfo\~ 
any change in plaee of p~yment was at her election (R., p. 
70). 
CASE CONTROLLED B1r DECISION OF YOUR 
HONORS IN ·wrtLI.AMS CASE 
It is conceded that if this case is governed by Virginia law, 
it is controlled by the decision of Your Honors in refusing 
a writ of error to Mrs. Pearl Jennings Williams, to a jn_dgmcnt 
entered against her and the Prudential Insurance Company 
of America in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Vir-
ginia, in favor of Horace G. Bass, Trustee in Bank-
12«< ruptcy *of the estate of lVfrs. Pearl Jennings Wil-
liams, plaintiff. .Application for this writ of error 
was made in 1936. It is true that no defense was made upon. 
the theory that the contract there was governed by New 
Jersey law. Otherwise the facts were very similar and the 
question of law involved was identical with that here pre-
sented. 
In the Williams case, at the time of the filing of her petition 
in 1bankruptcy she and her daughter were beneficiaries in a 
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life insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased hus-
band., David T. Williams. '' The said insurance policy pro-
vided that if the said policy should become a claim by the 
death of the insured, 240 monthly instalments would become 
payable as follows: To Pearl J. Williams and Anne C. Wil-
liams, beneficiaries, wife and daughter, respectively, of the 
insured, share and share alike, or to the survivor of them, if 
then living, and upon the death of both Pearl J. Williams 
and Anne C. ,villiams, to other beneficiaries set forth in said 
policy. 
'' David T. "Williams, insured, died prior to the filing of said 
bankruptcy petition and left surviving him his wife and 
daughter, who thereby became entitled to the monthly in-
stallments payable under said insurance policy. After the 
death of the insured said insurance company paid regularly 
on or about the first day of each month the sum of $29.66 to 
the said Pearl J. Williams until the filing of her petition in 
bankruptcy. After notice of the said ·bankruptcy proceeding 
was given, the said iusurance company began to withhold the 
said monthly payments and at the time of the filing of this 
action the said iusurance company held the sum of Thr.ee Hun-
dred Twenty-Six Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents ($326.26) as 
the accrued monthly installments of said Pearl J. Williams. 
"The said insurance policy, according to the terms of its 
general printed stock form., provided that 'any installment 
or installments payable •hereunder shall be unassign-
13* able after this policy shall become a claim .. ' '' 
It is pointed out that there is no substantial difference be-
tweerr that provision and the provision in the Metropolitan 
Instalment Certificate._ The language in the Metropolitan 
Certificate is : 
''·This Certificate may not be assigned, set over 0;r trans-
ferred and no obligation :will be recognized by the Company 
except to the extent and in the manne.r as herein set forth". 
As pointed out supra. in the Election of Instalment .Settle-
ment applicable to two of the policies the insured directed that 
the beneficiary 
'' shall not have t.he right at any time to commute, assign or 
encumber any stipulated payments yet to be made.'' 
Petitioner makes the following 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
First, to the action of tke court in adjudi.c.ating that pay-
ments 'Jl,OW due and payable, and to become due .wnd payable 
dwring the lifetime of Mrs. Hain, are exempt fr.om involwntary 
transfer mnd from subjection to her debts 0/nd liabilities by 
judicial process. 
8 econd, in adjudgi,ig that the bOJnk i,.'; vested witk title to 
the amount which may be payable 1.1,:1uler the certificate to her 
personal representative 'ttpon her dea.tli., arnd tha:t Bank's 
rights thereto are superior to tlwse of T'l'U$tee in B®krtl,1)tcy. 
Inasmuch .as the errors assigned involve questions of law 
they will be discussed in considering the several points of law 
involved. 
14• •1. What is the legal relationship between Metropoli-
tan OJnd Payee of its instalment certificate'I 
That the relationship between the insurance company and 
the beneficiary in these aeferred payment contracts consti-
tutes that of debtor and creditor is established by the de-
eisions .of the New York Court. Crossman O ompany v. R,auoh, 
263 N. Y. 264,188 N. E. 747, Uhl,11wm, v. New York Life ]'11,-
su-rance Company, 109 N. Y. 421, 17 N. E. ·363, 364, 4 A. S. A. 
482. . 
It is obvious Metropolitan is no trustee of this fund. It 
segregates no investments as property .of its payee. The cer-
tificate is not in form a declaration of trust. Neither is it 
a spendthrift trust. It is merely and only a promise of Metro-
politan to pay money in accordance with its terms. There is 
no relationship of trustee and oestui que trust. The Metropoli-
tan probably has no charter authority to conduct a trust busi-
ness. 
This certificate is not a contract of insurance but merely 
evidences the Company's obligation to the payee thereof. This 
is admitted by the Metropolitan's District Manager (R., pp. 
117-118). 
See also, M1.tt'Ual Bene.fit Life ln.s·urarwe Oomp(l!Jiy v. Ellis, 
et als., 125 Fed. (2d) 127, which involved a question of prop-
erty rights under an interest bearing certificate issued ·by the 
insurance company. The Appellate Court held that the ,con~ 
tract did not create a trust because of the obligation of -the 
company to pay interest and because there was no res. 
''·' • * • So, here, the funds which are allowed to remain with 
the insurance companies, bearing interest, clearly come within 
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this category of the State Personal Property Tax Act. The 
fact th~t, in their origin, they were the proceeds of insurance 
policies is immaterial. While insurance policies or their pro-
ceeds are not in themselves taxed by the act if the beneficiary, 
or the insured on her behalf, chooses to allow the companies 
to retain the proceeds and pay them in such manner and form 
as to constitute an interest..;bearing account, they thereby be-
come an investment which is taxable, irrespective of the source 
from which they were derived.'' 
'' 'Annuity' is a term somewhat loosely used in financial 
and l~gal nomenclature and is perhaps incapable of exact 
15• definition. , Generally speaking, it •designates a right-
bequeathed, donated or purchased-to receive fixed, 
periodical payments, either for life or a .number of years. Its 
determining characteristic is that the annuitant has an 
interest only in the payments themselves and not in any 
principal fund or source from which they may be derived. 
The purchaser of an annuity surrenders all right and title 
in and to the money he pays for it. On .the other hand, where 
a debtor agrees to pay his creditor in installments at regular 
intervals, the debt or principal sum itself is due to the creditor 
although payable only in the manner agreed upon; it is an 
account receivable in which he has a property interest. There-
fore, instalhnent payments of a debt, or payments of interest 
on a debt, do not constitute an annuity." 
Com. o.f Pa. v. Beisel, <--·---·· Pa. ---····, 13 A (2d) 419) 12~ 
A. L. R. 978 
16* *2. Did the debt have a. legal situs in Vir,qinia at the 
ti1ne of bankrn,ptcy for purposes of s1tccession b:11 tr'lls-
tee? . 
The principles to be applied . in determining the situs of 
debts are clearly set forth in Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901 
Edition, §121). With respect to legal and ach1al situs of debts 
this learned author says : 
'' But with respect to intangible chattels and choses in ac-
tion, such as bonds~ notes, hills of exchange, accounts, and 
debts of all sorts, certificates of stock, etc., different principles 
must be applied. Of course, the material evidence of the right, 
that is, the paper on ~vhic~ tl1e promise to pay is ,vritten, may 
11ave an actual locality~ it may occupy space. But this is 
merely the evidence of the right, the value of which lies in the 
fact that it will sutTice to entitle the owner to the valuable 
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property it represents. The value of the properity itself lies 
in the right of the creditor to enforce the obligation of the 
debtor to pay the debt. Such intangible rights can of course 
have no real situs, since they exist only in the mind's eye, 
but it frequently becomes necessary to assign them a situs 
somewhere, in order to ascertain the law properly applicable 
to them. 
'' Before laying down any rules for the determination of the 
situs of debts, it will repay us to notice briefly the dual mean-
ing of the term 'debt.' The phrases 'chose in action' and 
'deht' are often used as svnonvmous. But thev are rather 
correlative than synonymollS. They represent the same thing, 
but viewed from opposite sides. The 'chose in action' i~ the 
right of the creditor to be paid, while the 'debt' is the obliga-
tion of the debtor to pay. This distinction is ·brought out in 
the common phrase, 'the cho.ses in action and debts of a part-
nership, upon the death of one of the partners, ·survive.' 
Here both terms are nsed in the same sentence, but with op-
i)osite meanings; the former term signifying the firm's right to 
be paid certain sums of money, the latter signifying the firm's 
obligation to pay certain sums of money. Yet the term 
'debt' is often used indiscriminately to convey both these 
ideas. Much confusion has resulted from the failure to ob-
serve this distinction, and perhaps still more from· the failure 
to notice carefully the essential characteristics of these several 
conceptions. 
"The chose in action, or right of the creditor, is a personal 
right which adheres to him wherever his situs may be. It may 
for some purposes be his le,qal situs ( or domicil), for otherR 
his actital situs. Just as, in the case of tangible chattels, 
though the title thereto follows the owner, and its transfer 
will ·be regulated by the law o-f the owner's situs, yet his or 
his transferee's ab·ility to enforce that title may be in the ex-
ceptional cases determinable hy a different system of law 
should the chattels be actually ~dtuated elsewhere; so also in 
the case of debts, though the ril}ht to enforce them follows the 
owner ( the credifor), and his transfer is the ref ore to be 
governed by the law of his situs, actual $or legal, yet his 
17* or his transferee's ability to enforce that right may 
depend upon another jurisdiction and system of law, if 
he has to resort to another State to i:me the debtor. In other 
words, though the situs of the cre<litor's rig-ht follo,:1.rs the . 
creditor, the situs of the debtor's obligation follows the debtor, 
in the sense that the debtor's legal obligation exists only in 
the State where it can be enforced against him. 
"The delltor's obli~ation may be enforced in a proceeding 
in rem in any State where he has property, though he be absent 
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or a non-resident; or if in a proceeding in personani, the 
debtor must have been actually folmd within the court's jur~s-
diction and process served upon him there, or else he must 
have voluntarily appeared. It is not essential that the debtor's 
obligation should be enforced where he resides, though that 
will ordinarily be the place of its enforcement. 
''It will be seen therefore that, while the situs of the credi-
tor's right (chose in action) follows the creditor and corre-
sponds to tbe legal situs of tangible chattels, the situs of the 
debtor's obligation follows the actual situs of the debtor, or 
of his property (in case of a proceeding in reni to enforce it), 
and corresponds to the actual situs of tangible chattels. 
'' If these principles be kept clearly in mind there will be 
no difficulty in solving· most of the problems that present them-
selves involving the situs of debt, a subject upon which the 
decisions of the courts present the utmost confusion. The 
analogy between the situs of tangible chattels and the situs of 
debts is complete at every point. The legal situs. of debt, as 
in case of chattels, is the a,ctual or legal situs of the owner ( the 
creditor) according as the particular transaction in question 
involves the creditor's volimta,ry or inmolimtary participation 
therein. The a.ctual situs of the debt at a particular moment 
is the place where payment thereof may at that moment be 
enforced, whether by proceeding in rem or by proceeding in 
personani. If the former procedure is used, the actual situs 
of the debt will be the actual situs of the res subjected to its 
payment; if the latter, it will be the domicil of the debtor or 
some other State, according as he is sued in his own State or 
in the courts of another which have acquired jurisdiction over 
him by due process of law. 
'' And, as in the case of tangihle ehattels, the le,qal situs of 
the debt will furnish the 'prop.er law' governing transactions 
touching the transfer of the creditor's right, while, in the ex-
ceptional cases mentioned in the second chapter, the actual 
situs of the debt (and the forum) will be substituted therefor. 
The actual situs of the debt will be looked to also, as in the 
case of chattels, when the deht is the res in a proceeding in 
rem, the question being whether or not the court has juris-
diction of the res. 
'' These points will all be brought out more fully in the fol-
lowing sections. 
"It will be observed that the fact that the debt is con-
18*' tracted •or is ~ade paya11le by the debtor in a particula1· 
State, other than that of his domicil, though regarded as 
a circumstance of importance by some of the decisions in 
reality has nothing to do with the question, save only in so' far 
as the law of that place may determine whether or not the 
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debt is valid. It has no bearing upon the situs of a valid debt. 
That is independent of the place of contract. 
''Nor does the mere fact that the debt is secured upon land 
or chattels by mortgage, deed of trust, or otherwise affect its 
situs, save only where the debt is sought to be recovered by 
proceeding in rem against the debtor's property, and not by 
personal proceeding against the debtor; in which case the 
situs of the debtor's obligation (which is the actu.al situs of 
the debt) will be the actual situs of his property." 
In a recent case, Re Leibowitt (C. C. A. 3d) 93 F (2d) 333, 
115 A. L. R. 623, writ of certiorari denied in 303 U. 8. · 652, 
82 L. ed. 1113, 58 S. Ct. 7 50, holds : 
'' Ordinarily, the question whether a contract right to collect 
money in the future is one which may be levied upon or seized 
by equitable sequestration is one which must be determined 
by the law of the state in which the owner of such right is 
domiciled. '' 
. . 
In Cleveland, etc. Railroad Qompany v. Pennsylvania, 15 
"\Vall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. ed. 179, the Court says : 
"It is undoubtedly true that the actual situs of personal 
property which has a visible and tangible existence, and not 
the domicil of its owner, will1 in many cases, determine the 
state in which it may be taxed. The same thing is true of 
public securities consisting of state bonds and bonds of muni-
~ipal bodies, and circulating notes of banking institutions; the 
former, by general usage, have· acquired the character of and 
are treated as property, in the place where they are found, 
though·removed from t11e domicil of the owner; the latter are 
treated and pass as money wherever they are. But other 
personal property, consisting of bonds, mortgages and debts 
generally, has no situs independent of the domicil of the 
owner, and certainly can have none where the instruments, as 
in the present case, constituting the evidences of debt, are 
not separated from the possession of the owners.'' 
In Yost v. Gra.ham, 50 1V. Va. 199, 40 S. E. 361, the Court 
holds a debt has no situs and is deemed in contemplation of 
law to be attached to and to follow the person of the creditor. 
With reference to the situs of debt for purpose of garnish-
ment, Mr. Minor says : 
19• '*'" The true theory is that the situs of a debt, for pur-
poses of garnishment, is not only at the domicil of the 
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debtor, but in any State in which the garnishee may be found, 
provided the municipal law of that State permits the debtor 
to be garnished, and provided the court acquires jurisdiction 
over the garnishee, through his voluntary appearance or 
actual service of process upon him within the State. Of course 
in.most cases the question will arise in the garnishee's domi-
cil. '' (Minor, Conflict of Laws, §125, pages 289-290) 
The discussion of this learned author shows that a ''debt'' 
has dual characteristics when viewed from opposite sides. It 
represents, first, the obligation of the debtor to pay. This is 
called the debt. It represents, second, the chose in action 
which is the right of the credito1· to l1e paid. It follows that 
while the situs of the creditor's right ( chose in action) follows 
the creditor and corresponds to the legal situs of tangible 
· chattels, the situs of the debtor's obligation follows the actual 
situs of the debtor and corresponds to the actual situs of 
tangible chattels. 
Therefore, if in the .Court of the forum a debt owed by the 
original creditor is sought to be subjected by legal process 
against his debtor, and all three parties in interest, the 
original debtor (garnishee), the original creditor ( defendant 
in the garnishment proceedings,) and the claimant are all 
three before the court and are bound by its jud!,rment, no ques-
tion of conflict of laws is involved. The rights of no third 
person can be prejudiced by the judgment of the court. There 
can be no question of the double liability of the garnishee. 
It will be observed that the installments payable under the 
certificate are to be made to payee. No place of payment is · 
provided for. The payments are not expressly made payable 
at the office of the Company in New York. Apparently the 
Company intended that payments should he made at payee's 
residence. All payments which accrued before bankruptcy 
were mailed to the payee in Danville, Virginia. 
20* •"rt may be stated as a general proposition of law 
that debts, lJeing intangible, have no strictly legal situs, 
though for most purposes they a re given the situs of the 
creditor. However, for purposes of attachment by foreign 
creditors, they are by a legal fiction generally regarded as 
located where the debtor resides.''* • * 
""\Ve hold the law of this state to he in accord with the con-
clusion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Harris v. Balk. 198 U.S. 2U5, 25 S. Ct. 625. 626, 49 L. ed. 1023, 
3 Ann Ca.s. 1084: 'If there be a law of the state providing 
~or t11e attachment of fqe debt, then, if the garnishee be found 
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in that state, and process be personally served upon himthere-
in, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, 
and can garnishee the debt due from him to the debtor of the 
plaintiff, ancl condemn it, provided· the garnishee could him-
. self be sued by his creditor in tha.t state.' Parker, Peebles, 
db ICt1,ox v. National Fire Insurance Company of Hartforrl, 69 
A. L. R. 599 at 604; lllConn. 383, 150 Atl. 313. 
'' By the law of Virginia before July 1, 1850, incorporeal 
personal property, such as hi11s, notes, bonds, stocks, etc. 
( whlch are also called choses in action), was neither liable 
to levy under a fieri fa.cias, nor was that writ a lien on them, 
by virtue of which they could be -reached in any way to satisfy 
the creditor's judgment. The writ, hmyever, before July 1, 
1850, was a lien on all goods and chattels on which it could 
be levied from the time it was delivered to the sheriff; and at 
the revision of 1849 (taking effect July 1, 1850) it was en3:cted, 
in effect, that, though a fieri f acia.~ was not leviable on chose.<; 
in action, it should l1encefortli be a lien on them, and a method . 
was chalked out by wl1ich, by virtue of such lien, they might 
be made available to the creditor in satisfaction of 'l1is judg-
ment.'' 2 Y. L. R. 705 
That 1849 law, with some amendments, is now Sec. 6501 of 
the Virg-inia Code. This lien includes alJ choses in action to 
which the debtor is entitled. Evans v. Greenhaw, 15 Gratt. 
( 56 Va.) 153. In fact the lien extends to all the personal 
estate of the j1idgment debtor not canable of actual levy ex-
cept pro·perty which is exempt under Chapter 27 4 of the Code. 
21 * ., 'The question of the situs of the promise as a tech-
nical matter presents no difficulties. '.A debt is a legal 
relation between two parties and. if we think of facts, is situ-
ated at least as much with the debtor against whom th,1 ob-
ligation must be enforced as it is with the cr~ditor. .To say 
that ·a debt has a situs with the creditor is merelv to clothe a 
foregone conclusion with a fiction.' Safe Deposit, etc., Co. v. 
Virqinia. 280 U. S. 95, 97, 50 S. Ct. 59, 62, 74 L. Ed. 180, 67 
A. L. R.386. 
"For the purposes of ownership, the creditor's domicile 
is general1y re~ardcd determinative of the fictional locality 
of the debt. But since enforcement may be only where the 
debtor or his' property is found, the deht must be owned by 
the creditor the1·e as we11 as ownecl by the debtor. While as 
to ownersbin, 'debts can have no localitv separate from the 
parties to whom they nre due' (Cleveland, etc., Co. v. Pe'l,.tn.<ml-
11.an,ia, 15 Wall. 300,' 320, 21 L. ed. 179), in respect to enf orre-
ment, 'It is useless to say that a chose in action follows the 
. . . . 
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person of the creditor when the matter in hand is the enforce-
ment of payment by a suit at law.' 11 Harv. Law Rev. 101. 
'For the purpose of collection a debt is always ambulatory, 
and accompanies the person of a debtor.' 5 R. C. L. 931. This 
is the well-settled rule here.'' 
Robinson v. Datut (------- N. H. ------, 174 A. 772) 94 A. L. R. 
1441 
This case illustrates the proposition that with respect to 
enforcement where the court has jurisdiction of both the 
debtor and the creditor and the claimant the situs of the debt 
is from either the creditor's or the debtor's standpoint with 
the forum. 
"It may be stated as a general proposition of law that debts, 
being intangible, have no strictly legal situs, though for most 
purposes they are given the situs of the creditor. However, 
for purposes of attachment for foreign creditors, they are by 
a legal fiction generally regarded as located where the debtor 
resides''. • • • 
"We hold the law of this state to be in accord with the con-
clusion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S. Ct. 625, 626, 49 L. ed. 1023, 
3 Ann. Cas. 1084: 'If there be a law of the state providing 
for the attachment of the debt, then, if the garnishee be found 
in that state, and process be personally served upon him there-
in, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, 
and can garnishee the debt due from him to the debtor of the 
plaintiff, and condemn it, provided the garnishee could him-
self be sued by his creditor in that state.' '' Parker, Peebles, 
& Knox v. National Fire Insurance Cotnpany of Hartford, 69 
A. L. R. 599 at 604; 111 Conn. 383, 150 Atl. 313. 
On the question of situs of the 1·es, the court below cited 
Shannon v. Irving Tritst Company, 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 
792 and Hutchison v. Eoss, 262 'N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. ,65, 89 
A. L. R. 1007. 
22"" •rn the Shannon case a resident of New ~Jersey ex-· 
ecuted a trust indenture in New York to the Irving 
Trust Company of New York. The trust was for the benefit of 
the wife and son of tho settlor, both of whom were residents 
of and domiciled in New ,Jersey. The. property was delivered 
to the trustee in New ,Jersev where the trust was activelv ad-
ministered. The question was as to whether under New York 
law the provisions for accumulation of income were void .. 
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Under New Jersey law such accumulations were permitted. 
The trust agreement expressly provided that its validity 
should be determined bv the law of the settlor's domicile. that 
is New Jersey. The court says: . 
"(1-3) Much confusion has existed concerning the law that 
controls the validity and administration of inter vivos trusts 
of intangible personal property where the domicile of the 
settlor is in one _state and the situs and place of administra-
tion is in another. No invariable rule can be formulated for 
all cases involving varying facts. The domicile of the settlor 
is no longer the absolute and controlling consideration. 
Hittchison, v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65; Matter of 
Brown's Estate, 274 N. Y. 10, 8 N. E. (2d) 42. ·where the 
domicile of the owner of the res and the actual and business 
situs of the trust do not coincide, the law· applicable to the 
interpretation, construction, and validity of the trust and the 
legal obligations arising out of it and to taxation depend upon 
facts involved in and circumstances surrounding the particu-
lar case. In such a situation, the express or clearly implied 
intent of the settlor may control. Thus, where the actual and 
lmsiness situs of the trust, intent of the settlor that his domi-
ciliary law shall not be applied to test its validity and adminis-
tration, and domicile of the- trustee coincide, the law of the 
place of location and administration of the trust controls, re-
gardless of the place of execution of the trust instrument. 
Hittchison v. Ross, supra." 9 N. E. (2d) 793, 794. 
In Hutchison v. Ross, supra, John ~ss, a resident of Mon-
treal, married in Toronto in 1902. An ante-nuptial agreement 
was made so their property rights should be determined in ac-
rorcfance with the law of Quebec where they intended to rP-side 
and did after marriage. Subsequently, a trust was created in 
New York by the husband for the benefit of his wife, and the 
wife renounced all payments under the marriage settlement. 
The Court held that the validitv of the trust should be de-
termined by the law of the place of matrimonial domicile, 
wl1ich by the terms of tl1e marriage settlement was to regulate 
the property rights of the parties. · 
•Inasmuch as these cases deal with the situs of trusts 
23* we submit they are not controlling here. 
In this connection the following cases .are of interest. 
In re Berry, 247 F. 700, 41 A. B. R. 357 (1917; D. C. Mich.), 
Tuttle, J.: 
"It is well settled that whether any particular property of 
a bankrupt might have been transferred by him or levied upon 
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and sold under judicial process against him prior to the filing 
· of the petition in bankruptcy is a question to be determined 
by the laws of the State in which such property was located." 
In re. Shenberger, 102 F. 978, 4 A. B. R. 487 (1900; D. C. 
Ohio), Ricks, J'. : 
"·The test as to whether the property is of a character to 
pass, or not, depends upon the local laws governing the situa-
tion. If of such character that it is subject to levy and sale 
as property of the bankrupt under local laws, it passes to the 
trustee ; otherwise, it does· not.'' 
.•3. iW ould the debt pass to the Trustee in Rank-
24• ruptcy as '' property" as defined in the Bankruptcy 
Act? 
Under See. 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 
110 as amended in 1938, among other classes of property, the 
trustee of the estate of a bankrupt is vested by operation of 
law with the title of the bankrupt except in so far as it is to 
property which is held to be exempt to all 
( 5) property, including rights ·of action which prior to the 
filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred 
or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial 
process against him or otheru,ise se-ised, or sequestered. 
The words in italic8 were added by the 1938 amendment. 
This subsection excludes certain rights of action ex delicto 
''unless by the law of the State such rights of action are sub-
ject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration or 
other judicial process''. · . 
The trustee, under this subsection, also takes title ,to policies 
of insurance payable to the bankrupt or to his estate unless 
the bankrupt, within 30 days after the cash surrender value 
has been ascertained and stated, pays or secures this cash 
surrender value to the trustee, in which event the bankrupt 
continues to hold and own the policies free from the claims 
of creditors participating in the distribution of his estate 
under the bankruptcy J.Woccedings. 
Under subsection (6) "rights of action arising upon con-
tracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention of or 
injury to his property'' also pass to the trustee. 
The 1938 amendment added subsection 7 which makes '' con-
tingent remainders, executory devises and limitations, rights 
of entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities of re-
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verter, and like interests in real property, which were non-
assignable prior to bankruptcy'' pass t0. the trustee, if within 
six months after bankruptcy they '' become assignable 
interests or estates or give rise to powers in the bankrupt to 
acquire assignable interests or estates''. *Other prop-
25'"' erty rights which may vest in the bankrupt within sh: 
months after bankruptcy are also passed to the trustee 
under subsection 8. 
Other cognate sections of the Bankruptcy Act specifically 
vest title to property in the Trustee. For example, Sec. 47, 
11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 75 (a), as amended in 1938, provides that 
'' Trustees shall collect. and reduce to money the property 
of the estates for which thcv are Trustees under the direction 
of the Court''. " 
Sec~ 2 (7) 11 U.S. C. A. Sec. 11(7) authorizes the courts of 
bankruptcy to cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected 
and liquidated. By these sections it was clearly intended that 
every species of property not legally exempt should be made 
available for the benefit of creditors. 
,Sec. 6, 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 24, as amended in 1938 provides 
in part, 
'' This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of 
the exemptions whi~h arc prescribed by the laws of the United 
States or by the State laws in force at the time of the filing 
of the petition in the State wl,.erein they have had their domi-
cile for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the 
petition, or for a. longer portion of sucl1 six months than in 
any other State e * *. '' 
United Stutes statutes exempt pensions, soldier's bonuses 
and the like. 
Exemptions prescribed by the '' State Laws'' of Bankrupt's 
domicile for the six months immediately preceding the filing 
of the petition, or for a longer portion of said six months, 
certainly refer to statutes. 
Does the Bankruptcy Act not also refer to the State law of 
bankrupt's- domicile the determination of all questions of 
lia·bility of his property which has legal situs in the State of 
his domicile? 
Certainly the bankruptcy courts, having the administration 
of bankrupt estates, must look to the local law to determine 
the title of the property as well as all conflicting c.Ja.ims to 
property which bas a legal situs within the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court. 
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26• * After the 1910 amendment Sec. 47 (a) (2) U.S. C. A., 
Title 11, Sec. 75, as to all property of the bankrupt in the 
custody or coming into the custody of the court the trustee 
was vested with the rights of a lien creditor and as to prop-
erty not in the custody of the court to all rights of a judgment 
creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied. 
By the 1938 amendment this provision was deleted from 
Sec. 47 and enacted as a part of the amended Sec. 110 (c). 
As amended the provision now reads : 
'' The trustee, as to all property in the possession or under 
the control of the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy or other-
wise coming into the possession of the bankruptcy court, shall 
be deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy with all the 
rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien 
thereon by legal or equitable proceeding·s, whether or not such 
a creditor actually exists; and, as to all other property, the 
trustee shall be deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy 
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment credi-
tor ·then holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied, 
whether or not such a creditor actually exists.'' 
As to what law governs the determination of the trustee's 
title and rights it is said, 
'' In all the several ·branches of the discussion of the trus-
tee's title and rights, whether they be those derived as suc-
cessor of the bankrupt or of the creditors, or be those in-
dependently conferred by the special provisions of the bank-
ruptcy act itself, it is to be borne constantly in mind that the 
state law determines the efficiency of acts and transactions to 
effect the transfer of title of the property involved and also 
the tinie of the passing of title.'' Vol. 4 Remington on Bank-
ruptcy (4th ed.) Sec. 1405. 
''Where not affected by the peculiar provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the law of the State will control in bankruptcy 
as to the validity of mortgages and other liens, and as to 
ownership and otl1er interests in property.'' Vol. 4 Reming-
ton on Bankruptcy (4th ed.) Sec. 1406. 
This author points out that in consideration of the citations 
and quotations which he makes in subsequent paragraphs of 
this section care must be taken to distinguish between the 
cases cited or quoted as to whether they arose before or after 
the 1910 amendment to Sec. 47 (a} (2) U. S. C. A., Title 11, 
Sec. 75, whereby the trustee was lifted out of his former 
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situation "in the bankrupt's shoes" and was given the stand-
ing of a '' creditor armed with process''. This provision of 
the bankruptcy law was before the Virginia court i)in 
27• Nusbaum v. City Bank, 132 Va. 54, 110 S. E. 363. 
There the Virginia court quotes with approval the following 
from Remington on Bankruptcy. 
'' It is doubtless true that the trustee's title since the amend-
ment of 1910 is the most extensive and complete of any in 
jurisprudence''. 
It would seem fundamental that the law of a bankrupt's 
domicile where his estate is being administered must govern 
all questions of a trustee's right to subject the bankrupt's 
property under execution if that property has a situs -in the 
State. 
In Volume 3, Remington on Bankruptcy ( 4th ed.) Sec. 1229, 
it is said 
"vVhere beneficiaries have vested interest and are there-
after adjudicated, their interest will pass.'' * • • 
'' Insurance contracts take many forms, according to their 
subject matter, as, for example, life insurance, fire insurance, 
liability insurance, disability insurance, accident insurance 
and credit insurance. Annuity contracts a.re of similar nature. -
The passing of the interest of a bankrupt in an insurance 
policy to his trustee depends upon the application of two 
sections of the Bankruptcy Act. First, §6, 11 U. S. C. A. §24, 
provides for the allowance of exemptions prescribed by state 
or Federal law. If property is exempt, it does not pass to 
the trustee. The first problem presented when a bankrupt 
is found to have insurance of anv kind is to determine 
whether or not it is exempt. This involves reference to 
the law of the state of the bankrupt's domicile. The second 
statutory provision which applies is §70 (a), 11 U. S. C. A. 
~110 (a). This section vests in the trustee by operation of law 
all the property of the bankrupt which is not exempt and 
which is comprised within eight clauses. Three of these clauses 
are wide enough in their scope to include a bankrupt's interest 
in insurance policies, and one of them specifically mentions 
such policies in a proviso. The effect of the joint application of 
§§6 and 70, 11 U.S. C. A. §§24 and 110 upon the insurance 
of bankrupts has given rise to much difference of opinion in 
the lower Federal courts. The Supreme Court has resolved 
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the conflict. This calls for attention first.'' Remington on 
Bankruptcy, Volume 3 (4th ed.) §1229, 170-171. 
"The test to be applied under §70a(5) is twofold: at the 
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy could the prop-
erty· have been (1) transferred by the bankrupt, or (2) levied 
upon and sold under judicial process against him, or other-
wise seized, impounded~ or sequestered Y This test is simple 
and easily applied. If neither one of the conditions can be 
met, the property does not pass to the trustee by virtue of 
clause (5). Generally speaking, however, it is not necessary 
that both conditions be satisfied. Aside from an •ex-
28*' ception created by the Act itself, if the property in ques-
tion is transferable, it is not essential that it also be 
subject to levy or seizure. Conversely, if the property is sub-
ject to levy and sale or seizure but is not transferable, it is 
likewise an asset of the bankrupt estate. This was recognized 
by the Supreme Court in Pa.(Je v. Edmum,ds, where the court 
said, with regard to a stock exchange_ seat: 
'' 'Was the seat in the stock exchange property which could 
have been by any means transferred, or which might have 
been levied upon and sold under judicial process Y If the seat 
was ·subject to either manner of disposition, it passed· to the 
trustee of the appellant's estate.' '' Collier on Bankruptcy 
(Vol. 4, § 70.15) 
'' The rule is that where property is held in trust for one 
who becomes bankrupt, the bankruptcy trustee, upon his ap-
pointment, becomes vested with any interest in the trust estate 
or fund the bankrupt had, .provided that a;t the time of the 
filing of the petition such interest was under §70a(5) capable 
of being assigned or transferred by the bankrupt or was sub-
ject to attachment, seizure or judicial sale. Whether the l>ank-
rupt 's interest as a cestui quc trust was, at the time of the 
bankruptcy, assignable or transferal1le, or subject to attach-
ment, seizure or judicial sale, are matters generally to be 
determined by the law of state where the trust property either 
real or personal, is located. Of-.coursc, in the rare case where 
the trust is one created and controlled bv federal law, that 
law will goyem." Collier on Bankruptcy (Vol. 4, §70.26) 
'' Of course, the laws of the various states differ widely in 
their attitude toward lire irnmrnnce policies, annuity contracts 
and the like. ·what may he exempt in one state may be non-
exempt in another. Nevertheless, the matter of exemption 
is left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law, and in determining 
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what those laws are the bankruptcy court must be guided by 
the state court decisions thereon.'' Collier on Bankruptcy 
(Vol. 4, §70.23) 
"Upon adjudication, title to the bankrupt's .property vests 
in the trustee with actual or constructive possession, and is 
placed in the custody of the bankruptcy court. * * • The title 
and right to possession of all property owned and possessed 
by the bankrupt vests in the tru~tee as of the date of the 
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, no matter whether situated 
within or without the district in which the court sits. * * * It 
follows that the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction 
to deal with the property of the bankrupt estate. It may 
order a sale of real estate lying outside the district. * * * When 
this jurisdiction has attached the court's possession cannot be 
affected -by actions brought in other courts.'' Isaacs v. Hobbs 
Tie & Tfmber Co., 282 U. S. 734, at 737; .75 L. ed. 645 .. 
29* *COMMENTS ON CHANCELLOR'S OPIN[ON 
AND ANALYSIS OF CASES CITED ON QUESTION 
OF WHAT LAW SHOULD GOVERN TRUSTEES' TITLE 
TO BANII(RUPT'S PROPERTY 
The learned Chancellor below in his opinion states 
'' ·whether she could have transferred the payments due 
her from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company is a ques-
tion of State law . .'' 
Petitioner admits that questions of the passing of title to 
property· to bankrupt 'R trustee depend upon State law. The 
question is what State law applies. Is it not always the State 
law of bankrupt's domicile as defined by the Bankruptcy Act 
unless the situs of the property such as real estate, tangible 
personal property or a trust estate has a situs in some foreign 
State? 
The Court below cited the following primary and secondary 
authorities which, as we understand, merely establish the 
principle that in determining- title of the trustee in bankruptcy 
to trust propert11 owned ·by the bankrupt this is to be done ac-
cording to .the law of the State in which the trust propertv 
has its situs. .. 
In Eaton, Trustee in Bankrupfr.J/, v. Bostmi Safe Depo.c~it 
<11 Tru,r;t Company, 240 U. S. 427, 36 S. Ct. 391, 60 L._ ed. 723 
the Trust Company, as testamentary trustee under the wiII 
of Mrs. Fannie L. Luke, filed its hill in the State Court in 
Massachusetts for instructions to as~ertain whether a trust 
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fund of $75,000.00 which it held as trustee under the will 
passed to Mrs. Luke's trustee in bankruptcy. 
The income of said trust and so much of the principal as was 
necessary to insure her $3,000.00 income for life was provided 
for in testator's will. 
The terms of the· trust were that '' the income (was) to be 
free from the interference or control of her creditors''. 
Under the Massachusetts law, which recognizes that a donor 
may, in creating an equitable estate, carve out and create such 
equitable rights in property as his fancy may dictate, with-
out regard to the rights appertaining •to the several 
30* estates known to the law, her Courts have held that a 
general trust which carried a provision that income 
should be free from inter£ erence and control of the bene-
ficiary's creditors is to be considered and treated in its legal 
significance as a technical spendthrift trust. 
This trust estate was being administered in Massachusetts,. 
it was created by a Massachusetts will and the trustee of the 
estate resided there. There appears to be no question of con-
flict of laws involved. The bankrupt's estate was apparently 
also being administered in Massachusetts and the trustee was 
a party to the proceeding. 
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Holmes, says : 
'' The policy of the bankruptcy act is to respect State ex-
emptions, and until Massachusetts decisions shall have gone 
farther than they yet have ·we are not prepared to say that the 
present bequest is not protected by the Massachusetts rule''. 
Petitioner admits that the situs of trust estates is w·ith the 
trustee in the State in which the trust is being administered. 
Hull v. Farmers' Loan arnd Trust Company, 245 U. S. 312, 
38 S. Ct. 163, 62 L. ed. 312, was an appeal from the Supreme 
Court of the .State of New York. Testator, Charles Palmer, 
of New York City, bequeathed $50,000.00 in trust, the income 
to go to his son, Francis, during his life, with the remainder 
over to others, subject to the 
''wish 11 * * that my son shall have the principal of said 
trust fund, whenever he shall become financially solvent and 
able to pay all his just debts and liabilities from resources 
other than the principal of the trust fund.'' 
Shortly after probate of the will testator's son, Francis, 
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was in due time 
discharged from his debts. Thereafter, the Trust Company 
instituted proceedings in the Surrogate court in New York 
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for a judicial settlement of the estate. The Court adjudging 
that Francis had become entitled to the principal of the trust 
fund it was paid over to him. Later., the Trustee in 
31 * Bankruptcy., who had not *been a party to proceedings 
in the Surrogate court, brought suit in the Supreme 
Court of N:ew York against the Trust Company and Francis 
to recover the principal. The Court says: 
'' This is not a case where a testator seeks to bequeath prop-
erty which shall be free from liability for the beneficiary's 
debts * • "'. Here t.he testator has merely prescribed the con-
dition on which he will make a gift of the principal'' 
No question of conflict of laws arises, as the bankrupt was 
adjudged in New York, the trust estate had a situs there and 
all parties were before the court. 
In Siiskin & Berry v. Rif;mley, 37 F (2d) 304, 68 A. L. R. 
768, 15 A. B. R. (N. S. 232) (1930 C. C. A. N. C.) Bayard 
Taylor, a resident of North Carolina, was there adjudged 
bankrupt. The question involved was whether the bankrupt 
had "such an interest in a trust estate in Maryland, under 
the will of a former resident of that State, as passed to his 
trustee in bankruptcy and was subject to sale in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings". The bankruptcy interest in this trust 
estate was sold by order of the Referee to Suskin and Berry, 
one of the creditors of his estate, for $325.00. Bankrupt was 
one of the children of Mary C. Taylor, who was still living. 
The interest of the bankrupt arose under the will of Cecil C. 
Buckman of Baltimore, Mrs. Taylor's brother. Bankrupt's 
interest was. wholly contingent. His mother, a life tenant, 
was entitled to the net income in a trust estate of $150,000.00 
and at her death this trust fund was to be "divided among 
and paid over to the then living issue or descendants of my 
Raid sister per stirpes and not per capita". This contingent 
remainder was set up as a technical spendthrift trust. Testa-
tor expressly directed t11at '' no such beneficiary shall be en-
titled at any time to alienate, anticipate or encumber, his, her 
or their share of the income or principal, and that the same 
shall at no time be liable to be taken or attached for his, her 
or their debts". 
All of the property constituting this trust estate was 
32* held by the •Mercantile Trust and Deposit Company of 
Baltimore, Maryland, as trustee. The Court held that 
under the law of Maryland, as well as the general rule else-
where, ·bankrupt's interest constituted a contingent remainder. 
Under the law of Maryland a contingent .remainder cannot be 
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levied upon and sold for the debts of the contingent remainder-
men. In the opinion the Court says : 
'' The case at bar illustrates the wisdom of the Maryland 
rule. The trust estate here appears to have a value of many 
thousands of dollars. The bankrupt has no interest in it now,. 
and it is not certain that he will ever have an interest therein. 
If he should not survive his mother, he not only will not be 
entitled to an interest, but will ~ever have been among the 
class entitled to an interest. For this reason the value of his 
expectancy is entirely speculative and no one is willing to pay 
any considerable amount for it, and it has been sold to one 
of his creditors in this proceeding for the paltry sum of $325. 
As said by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in the case cited 
above, it is unjust that a creditor should seize and destroy 
an interest of his debtor which is so uncertain and contingent 
that it cannot be fairly sold or appraised. • • • 
"But there is another reason why, under the law of Mary-
land, the interest or expectancy of bankrupt in the trust estate 
could not have been transferred by him or levied upon and 
sold under judicial process against him; and that is that the 
will creating the trust estate specifically provides that the 
'iucome and ultimately the principal thereof' shall be paid 
over to the respective beneficiaries and to no one else, and 
that 'no such beneficiary shall be entitled at any time to 
alienate, anticipate or encumber, his, her, or their share of 
the income or principal, and that the same shall not be liable 
to be taken or attached for his, her or their debts'. There 
can be no question that this creates a valid spendthrift trust 
under the laws of Maryland, and that no interest in the prop-
erty subject thereto can be aliened or transferred by any 
beneficiary or reached in satisfaction of his debts.'' 
A statement of the facts involved and of the Court's opinion 
clearly distinguishes the above case from the ease at bar. 
Custody of the trust estate was with the trustee and had its 
actual and legal situs in Maryland. It was a valid spend-
thrift trust executed in Maryland and there being adminis-
tered. 
In the case at bar there is no trm:t ei;;tate, no contingent 
interest but a vested legal right in property. 
33* •Remington on Bankruptcy, Vol. 3 ( 4th Ed.) Sec. 
1189, says 
''The determination of the question whether a property 
interest of the bankrupt passes to the trustee under Clause 
5 (of Sec. 70 A) may depend not upon tl1e law of the bank-
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rupt 's residence, hut on the law of the State where the prop-
erty subject to the interest is situated.'' 
To support this the author cites S'U,skin and Berry v. Ri1..1n-
ley, su,pra, and Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U. S. 542, 28 L. ed. 512, 
4 S. Ct. 542. In this case, the bankrupt proceedings were in 
Illinois, the assignee, Spindle, sought to subject an equitable 
interest in certain real estate, situate in Chicago, alleged to 
be the property of the bankrupt and assets belonging to his 
estate. 
Bankrupt's father died at his domicile in Kentucky. His 
will was probated and recorded in that Sta.te. Testator de-
vised one-fifth of his estate to his son, Chades, '' subject to 
such conditions and restrictions as are hereinafter named". 
Testator directed that one-half of each share given to his 
five children invested in income paying real estate should be 
conveyed to a trustee for the use of such children during his 
or her life and then to descend as directed, without any power 
or right on the part of the child to encumber said estate or 
anticipate the rents tl1ereof, all rents to be collected by the 
trustee. The other half of each share was devised outright 
to his five children. The property assigned to bankrupt was 
situate in Chicago but was conveyed upon the same trust.· The 
Court said, 
''It cannot be doubted that it is competent for testators and 
grantors, by will or deed, to construct and establish trusts, 
lloth of real and personal property, and of the rents, issues, 
profits and produce of the same, by appropriate limitations 
and powers to trustees, which shall secure the application of 
such bounty to the personal and family uses during the life 
of the beneficiary, so that it shall not he subject to alienation, 
either by voluntary act on his part, or in invititm, by his credi-
tors. The limits, within which such provisions may be made 
and administered, of course, must be found in the la-w of that 
jurisdiction which is the situB of the property, in case of real 
estate, and in cases of personalty, where the trust was created 
or is to be administered according to circumstances. .And in 
determining those limits, that law declares how fa.r and by 
what forms and modes, tlrn institution of property may be 
permitted to accommodate itself to the will and convenience 
of individuals, without prejudice to public interest and policy; 
by what limitations and instruments its usual incidents mav 
be affected and altered, so as to effectuate tl1e intentions of 
parties: how far the dominion, implied in the idea of 
34• property, *may be extended so as to limit the future do-
minion of those who succeed to its beneficial enjoyment. 
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"It follows, therefore, tha.t the judgment in each case must· 
be determined by the positive provisions of the law of the 
locality which governs it, and the particular terms of the in-
strument by which the scheme is framed.'' 
It is petitioner's contention that the foregoing cases relied 
upon by bankrupt below and cited in support of the quotation 
in Remington on Bankruptcy, supra, do not conflict with 
petitioner's claim that the situs of an ordinary contract obliga-
tion payable to a bankrupt should be ref erred to the bank-
rupt's domicile as defined in the Bankruptcy Act. 
All of these cases deal with the situs of property which 
forms a part of a trust estate. It is generally conceded that 
a trust estate acquires a domicil of its ovm in the state where 
it is being administered. The title to trust property is with 
the trustee who has dominion and control over it and for these 
practical reasons trust property acquires a separate situs. 
The location of the administration of a trust, or the ·situs 
of a trust, means the place of the performance of the active 
duties of the trustees. 
Fisher v. American Siirety Company of New York 
( ...... vVis ....... , 277 N. W. 160) 115 A. L. R. 790, and extended 
note. 
'' • • • The administration by the trustee is the action of the 
trustee in carrying out the duties of the trust. In what securi-
ties can he invest? ·what interest should he receive on in-
vestments? To whom should he pay the income1 These are 
questions of administration.'' Comment (a), Restatement, 
Conflict of Laws, under Sec. 297. 
See generally, Beale Conflict of Laws (1935) Sec. 297 .1, Vol. 
II, page 1023. 
35• •4. If the "debt'' due Vfrgin:ia Bankrupt represents 
proceeds of life insurance policies in, which Bankrupt 
was beneficiary which were left with C01npany upon death of 
1'1'1;S'l_tred, are such proceeds exenipt from legal process in Vir-
gvnia; 
(a) Where ori.qinal policies anrl. supvlementary contract 
held by be·neficiary expressly provide that instalment pay-
ments thereumder shall be free from debts a,nd legal liabili-
tie_~c; of b ene fi.ciary, 
(b) Where insur'!nce poli?1'es contain, no such provisions, if 
there are statutes in effect i~ the home office state of issuing 
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·company which exenipt su,ch proceeds /~om. debts of bene-J!,ci-
ary do such statutes have any e.'lJ territorial effect against 
rights of creditors armed with legal process who bring action 
v,i state where beneficiary residesf 
It is claimed by defendants that the exemption laws of 
New York form a part of the contract between Joseph Hal-
berstadt and Metropolitan and that this must be inf erred be-
cause the original p~licies were made payable in New York. 
vY e do not concede that any such inference should be drawn 
but prefer to argue the· question as though the exemption 
statutes of New York were expressly incorporated in the 
contract. 
Three cases were relied upon by defendants and cited by 
the learned judge below. We now ref er particularly to these 
cases. 
One of the cases relied on by defendants below is from an 
inferior court of Georgia, Citizens and Southern National 
Bank v. Fran,k Palmer and Aetna Life Insurance Company, 
decided by the municipal court of Savannah. 
The Bank issued garnishment process against the insur-
ance company as garnishee and ~Irs. Frank Palmer as debtor. 
Debtor's late husband had life insurance with garnishee. The 
policy contained a beneficiary agreement 
''that all monies payable or retained hereunder whether of 
principal or interest shall be free from claims of credi-
36'» tors of the beneficiary or (lcbeneficiaries and from all 
legal process to levy upon or attach the same". 
This provision is authorized by a Connecticut statute where 
tl1e Aetna Company is domiciled. This statute, Sec. 4193 of 
the Code provision of 1930 provides 
'' Any domestic life insurance company shall have power 
to hold the proceeds of any policy issued by it under a trust 
or other agreement upon such terms and restrictions as to 
revocation by the policyholder and control by beneficiaries 
and with such exemptions from claims of creditors of bene-
ficiaries other than the policyholder as shall have been agreed 
to in writing by such company and the policyhqldcr. Such 
insurance company shall not be required to segregate funds 
so held but may hold them as part 0£ its general corporate . 
assets.'' 
It was stipulated in the case that the policy constituted 
a Connecticut contract and that 
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'' if this case was pending in a court of :Connecticut that 
court would hold ·the funds to be exempt under a Connecti-
cut statute.'' 
The Savannah municipal court held that as it was admitted 
the parti~s had contracted with reference to the law of Con-
necticut and that the contract was governed by the laws of 
Connecticut, that it would be a denial of the full faith and 
credit clause of ·the Constitution n.ot to give force and effect 
to the Connecticut contract in Georgia. . 
In other words, the court held that the provision exempt-
ing the payments to be made under the insurance contract 
from liability for the beneficiary's debts was to be consid-
ered as a contract right valid in the state where the contract 
:was made and to be performed and that the exemption laws 
·of the state of the forum being in conflict with those of the 
place of contract should not apply as such laws are merely 
a matter of the remedy and not a contract right. 
The Georgia court cites the case of Awn.is v. Pilkewitz, 287 
Mich. 68, 282 :N. W. 905. 
In this case, which is cited by the court below, a judgment 
·creditor's bill was filed by Annis against Mrs. Pilkewitz, 
judgment debtor, and New York Life Insurance Company. 
The policies contained the f Qllowing provisions: 
37'"' *'' The benefits under said trust shall not be trans-
ferable nor subject to commutation or encumbrance, nor 
except in an action to recover for necessaries shall said com-
pany as trustee, or otherwise, pay or be liable to pay any 
benefits under said trust to any person, firm or corporation 
except to said beneficiary personally, or to a guardian for 
said beneficiary during minority. 
'' This appointment is made and delivered at the home 
office of said cnmpany in the city of New York where said 
trust is to be performed. All payments thereunder are to 
be made at said home office. Said trust is to be subject to 
and g·overnecl by the laws of the State of New York and not 
subject to or governed by the laws of any other place, and 
especially is to be p:overned bv Chanter 327 of the Laws of · 
New York. 1911. which amends Section 15 of the Personal 
Property Law of the State of New York. 'relatin~· to trust 
funds, bv providin~· that when tl1e proceeds of a life insur-
ance policv becoming a claim l)y the deat]1 of the insured, 
are left witl1 the insurance companv under a trust, the bene-
fits accruing thereunder after the death of the insured, shall 
not be transferable, nor subject to ·commutation or encum-
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brance, nor to legal process except in an action to recover 
for necessaries.'' 
The ,Court held that, while the relationship between the 
insurance company and the judgment debtor was that of 
debtor and creditor, the provisions of the contract expressly 
incorporated the statutory exemption laws of 1New York as 
a part thereof and that the contractual relations of the par-
ties being- valid in the State of their origi~ where, by the ex-
press terms of the contract, it was to be executed, the terms 
of the contract should be given effect instead of the laws of 
the State of the forum. , 
The substance of the Court's conclusion is in these words, 
"The substantive provisions of a contract, valid by the 
law of the State where the contract is made and is to be per-
formed, create a right of property enforceable in anothei' 
jurisdiction provided it is not contrary to the public policy 
of the forum.'' 
It is our contention that this case is distinguishable from 
the Hain case on the following grounds : 
1. It does not involve the title of a trustee in bankruptcy. 
2. The New York law and the New York exemption statute 
are expressly made a part of the contract. . 
3. All payments under the ·contract were to be made in 
New York. 
4. The contract was made and delivered in New York. 
38* *Petitioner further contends that provisions of sup-
plementary contracts similar to the one involved in the 
Anni;;; case are contrary to established public policy in Vir-
gfaia. If these contracts are recog·nized as valid in states 
where t:µe beneficiaries reside, the result is to give ex terri-
torial effect to exemption laws of a state other than the place 
of residence of the bankrupt. 
Such contracts are of course encouraged by the New York 
legislature, because it induces insureds and beneficiaries to 
leave funds with the New York companies on a debtor-creditor 
basis, at a small rate of interest. If such contracts are g·iven 
ex territorial effect generally by the courts of the country, 
eventually a great portion of the wealth of the nation will 
be controlled in states in which insurance companies have 
their home offices and will be made exempt from debts and 
legal liabilities of the owner at the place of his domicile. If 
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by such an arrangement property of the debtor may be made 
exempt from his legal liabilities, New York could be made 
its situs for taxation and for purposes of succession and the 
whole economic life of the country will be largely controlled 
from the large financial centers rather than by the laws of 
the state in which the beneficial owner of ·the contract re-
sides. 
39* *In the Court below Mrs. Hain relied upon, and the 
Court cited, Michaelson Y. Sokolove (Md.), 182 Atlantic 
458. In that case the life insurance policy provided that the 
insured might select one of several specified modes of settle-
ment in favor of the beneficiary. The insured exercised the 
option and directed that the amount payable under the policy 
at his death should be paid in monthly instalments. The policy 
further provided if a supplementary contract was issued to 
evidence the deferred payments that 
''neither the supplementary contract nor any of the benefits 
accruing thereunder shall be transferable or subject to sur-
render, commutation or encumbrance, except that at the 
death of the last surviving payee the then surrender value 
* • * shall be payable to the executors or administrators of 
such payee''. 
When the insured exercised this option and selected this 
mode of settlement with his beneficiary the form which he 
executed contained the foregoing provisions and also the 
further provision that neither the contract nor any benefits 
accruing thereunder should be 
''in any way subject to the debts of any beneficiary or payee 
or to legal process except as otherwise provided by law". 
These provisions were included in the supplementary con-
tract issued after the insured 's death to his widow. 
Notwithstanding the contract, the widow assignee~ 
"all her right, title and interest in and to the payments" 
of $100.00 per month, to which she was entitled under the 
policies, to her creditor as additional security for the pur-
chase price of certain shares of stock. 
The vendor of the stock sued the widow, in an equitable 
proceeding, and also sought to restrain the insurance com-
pany from making further payments to her. 
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It appears that the plaintiff creditor had knowledg·e of the 
non-assignability of the supplementary contract when he at-. 
tempted to . ~ecome assignee thereof. 
40* *This case clearly holds that the provision against 
assignment or transfer was valid and binding on the 
assignee and that ''it would not be permissible for the in-
surance company to disregard that provision of its contract 
with insured, nor to assume the right to waive it in favor of 
an assignee by whom it had been ignored. It could not prop-
erly be regarded as a restriction imposed simply for the in-
surer's benefit and convenience.·'' 
If this Mary land case is followed by the Virginia Court 
it will require a holding in the case at bar that the volun-
tary assignment made by Mrs. Hain to American National 
Bank and Trust Company is not valid. 
Insofar as the rights of Mrs. Hain 's trustee in bankruptcy 
are concerned the case is distinguishable because in the Hain 
case there is no provision in the contract whereby its pro-
ceeds are exempt from the claim of her creditors and such 
exemption, not being a spendthrift trust, is not valid under 
the laws of Virginia. 
This question was before the 7th U. S. 0. C. A. ilfl, re 
Power, 115 F. (2d) 69. 
An annuity contract had been issued by the insurance 
company under which it agreed to pay $100.00 a month for 
204 months to Power if living, otherwise to his wife if living, 
etc. Power became bankrupt and claimed the benefits of 
this contract as exempt. 
The contract provided: "Neither of the annuitants nor 
the beneficiary under the contract shall have the right to 
transfer or assign, or to anticipate his or her right to the 
annuity payments thereunder.'' 
The court says : '' The interest of the bankrupt in the an-
nuity contract is a valuable one. Under it he receives $100 a 
month for life. It is not a life insurance policy and does not 
come within the provisions of the second proviso of section 
70, sub. a ( 5), of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A. 
41 * §110, *sub. a(5). It was purchased and paid for in full 
by the bankrupt, and by section 39-704, Burns' Indiana 
Statutes of 1933 it is excepted from the class of insurance 
and annuity contracts which are not subject to process 
against a beneficiary for the payment of his debts. The 
interest of the bankrupt under the contract passed to the 
trustee to be administered as a part of the estate.'' Matter 
of Po~er (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), 44 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 350, 115 
F~ (2d) 69, 72. 
It is the theory of petitioner that as the instalment con-
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tract was delivered in Virginia to Cecelia Halberstadt when 
she was a Virginia resident it should be interpreted accord-
ino- to the law of Virginia. If the original policies had been 
delivered in Virginia to Joseph Halberstadt they would have 
been interpreted according to Virginia law. 
Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Johnson, Adm'r. (From 
the Western District of Virginia), 293 U. S. 335, 55 S. Ct. 
154, 79 L .. Ed. 398. 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co1npany v. J. Wil-
liam McCite (From Western District of Virginia), 223 U. 
S. 234, 32 S. Ct. 220, 56 L. Eel. 419, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57. 
Public policy requires that a debt be given a situs for pur-
poses of administration, for purposes of taxation, for pur-
poses of succession and property taxes, and for purposes 
of garnishm~nt. It seems to be a principle of universal ap-
plication that debts owing by ·corporations or individuals are 
not property of the debtor in any sense. Whatever prop-
·erty there can be in such debts belong to the creditors 
42* to whom they are payable and follows their domicile, 
*wherever that mav be. Any other rule would lead to 
the greatest confusion. ..A person· might live and die in Vir-
ginia and if a debt payable to him is held to have a legal 
situs in a foreig·n State he and his estate may escape all 
taxation and his property may not be liable for his debts un-
der the exemption laws of the foreig11 .State of his debtor. 
In Griffin v. McCoach, Trustee, .... U. S ..... , 85 L. Ed . 
. . . . , 61 S. Ct. 1023, 134 A.· L. R. 1462, the U. S. Supreme 
Court announces the principles applicable in determining 
wh~t law governs an ins~rance policy and whether the public 
pohcy of the forum pernnts recovery on the policy by a bene-
ficiary having no insurable intereRt in the life of the insured, 
and l1olds that Federal courts a re bound to follow decisions 
of courts of the State in which it sits and that the principle 
that rights acquired by contract outside a State will be en-
forced within tI1e State, at least w]Jere its own citizens are 
concerned, is inapplicable, where the claimed rights are so 
contrary to the law of the forum, as to subvert its view of 
public policy. . 
In a note on Federal Constitution and conflict of laws as 
to rights not based on judgments, the learned annotator says: 
. '.'Under the la": as it now stands expounded by the de-
cisions of the Umted States Supreme Court, there can be 
no question as to the fact of such restriction. AI)d the only 
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question that arises, and which bv no means can be regarde.d 
as yet settled, is as to the extent of such restriction. On 
the one hand it is clear that the freedom under the rules of 
comity to decline enforcement of foreign rights ( affirmative 
or defensive) is limited by the constitutional provisions as 
to full faith and credit and due process of law; on the other 
hand it is also clear that this limitafam is not ab-solute, but 
qualified, and that under some circumstances at least, a court 
of the forum may decline to give effect to the rights acquired 
under the statute of another state, or even give effect to 
its own statute or policy in subordination of the foreign 
statute. The field left open to the state for free action be-
tween these two limits has been marked by the United States 
Supreme Court from time to time in recent years by in-
clusion and exclusion of particular classes of cases, ori. the 
principle of balancing the governmental interests of the two 
competing states in the subject of the litigation. 
"Under this test the following conclusions are reached: 
'' (1) If there exists in the state of the forum a statute or. 
a public policy, and the governmental interests of that state 
in the persons, property, or events in the state involved in 
the litigation outweig·hs the governmental *interests 
43* of the foreign state for whose statute recognition is 
sought, the refusal of the courts of the· forum to give 
effect to the right under the foreign statute does not consti-
tute a denial of full faith and credit to that statute. 
"(2) On the other han'd, if the go_vernmental interest of 
the state of the forum in the subject of the litigation is lack-
ing or slig·ht as compared with the governmental interest of 
the state for whose statute recognition is sought, the refusal 
of the courts of the forum to accord that recognition is a 
denial of full faith and credit. 
'' (3) Where the g·overnmental interests of the two juris-
dictions are equally balanced, and the statute of each prop-
erly extends over the event or transaction because of the con-
nection with that state of one or more of the elements of the 
event or transaction, the f o~um may give effect to its 9wn 
statute although in conflict w1th the statute of the other state 
in which some of the other elements of the transaction are 
located, and the latter state in turn may do likewise if the ac-
tion is brought in its courts." 134 A. L. R. 1472-1473. 
In Virg'inia every foreign corporation which complies with 
provisions of Sec. 384 7 of the Virginia Code is declared by 
Sec. 3844, for all purposes, to be deemed and treated as a cor-
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poration of this State and to be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts thereof. 
Surely if a corporation thus domesticated in Virginia owes 
a debt to a Virginia resident whether such debt should be 
exempt from legal process in Virginia should be determined 
by the laws of the forum. 
Virginia has a long established definite public policy 
whereby property in which debtor has a legal or equitable 
estate is rendered liable for his debts save and except only 
where such property has been set apart as exempt under the 
spendthrift trust statute. 
The leading case prior to the adoption of the spendthrift 
trust statute in Virginia, when the Code was revised in 1919, 
is that of Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 175, 40 S. E. 657, 57 
L. R. A. 384, 93 A. S. R.. 944. 
That case holds that it is contrary to public policy to ex-
empt a debtor's property from liability to his debts. 
After this case was decided, Section 2428 of the Code of 
1887 was amended and now appears as Section 515,7 Vir-
. ginia Code. 
Until amended in 1919 it read as follows: 
'' Estates of every kind, holden or possessed in trust, 
44* shall be subject *to debts and charges of the persons 
to whose use or to whose benefit they are holden or 
possessed, as they would be if those persons owned the like 
interest in the things holden or possessed, as in the uses or 
trusts thereof.'' 
The· 1919 amendment adds the following: 
" * • * ; but any such estate, not exceeding· one hundred 
thousand dollars in actual value, may be holden or possessed 
in trust upon condition that the corpus thereof and income 
therefrom, or either of them, shall be applied by the trustee 
to the support and maintenance of the beneficiaries without 
being subject to their liabilities or to alienation by them; 
but no such trust shall operate to the prejudice of any exist-
ing creditor of the creator of such trust.'' 
.Since the amendment a debtor's property remains liable 
unless a spendthrift trust has been created, as authorized by 
the amendment. 
As shown in D'ltnlop v. Dimlo11's Exec,utors (1926), 144 Va. 
297, a debtor enjoys no immunity against execution where 
he has a right to receive and dispose of the estate. The Dun-
lop . case was decided after the amendment. 
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It is true that the Supreme Court seems to have whittled 
down some of the apparently mandatory requirements of 
this statute. For instance, in .Thomas v. House, 145 Va. 742, 
the court held that a devise intended by the testator to cre-
ate a trust estate may be upheld as a spendthrift. trust even 
though tlie life tenant was not made a trustee. 
The facts in that case, however, strongly indicated that 
the testator intended that no sale of the property should 
be made during• the life tenant's life but that it should re-
main for his use and then pass to testator's grandchildren. 
In the case of Rowley v . .Atnerican. Trust Go., 144 Va. 375, 
testator made bequest of $10,000.00 to a named trustee "in 
trust to invest and re-invest said sum and to pay all the net 
income therefrom semi-annually to my daughter, Maude Kent 
Rowley, for life and upon her death to divide" the principal 
of the beqU';3st equally between an~ther daughter and a 
grandson of testator, or to the survivor. 
The court says: ''The language of the fifth clause of the 
will is perfectly plain and without. ambiguity. Even if spend-
thrift trusts had been legal at the time of the writing of the 
will, there is no element of a spendthrift trust suggested by 
the language used. It gave to the plaintiff in the clear-
45* est sort of way a (tvested life estate, with absolute and 
unfettered control of the income for her life, from the 
sum of $10,000.00, which sum was to be held in trust during 
her life and then the principal paid over, $5,000.00 to Alice 
Tinsley Hall and $5,000.00 to Charles Edward Dickinson, or 
the whole amount to the survivor." 
In Sheridan v. Krause, 161 Va. 873, the testator, by a codi- 1 
cil to his will, directed that a certain son's share of his es-
tate '' shall be held for him in trust by my daughter, Clara 
* * * , free from the debts and claims of all persons what-
soever and the income therefrom paid to him as she may 
consider proper". Them follows a proviso to the effect that 
if the son gets out of debt and in the judgment of the trus-
tee is in position to take care of his share of testator's estate, 
trustee could turn the same over to him. 
The court at 887 says: "We interpret the words of the 
codicil to mean that the property shall be held in trust for Leo 
by Clara V. Sheridan free from liability for his debts, and the 
income therefrom paid to him for his support and mainte-
nance and such other purposes aR she may consider proper, 
when and in such amounts from time to time as she may con-
sider proper for his interest". 
Judge Epes then discusses the English rule which was fol-
lowed in Hutchinson. v. Maxwell, supra, and then discusses 
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the amended Virginia statute, and its purposes. The court's 
conclusion is, page 895, that 
''the intention of the General Assembly in enacting the new 
matter contained in section 5157 was not merely to provide 
a begrudged exception to the application of the doctrine of 
Hutchinson-v. Maxwell or to the rule laid down in the old part 
of that section as it had been interpreted by this court in that 
case. Its intention was to make a material change in the 
public policy of the State on thts _subject, and to liberalize 
and humanize the rule of Hidch~n.son. v. Maxwell. 
"Though it gives lip service to the indisputable prin-
46* ciple that a testator *is not, unless he bas obligated 
himself to do so, under any obligation whatever to pro-
vide for the payment of the depts of his devisee, yet the rule 
of Hittchinson v. Maxwell, made it impossible for a testator 
to provide in his will for the support and maintenance even 
of a hopelessly invalided son, whose only source of support 
has been for years the bounty of the testator, without being 
forced by law to pay his son's debts as the price of the right 
to provide for his necessities. 
'' (11) The General Assembly was not satisfied with a public 
policy that worked such results, and by the addition of the 
new matter in Section 5157 has declared it to be the public 
policy of Virginia to permit property not exceeding $100,000 
in actual value to be· held in trust for the support and main-
tenance of a person without being subject to alienation by 
him or to his debts, ·where the creator of the trust so pro-
vides.'' 
The court then discusses whet11er an equitable life estate 
may be followed by a fee simple legal estate in the cestui qu,e 
trust and holds that this is permissible. However, as pointed 
out on page 897, it is universally held that in jurisdictions 
where spendthrift trusts are valid that tbe "creation of an 
inalienable, equitable fee is not allowed anywhere''. 
It must follow that no spendthrift trust can be created 
which involves an inalienable legal fee in the estate. 
Continuing on page 899, the court says:-
" There are other cases to be found in which it is either 
said or held that neither an equitable fee simule estate in 
real property nor an equitable estate of the same duration in 
personal property can be ~·iven subject to or encumbered by 
a spendthrift trust. And we have 11ot fou11d nor have we 
been cited to any case in which it has been held that where 
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the whole beneficial interest, of unlimited duration, in prop-
erty is given to a donee, his estate can be made subject to a 
spendthrift trust for bi's life, or that property may be 
47* conveyed *to a trustee to be held by him on a protective 
or spendthrift trust for the benefit of a person during 
his life with remainder to that person (i. e., his estate) at his 
death. 
'' (14) .Notwithstanding this, after a careful and extensive 
examination of the subject, we are of opinion that on prin-
ciple there is no more objection to upholding a spendthrift 
trust for the life of a cestui qite tru,st where the remainder 
in the property passes to him ( i. e., his administrator or 
executor upon his death as a part of his estate), than there 
is to upholding such trust. where the remainder in the prop-
erty passes at his death to another person, or there is to 
sustaining such a trust for a term of years where the re-
mainder in the property is given to the cestu;i que tritSt at the 
termination of the trust period.'' 
The conclusion of the court is in these words : 
''Where a spendthrift trust is for the life of the cestui que 
tri1.,St the property is not tied up any longer or any more 
completely where the remainder passes at his death as a 
part of his estate than it is where the remainder at his ileath 
is devised to another person or reverts to the creator or his 
estate. So far as the creditors of the cestui qite trust are 
concerned they are better off where the remainder passes as 
a part of the estate of the cestiti que trust than they would 
be if it passed to another. In the first case they have the op-
portunity of ultimately getting their claims paid in whole 
or in part. In the latter case they have no chance of getting 
them paid. 
'' Where it is held not to be against public policv to permit 
a spendthrift trust of any particular nature to .. be created 
for the life of a. cestui q'lle trust with remainder in the trust 
property to anotl1er, we are of opinion that there is no. sub-
stantial reason for holding it ag·ainst public policy to uphold 
1 the same spendthrift trust where the estate given the donee 
is such that the remainder in the trust property passes 
48* at his death as a part of his *estate. And we hold that 
an equitable fee simple or absolute equitable estate 
may be given to a person subject to any spendthrift trust 
for his benefit for his life, or a lesser period, which under 
section 5157, would be good if the remainder in the trust 
property were given to another.'' 
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The court then considers the further question of whether 
this discretionary trust was rendered void by reason of the 
fact that the purposes of the trust were not limited to the sup-
port and maintenance of the cestu.i que trust. The court then 
concludes that the bequest was a valid spendthrift trust in-
sofar as it provided for the support and maintenance of tes-
tator's son but that the bequest should not be free from the 
son's debts for any other purpose. 
In considering this case it should be borne in mind that 
the court was dealing with an express declaration of trust 
made to a designated trustee who was the sister of the spend-
thrift. 
We have considered at length the decisions of Your Hon-
ors applying the spendthrift trust statute of Virginia. 
In this connection defendants below do not claim that any 
spendthrift trust was created by the arrangement made with 
Metropolitan. 
In Lynch v. Lynch, 161 S. C. 170, 159 S. E. 26, 80 A. L. R. 
997, the court says : 
"Thoug·h under what has been called the English rule, 
which was also the rule of the common law, followed in some 
of the American states, property cannot be withheld from 
subjection to the claims of creditors of the beneficial owner 
by the creation of a trust for his benefit, in the absence of 
some provision of defcasance, technically called "cessor", 
upon attempt of a creditor to subject_ the property to his 
debt, yet what is called the American rule has been adopted 
in most of the American states, apparently including South 
Carolina, and the validity of spendthrift trusts·, either with 
or without a provision for a cessor, has been sustained, 
49*' not out of any special anxiety of the law for the *pro-
tection of the impecunious beneficiary, but rather to pro-
tect the donor's right of property and the right to choose the 
object of his bounty.'' 
Continuing, the court says: 
"It seems to be settled, however, that to be valid spend-
thrift trusts must necessarily meet these requirements ; the 
interest of the donee cannot exceed an equitable life estate in 
the income of the property, without title or right to the pos-
session of the property itself; the legal title must be vested 
in a trustee, and the ti-ust must be an active one.'' 
It seems to be universally held that a conveyance, devise 
or transfer of property in fee simple, to the effect that the 
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property shall not be subject to, or liable for the debts of 
the grantee or devisee, or that it shall not be seized, at-
tached, or sold for his debts, or any provision by which it is 
sought to place the property beyond the reach of creditors or 
to restrict the involuntary alienation thereof, is ineffectual 
and void, where there is no limitation over or provision for 
cesser or forfeiture in the event of a violation of the condi-
tion. See extensive .Annotation 80 .A. L. R. 1007. 
The writ of error applied for by Mrs. Pearl Jennings Wil-
liams and Prudential Insurance Company in 1936 to the judg-
ment obtained by Horace G. Bass, Trustee in Bankruptcy 
of the bankrupt's estate, in effect reaffirmed the Virginia 
doctrine that ordinary contract debts due a bankrupt are not 
exempt from his debts unless set up in a spendthrift trust 
in Virginia. 
It is stated in Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.), Sec. 6.16 
that 
'' Whether or not insurance policies are exempt depends 
upon law of the bankrupt's domicile.'' 
The author cites Legg v. St. John, 296 U. S. 489, 56 S. Ct. 
336, 80 L. Ed. 345. 
In this case, Legg, a resident of Tennessee, was on his pe-
tition there adjudged a bankrupt. He then held a life 
5011 policy issued by Metropolitan for *$17,452.00 as com-
muted value. Under supplementary contract issued the 
same day and attached to the policy, bankrupt was entitled 
to a monthly benefit payment of $174.52 upon due proof of 
total and permanent disability. Legg had become entitled 
to these disability payments before the adjudication and 
until then the Company had regularly paid him the monthly 
disability benefits. Leg·g- requested bankruptcy court to ex-
empt from the operation of the assig·nment to the trustee the 
life insurance policy upon payment of its cash surrender 
value, which was done. The disability payments were con-
sidered an asset of the bankrupt's estate. In other words, 
the exemption of the disability payments was requested, but 
denied. The Bankrupt appealed and claimed exemption of 
these benefits under Tennessee's statutes. 
The Court, speaking- through Mr. Justice Brandeis, held 
that the monthly benefit payment 
''was property of the hankrupt which passed to the trustee, 
unless specially exempted by the law of Tennessee, or by 
Sec. 70 (A) of the Bankruptcy Act.'' ' 
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The Court held that this section only conditionally ex-
empted insurance known as legal reserve life insurance hav-
ing a cash surrender value. The Court also construed the 
statutes of Tennessee holding that there was no statute in 
Tennessee which exempted disability benefits. The Court also 
followed the Tennessee law as interpreted by an inferior ap-
pellate court. which had held that the Tennessee statute ex-
empting lif~. insurance did not apply to disability benefits. 
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in re Dudley's ,Estate, 3 Fed. (2d) 832, says: 
;'Whether or not the will cr'eatecl a spendthrift trust is a 
question to be determined in accordance with the Maryland 
decisions (place of bankruptcy) since it is the policy of the 
Bankruptcy Act to respect state exemptions.'' 
In this case the bankrupt contended that the trust estate 
under the will was a spendthrift trust and therefore his 
51 * interest therein did not pass *to his trustee in bank-
ruptcy. · . 
The court referred to the class of cases which hold that 
by the use of apt terms a testator may forbid the alienation 
of property in trust and place it beyond the reach of the 
creditors of the beneficiary and in this connection said: 
'' Even that class of cases should be carefully guarded, and 
courts should not be inclined to exempt property from its 
usual incidents of the right of alienation and liability for 
debts, unless the language of the donor be free from doubt.'' 
In holding that the life estate in the property passed to 
the trustee in bankruptcy, the court says: 
"Since it is contrary to the policy of the law to allow 
property to be fettered by restraintg upon alienation, unless 
the language of the donor and founder of the trust be free 
from doubt, it must be held, so far as the language under 
discussion is concerned, that the estate of the bankrupt was 
clothed with the usual incidents of such property, and passed 
to his trustee in bankruptcy." 
'' The rule, we think, is well settled that, 'although an ex-
ecutory contract may be nonassignable because of its per-
sonal nature or because of a provision therein for nonassign-
ment, nevertheless, once the contract has become executed 
to the extent that nothing remains to be done except the pay-
ment of money by one of the parties to the other, the claim 
T. B~yan Tate, Trustee, etc., v. C. H. Hain, et als. 45 
becomes a chose in action which is assignable'.'' Florence v. 
Kresge, 93 F. 2d 784, 787 (4th Circuit). 
"Under the terms of §70a(6) the bankrupt's trustee suc-
ceeds to all of the rights of action that the bankrupt may 
have arising from contract. Thus a right of action on a 
promissory note, for rent due under a lease, or for wages 
due on a contract, all pass to the bankruptcy trustee. The 
fact that a contract contains a clause against assig'llability 
will not prevent a cause of action thereon from vesting in the 
trustee.'' Collier on Bankruptcy, Volume 4, ~ 70.28. 
52* *5. If the evidence of indebtedness clai1!ied . by the 
Trustee, as property of the bankritpt, provides, 
"This cert-ificate may not be assil}ned, set over or trans-
/erred ati(l no obligation, will be recognizecl by the Company 
except to the extent and in the 'lnanner as herein set forth." 
Is this language appropriate to evidence the intention of 
the contracting parties that the debt payable U/Juler the cer-
tificate shall not pass, upon bankruptcy of payee to her trus-
tee in bankr·uptcy, as assets for creditors? 
How should this provision be construed f Is the language 
appropriate and sufficient to exempt the monthly payments 
from debts and legal liabilities of payee? If it was the in-
tention of the Company in preparing the contract to have 
attempted to exempt monthly payments from the operation 
of the bankruptcy law and from illegal liabilities of the 
payee, would not different language have been used? For 
instance, Virginia's Spendthrift Trust Statute (Sec. 5157) 
in referring to exemption of a trust fund, provides that 
same 
"shall be applied by tl1e trustee to the support and mainte-
nance of the beneficiaries without being subject to their lia-
bilities or to alienation by them'~-
The New York statute which exempts proceeds of life in-
surance policies when they are left with the insurance com-
pany under a trust agreement provides 
'' the benefits accruing thereunder after the death of the in-
sured shall not be transferable, nor subject to commutation 
or encumbrance, nor to legal process except in an action to 
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recover for necessaries, if the parties to the trust or other 
ag·reemen t so agree.'' 
Certainly the leg·al specialists of the Metropolitan would 
have clearly expressed by appropriate language an intention 
to wholly exempt the monthly payments from all legal lia-
bilities including involuntary· assignments to a trustee in 
bankruptcy if this had been their object in preparing the 
contract. 
The lang11age used by l\fotroplitan accurately ex-
53* presses its intention •which was that it would not it-
self recognize any assignment or transfer of the cer-
tificate. It had issued no negotiable certificate and its obli-
gation was limited to make monthly payments to payee, if 
living, and at her death to pay the ·balance in one lump sum 
to her executors or administrators, of necessity monthly pay-
. ments had to be evidenced by check and transmitted through 
mail, addressed to payee. These checks had to be endorsed 
and deposited and were negotiable. In the hands of payee 
the checks and the avails thereof were subject to no restric-
tions whatever. Metropolitan recognized this and used ap-
propriate language in its certificate of indebtedness. Metro-. 
politan had agreed with its insured, Joseph Halberstadt, 
when he, in 1930, exercised the option concerning mode of 
settlement under the first and second policies, dated March 
22, 1912, and September 28, 1927, that '' the beneficiary of 
record shall not have the rig·ht at any time to commute, as-
sign or. encumber any stipulated payments yet to be made'' 
and in issuing. the other two policies in 1929 had provided 
in the policies themselves that 
''no beneficiary may assign or commute income payments 
unless the insured has so provided in writing .and such pro-
vision has been endorsed on the policy by the Company at 
its Home Office". 
If these provisions should be considered as forming a part 
of the instalment contract they likewise seem wholly inap~ 
propriate to show an intention on the part of either Joseph 
Halberstadt, Metropolitan or payee that the monthly pay-
ments made to payee under the certificate should not be sub-
ject to her leg·al liabilities and pass bv involuntary assign-
ment in the event of her bankruptcy . ., .. 
Under the instalment certificiate Metropolitan said to 
payee "You may not assign, set over or transfer this cer-
tificate". As between Metropolitan and its payee the certifi-
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cate may not be assigned, set over or transferred and the 
Oompany is not obligated to recognize any such assignment 
or transfer of the certificate. The Trustee in Bankruptcy 
claims title by operation of law under au involuntary assign-
ment. He claims the right to receive monthly payments 
54* when due and until •creditors' claims are fully satis-
fied. Whether the provisions of the certificate were 
made for the protection of Metropolitan or for the benefit of 
payee or for their joint protection no bold declaration was 
made that either the certificate or the monthly payments 
should be exempt from payee's legal liabilities and should 
not pass to her assignee in bankruptcy. . . 
No right to have the value of the certificate conpnuted 
until after the death of payee is claimed. It will be observed 
that in the two earlier policies the form includes the word 
"encumber", while in the 1929 policies this word is omitted. 
It is Trustee's contention that there is no appropriate. 
language in either the certificate or in the policy forms which 
prohibits or was intended to prohibit an involuntary assign-
ment to an assignee in bankruptcy. Is it not unreasonable 
to assume that Joseph Halbersta.dt intended that the pro-
ceeds of his insurance, after it passed to his daughter, should 
not be liable for her debts and oblig·ations? 
55* *6. Could payee m.ake a valid 'l'oluntary pledge of the 
certificate or the proceed.~ thereof? 
Generally, all ordinary business contracts are assignable, 
with the exc2ption of executory contracts for personal serv-
ices or those involving a relationship of confidence, and where 
the chose sought to be assigned merely involves a right to 
receive money, it has generally been held assignable. With 
reference to the typE, of instalment contract here involved,. 
it must be admitted that insofar as public policy is concerned, 
there seems to be no valid reason why lVIetropolitan can not 
issue a non-negotiable certificate and agree with its payee 
that the certificate may not be assigned, set over or trans-
ferred, and refuse to recognize any obligation '' except to the 
extent and in the manner'' as set out in the certificate. 
This certificate fo11ows the agreement the company had 
with its insured that when the supplemental contract was is-
sued the beneficiary thereunder could not '' assign or com-
mute income payments'' or as provided in two of the poli-
cies should not ''have the right at any time to commute, as-
sign or encumber any stipulated payments yet to be made''. 
In making the gift, payee's father indicated his wish that 
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his daughter should not anticipate the monthly income, should 
not ·have the right to commute the deferred payments or en-
cumber the certificate by pledging or assigning it. In issuing 
the certificate Metropolitan had a legal right to agree with 
its payee that it would only make monthly payments to payee 
and that it would not itself recognize any assignment or trans-
fer of the certificate. It had agreed with its insured not to 
consent to any commutation, assignment or encumbering of 
this certificate by payee. As between the parties these con-
tractual oblig·ations should no doubt be recog·nized and up-
held. -
Notwithstanding her contract. not to assign or encumber, 
Mrs. Hain on July 12, 1937, made a written assignment 
56* Of the certificate to the Bank as security for *an exist-
ing indebtedness of" $8,500.00 and also as security for 
'' any other indebtedness that I may owe your institution''. 
Payee attempted to assign all of her rights, title and inter-
est in and to the certificate. The Bank understood Metropoli-
tan would not accept an assignment of the certificate· and bad 
payee ag·ree to request it to forward the monthly checks to 
the Bank and there be placed to her credit. She further 
agreed to endorse these checks over to the Bank whenever 
requested, so that they could be applied as credit on her in~ 
debtedness. 
The question therefore is what was the legal effect of this 
attempted transfer of the certificate itself and of the other 
provisions of the assignment 1 Did it pass title to the cer-
tificate 1 Could the Bank have required Metropolitan to 
recognize the transfer? Upon its refusal to consent, what 
remedy would the Bank have f Could it by any process of 
law have acquired title to the certificate itself 1 If payee 
had refused to endorse over the monthly checks she would 
have breached her contract with t.I1e Bank. However, the 
· damages the Bank sustained consisted only in its failure to 
collect its debt in part. Its oblig·ation would have matured 
and it could have obtained a judgment and issued garnish-
ment process against :Metropolitan and its debtor. In this 
event, its right to subject the monthly payments would de-
pend not upon the contract of a8si~·nment but upon its legal 
rig·ht to enforce its judgment against property of its judg-
ment debtor. Unless under applicable state law the judg-
ment debtor could hold the proceeds of these monthlv pay-
ments exempt from legal process, a creditor would have a 
remedy. 
It seems to us to be a distinct difference between the public 
policy involved where a contract of this type merely restricts 
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the voluntary action of the payee and the added provision in 
some of the contracts which attempt to exempt the· install-
ment payments or the certificate from the legal liabilities of 
payee. 
57* wlf we consider first the limitation on the power of 
the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to make volun-
tary alienation of the income it may help to clarify the ques-
tion under consideration. 
It is stated to be of the essence of a. spendthrift trust that 
it is not subject to voluntary alienation by the cest1.ti or sub-
ject to involuntary alienation through attachment or other 
process at the suit of his creditors. But even in spendthrift 
trusts it seems to be everywhere agreed that after the bene-
ficiary has actually received the trust property, his creditors-
may reach it, and be may dispose of it as be wishes. 
In other words a voluntary assignment executed by. the 
cestui before he receives the fmids confers on the assignee 
no right to demand payment or delivery from the trustee as 
it becomes due to the beneficiary. It is only after the funds 
come into the hands of the ccsfu,i that they become subject 
to his absolute control and liable for his debts. 
Our conclusion, from a search of the authorities, is that 
the true rule should be that t·esti·aints against pledging, com-
muting· or anticipating· monthly payments embodied in a de-
ferred payment contract of life insurance proceeds, should 
be made effective as against voluntary action of the payee 
with reg·ard to his right to receive future payme~ts. But as 
to involuntary alienation, or subjection under legal process, 
the rights of the payee to receive the funds, being property 
rights, must as a matter of public policy be held liable for his 
debts. . 
An interesting case dealing· with the rights of the bene-
ficiary of a spendthrift trust to make assignments is that 
of Kelly v. Kelly, 11 Ca. (2d) 356, 79 P. (2d) 1059, 119 A. 
L.- R. 71. There the court bolds that au assignment of funds 
which lrnve not reached the hands of the beneficiary does not 
give the assig·nee the right to claim the trust property 
58• after it reaches his hands, but that an *assignment of 
cestui' s interest in a spendthrift trust ex.ecuted during· 
its continuance while ineffective to impose a trust for the 
benefit of the assignee on the property after it has come into 
the hands of the cest?d, operates fls a contract to pay over 
such share when received, for breach of whic.h damages arc 
recoverable. 
In Bixby v. St. Lo'ltis Union Tn, .. ~f Co. (1929), 323 Mo. 1014, 
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22 S. W. (2d) 813, the beneficiary of a ~pendthrift trust had 
contracted "to pay over and account for" the trust income 
when received by him. '11he court held this contract to be 
void, it being conceded that the beneficiary could not assign 
his interest prior to the receipt of his income from the trus-
tee. 
In King v. United 8ta.tes (1935, D. C.), 12 F. Supp. 614 
(affirmed i~ (1936, C. C. A. 1st) 84 F. (2d) 156), the court 
held invalid an attempted assignment by the cestui of a 
spendthrift trust and rejected the e.ontention that the assign-
ment should be held to constitute a contract for breach of 
which cest-u-i could be held liable in damages. 
Mrs. Hain was s1ui j,itris. She could contract with the Bank 
to make monthly payments and to bring~ or send Metropoli-
tan checks as they were received. If she breached this con-
tract she might be liable in damages but it passed no title 
to Bank as assignee of the certificate. 
59* *7. If payee's volztntarv ass·ignrnent was not effective, 
what are Bank's rights a.t death of bankrupt to pay-
1nents which have not then. accrued? 
If Mrs. Hain dies before receiving all the instalments, pay-
able under the certificate, the remaining payments must be 
''commuted'' and paid in one sum to her personal represen-
tatives. 
The second assignment of error is to the holding· that as 
to payments accruiug· after her death the Bank's rights are 
superior to those of her assignee in bankruptcy. 
Petitioner contends that if the Bank's assig·nment is void 
· it passed no title to the certificate or any rights thereunder 
so that upon bankruptcy, petitioner, as trustee, being armed 
with legal process, acquired a lien, on payments accruing 
after her death, which has priority over any rights of the 
Bank under its void assignment. 
This lien attached as of date of Bankruptcy and if at that 
time Bank held no title to the certificate, or rights there-
under, it seems clear, that after the lien of trustee in Bank-
ruptcy attached, any rights the Bank may have must be in-
ferior to the lien of the Trustee. Such rights, bv revival of 
its assignment, could only attach at her death. · Assignee's 
lien dates from Bankruptcy. 
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60~ 4tQONCLUSI0N. 
The petitioner respectfully submits that: 
(a) the relationship existing between Metropolitan and 
Mrs. Hain is that of debtor and creditor. 
(b) the performance of the contract, required only the pay-
ment of money; that, as the contract provided no place for 
payment, the parties must have intended that payments 
should be made to payee at her place of residence; that her 
domicile and place of residence at and before bankruptcy was 
in Virginia, so that the situs of the debt was in this State; 
that no question of coniiict of laws is involved because the 
Virginia Court has complete jurisdiction of all parties to 
this action and Metropolitan is domesticated in Virginia; 
that Mrs. Hain moved to Virginia and engaged in business 
and incurred the debts which petitioner seeks to enforce, and 
she has voluntarily subjected herself to the laws of this Com-
monwealth; that her intangible property followed her; that 
her ownership of the· instalment certificate and her rights 
to receive payments thereunder constitute property rights 
which pass to petitioner as Trustee in Bankruptcy under Sec-
tion 70A of the Bankruptcy Act; that the proceeds of the 
instalment oJertificate are not exempt under Section 6 of 
the Act, but constitute property which under Section 70 (a) 
( 5) of the Act could have been transferred prior to bank-
ruptcy or might have been levied upon and sold under judi-
cial process or otherwise seized or sequestered; and whether 
it is property which could have been levied on and sold· under 
judicial process is a question of local Virginia law. 
That the statute laws of. New York making proceeds of 
{~ertain insurance policies exempt have no ex territorial ef-
fect; that the instalment contract is not a '' spendthrift trust' t 
either under the law of New York or the law of Virginia; 
and that under Virginia decisions, and under estab1ished 
public policy, property, which is not set apart under 
61* the "spendthrift trust" statute, "4imay be subjected to 
the payment of the debts of the owner. 
We respectfully contend that tl1e judgment below is based 
upon a false premise. A metamorphosis was effected. A 
simple contract debt was transformed into a spendthrift 
trust and principles governing a trust estate applied to a 
Rimple contract debt. . 
If appeal is allowed, petitioner desires to adopt this peti-
tion for appeal as his opening brief. 
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Petitioner requests an opportunity to present orally rea-
sons why the Court should review the decree complained of. 
Your petitioner respectfully prays that an appeal may be 
allowed from the decree complained of and said decree may 
be reviewed and reyersed and final decree entered in favor 
of petitioner. 
Respectfully submitted, 
T. BR.YAi~ TATE, 
Petitioner in Bankruptcr. 
BROWN & GARRETT, 
By E. ,v ALTON BROvVN, 
Counsel. 
I, E. Walton Brown, an attorney practicing- in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my judg·-
ment there is error in the juclg1nent complained of in the 
foreg·oing- petition and the same s1101.1Id be reviewed and re-
versed. 
I further certify that a copy of this petition was delivered 
to Meade and Talbott, Counsel for Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, 
and a copy delivered to Crews and .Clement, Counsel for 
l\fetropolitan, and a copy delivered to the American Na-
tional Bank and Trust Company of Danville, Danville, Vir-
ginia, on the 5th day of Aug11st, 1942. 
E. °"7 ALTON BROWN. 
Received A.ug-ust 6, 1942. 
M. B. WATTS. 
Sep.tember 8, 1.942. Appeal awarded by the court. Bond 
$500. 
M. B. ·v-.r. 
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RECORD 
. Pleas before the Judge of the Corporation Court of Da1i:. 
ville, Virginia, at the Courthouse thereof on Saturday, the 
23rd day of May, 194:2. 
Be it remembered that on the 23rd day of January, 1941; 
cmlie T. Bryan Tate, Trustee in Baukruptcy of the Estate of 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, and filed his bill of complaint in 
the Corporation Court of Danville against ,Cecelia Halber.., 
stadt Hain, American National Bauk & Trust Company of 
Danville, Virginia, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
BILL OF' 00:MPL:A.INT: 
To Hon. Henry C: Leigh, ,Judge: 
Your complainant, T. Bryan Tate. respectfully represents 
hnto Your Honor that on 1\.fay 16, 1.940, Cecelia Halberstadt 
Hain filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the United 
States Dis.trict Court for the "\V cstern District of Virginia; 
Danville Division~ · 
That on lVI~y 18~ 1940~ said petitioner wrts duly adjudf:. 
catecl bankrupt by said United State8 District Court, and on 
the 31st day of May, 1949, your complainant was ap-
page 2 ~ pointed ns trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of 
, said bankrupt, the proceeding being styled case 
No. 2120. 
Your co~plain~nt .furtb~.r reprc~ents unto .Your Honor 
that said bankrupt listed among· her . liabilities notes to 
American ,National Bank & Trust Company of Danville, Vir ... 
ginia, in the pr~ncip~l snm of $9,000.00, one in the sum of 
$3,000.00 princiP,al elated Decembe.r 19, 1939, secured by deed 
.of trust on property located at 206. Robertson Avenue, Dan-
yille, Virgi:µia, to W. R. Hai~rison, Trustee, from Simon Hain 
and Cecelia H~ Hain, his wife; the second of said notes bc-
h.:ig dated December 5, Hl3f>, in the principal sum of $4,000.00, 
and the last of said notes being· dated December 19, 1939, 
in. the principal. sum of $2,000.00: 
That said bankrupt alleges in her schedules that said three 
notes aggregating $9,000.00 held by the American National 
Bank & Trust Company are secured by tl1e following col-
lateral, to-wit: 
Supreme Court of ... t\.ppeals of Virginia 
25 shares No. 6686 Union :Mutual Building & Loan Asso-
ciation, Danville, Virginia: 
title to one 1937 Dodge Sedan, ::M:otor No. D5-264091, Dan-
ville, Virginia; 
one installment certificate No. 18113-R l\!Ietropolitan Life 
Insurance Company, whereby said company is obligated to 
pav to said bankrupt the sum of $121..37 in 247 monthly in-
stallments, beginning October 19, 1935, and ending Septem-
ber 19, 1955: 
page 3 ~ That your complainant is advised and here 
· charges that said bank claims to hold the above de-
scribed installment certificate # 18113--R issued by the Metro-
politan Life Insurance .Company as collateral security for its 
indebtedness against said bankrupt: 
That your complainant is advised and here charges that 
said pretended assignment of said installment certificate is 
claimed by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to be 
null and void and of no effect, because prohibited by the terms 
of the policy, one of which provides: 
'' This certificate may not be assigned, set over or trans-
ferred, and no obligation will be recognized by the company 
except in the extent and in the manner as herein set forth." 
Your complainant is advised and here charges that said 
bank claims to hold a valid voluntary assignment of said 
policy pursuant to letter from the bankrupt dated July 12,, 
1937, which contains the .following language: 
'' In consideration of your continuing to carry indehted-
ness to~aling $~,5~0.00, whic.h you have previously loaned :rµe·,, 
and which I or1gmally agreed to pay at a faster rate than I 
now :find myself able to, I hereby assign and set over to you 
as security for this indebtedness that I may owe your in-
stitution, all of my rights, title and interest in and to Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, contract No. 
, page 4 ~ 18113-A Instalhnent Certificate, in the principal 
amount of $29,128.80, etr. 
"Since the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company will not 
accept au assig'Ilillent of this policy, I am directing that they 
forward these installment checks to you each month to be 
placed to my credit. 
"I hereby contract and agree with you that I shall, wl1eri-
ever requested to do so by you, endorse these checks over to 
you, and allow the entire proceeds to be placed to my 
credit.'' 
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That if the foreg·oing attempted voluntary assig·nment gives 
said bank no right to collect any installments payable under 
said certificate after the date of bankruptcy, your complain-
ant as trustee in bankruptcy is en.titled to collect such in-
stallments even though a voluntary assignment is prohibited 
by the terms of the contract. , 
.. Your complainant charges that said bank and the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company are denying your complain-
ant's right to have and receive the monthly installments of 
$127.37 which have accrued under Raid certificate since bank-
ruptcy and which may hereafter accrue on said policy, and 
are also denying the rig·ht of your complainant, in the event 
the voluntary assignment of said bank is held to be valid, 
to collect future installments which may accrue under said 
policy after the debt of said bank is fully satisfied. 
Your complainant the ref ore alleges that by rea-
page 5 ~ son of his adverse claims as trustee in bankruptcy, 
and those of the said bank and said life insurar1ce 
company, an actual controversy exists which your complain-
ant has a right to have adjudicated under Chapter 254A of 
the Code of Virginia. 
Your complainant is advised and therefore charges that 
11e has a right to invoke tho court's general equity jurisdic-
tion as to the validity or non-validity of said volunt~1ry as-
signment, and also the right to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment which will determine the· conflicting claims of the par-
ties and be forever binding on complainant and respondm1ts. 
Your complainant further avers that if the pretended as-
signment of said bank should be upheld and enforced by the 
court as a valid and subsisting assignment, your complain-
mtt is entitled as alternate relief to subject all and wllatevm· 
rig-hts under said policy said Cecelia Halberstadt Hain would 
otherwise be entitled to receive after her· indebtedness to said 
lJanl{ shall have been fully satisfied. Under A.cts of Con-
gress for such cases made and provided, to-·wit, S(~ction 70-A 
of the Bankruptcy ... .L\..ct, 11 U. S. C. A., Section 110 (a) your 
complainant is by operation of law vested with the tit.IP. which 
said bankrupt had at the time of b(n· adjudication in said 
contract of insurance, and by virtue of said net is 
page 6 ~ therefore entitled to have nnd receive all monthly 
installments which may be payable by the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company under said policy No. 
18113-R after the rights of the American National Bank l~ 
Trust Company as assignee of said policy have bP-en satis-
fied. 
Your complainant further avers that said CP.eelia Halber-
Stadt Hain and the Metropolitan Life Insni·ance Company 
are clenying your complainant's rights as asserted in this 
paragraphs, and therefore there is_ an actual controversy be-
tween them and your complainant which the court has juris-
cliction to determine under the Virginia Declaratory J udg-
ment Statute above mentioned; 
Your complainant therefore prays that the Ainerican Na~ 
t.ional Bank & Trust Company of Danville, Danville, Vir-
ginia, the Metropolitan Life Insu.rance Company, a foreig~1 
corporation, and Cecelia Halber~t.adt Hahi may be made pai·-
ties defendant to this bill of complaint ~nd required to an-
swer the ~~u:~e, answers under oath .beit1g· he:i;~by waived; 
that propel" ·1jrocess may issue; that your complaimmt may 
have the validity of the assig·ument of the installmcmt con-
tract determined and an adjudication made_ of his righfa as 
trustee in bankruptcy in ~aid contract; that your complaiI1-
ant may have and be afforded all other equitable relief which 
the circum~tances. ?f hts case may require, and may also 
. . Juive a,l proper d~claratory judgments entered, and 
pag·e 7 ~ may have such further an~ other and general re-
. lief as tbe. ~ature of his case mity require; or to 
Equity may seem :µieet. . 
And he will ever pray etc . 
. - . . 
... . T; BRYAN TAT~.,
1 
Trust~e 
T. Bryan Tate, Trustee. m Bankruptcy 
of the Estate .of Cecelia Halberstac1t 
Hain, Coinplainaiit 
BR.OWN & GARRETT, F. C. 
And, at another day, to-wit: 
• I I t 
. In, the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Coui·t of Danville, 
at the February, 1941, Rules ( 3rd Monday) came Cecelia 
Halberstadt _Hain,.l\'Jpt.rop9litan LiJe Insnrane~ Company .and 
the American National Bank & Trust CQmpany of _:panvilfo, 
Yirg:inia, an.d file~ their. sepa_ratc Pleas in Abatement, which 
are in the followmg words and fig·ures, to.:.wit: 
PLEA IN ABATEMENT "B,ILED -IN .BEHALF OF CE-
CELIA H.A.LBERSTADT HAIN. 
Th~ _plea of Cecelia- Halb~rstaqt !Jain, l)amed in th~ l>ill 
of complaint exhibited ag~inst her .and Americm1 .Nf)tif)Jtv.l 
Bank a.nd Trust Company of Danville..and Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company, in this court by T. Bryan Tate, Trustee 
of the estate of Cecelia Halberstadt Ha.in. 
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,, 
This defendant for plea to tl1e said bill says that she has 
been duly adjudicated a bankrupt by the United 
page 8 ~ States District Court for the ,v estern District of 
Virginia, and that the Honorable Horace G. Bass, 
referee in bankruptcy for the Danville Division of said court 
bas under consideration and within his jurisdiction all mat-
ters properly touching her status as a bankrupt and any es-
tate of which she may be possessed; that the purpose of this 
snit is to subject amounts which may be clue to her from tlw 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company under installment c.er-
tificate No. 18113 to the claims of her creditors; that this 
property is now being held by the l\fotropolitan I.. .. ife lmmr-
ance Company and that the _said l\Ietropolitan Life Insm·ance 
Company asserts no claim thereto adverse to this respond-
ent. Under these facts and circumstances this respondent 
says that the exclusive jurisdiction to determiue the contro-
veri-;y set up in tl1e hill of complaint is vested in the United 
States District Court for the ,v estern Distri~t of Virginia 
and to its agencies sitting· nnd actin~; a.s a. bankrupt court. 
·wherefore tlJis respondent doth plead to the said bill and 
to the jurisdiction of the Corporation Court of Danville, Vir-
ginia, and prays the judgn1t.~nt of the court whether she should 
he compelled to make anv further or other answer to the 
said bill and prays to be l1enc~e dismissed with her reasonable 
costs and charges in this behalf most wrongfully 
page 9 ~ sustained. 
CECELIA HALBERSTADT HAIN 
By Counsel 
CARTER, & "WILLIAMS, F. D. 
By JNO. ,v. CARTER, JR. 
State of Virginia 
City of Danville, to-wit: 
.John ,v. Carter, Jr., one of c.ounsel for the respondent, 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, named in the af orementionecl hill 
being duly sworn $ays that the facts and allegations therein 
contained are true except so far as they are tlierein stated 
to he upon information and that so far as thev are therein 
stated to be upon information, he believes tl1em to be tme . 
• TNO. "\V. CARTER, JR. 
One of Counsel for CP-celia 
Halberstadt Hain 
58 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Taken and sworn to and subscribed before m~, Lola Turner 
Morris, a Notary Public of and for the city and state afore-
said in mv said citv and state aforesaid this 18th da.v of 
] 1ebrua1·y, "1941. ., .. 
My commission expires on the 4th day of August, 1942. 
I was commissioned Lola Turner. 
LOLA TURNER MORRIS 
Notary Public 
PLEA IN ABATEMENT FILED IN BEHALF OF MET-
ROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY. 
The plea. of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a for-
eign corporation named in the bill of complaint 
page 10 ~ exhibited against it and Cecelia Halberstadt Hain 
and the American National Bank and Trust 00111-
pany of Danville, Virginia, in this court by T. Bryan Tate, 
'~Prustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Cecelia Halberstadt 
Hain. 
This defendant for plea to the said bill says that Cecelia 
Halberstadt Hain has been duly adjudicated a bankrupt by 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia and that the Honorable Horace G. Bass, Referee in 
Bankruptcy for the Danville Division of said court has un-
der consideration and within his jurisdiction all matters prop-
erly touching her status as a bankrupt and any estate of 
which she may be possessed; tha.t the purpose of this suit 
is to subject amounts wl1ich may be due to her from the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company under installment cer-
tificate No. 18l13R to the Claims of her creditors; that tl.tis 
property is now being held by the Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company and that the said Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company asserts no claim thereto adverse to said Cecelia 
Halberstadt Hain. Under these facts and circumstances this 
respondent says that the exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
the controversy· set up in the bill of complaint is vested in 
the United States Distrie.t Court for the vVestern District 
of Virginia a~d to i fa;; agencies sitting. and acting as a bank-
rupt court. 
page 11 ~ "Wherefore this respondent doth plead to the said 
bill and to the jurisdiction of the Corporation 
Court of Danville, Virginia, and prays the judgment of court 
whether it should be compelled to make any further or other 
:mswer to the said bill and prays to be hence dismissed with 
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its reasonable costs and charges in this behalf most wrong-
fully sustained. 
:METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
By Couilsel 
CREW1S· & CLEMENT., f. d. 
By GRASTY CREWS. 
State of Virginia 
City of Danville, to-wit: 
Grasty Crews, one of counsel for the respondent, Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, named in the aforemen-
tioned bill being duly sworn says that the facts and allega-
tions therein contained are true, except so far as they are 
therein stated to be upon information and that so far as they 
are therein stated to be upon information, be heJievus them 
to be true. 
GRASTY CREWS 
One of Counsel for Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. 
Taken and sworn to and subscribed before me, Nancy C. 
Sawtell, a Notary Public, of and for the city and state ufore-
sa.id in my said city and state aforesaid this t9th day of 
February, 194.1. . 
page 12 } My commission expires on the 12th day of Sep~ 
tember, 1942. 
I was commissioned Nancy Carpenter. 
NANCY C. SA WT.ELL 
Notary Public. 
PLEA IN ABATEMENT FILED IN BEHALF OF AMERI-
CAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
OF DANVILLE, DAN.VILLE, VIRGINIA 
The plea of American National Bank & Trust Company of 
Danville, Virginia named in the bill of complaint exhibited 
against it and Cecelia Halberstadt Hain and M~tropolitan 
Life Insurance Company in this court by T. Bryan Tate, 
Tmstee of the estate of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain. 
This defendant for plea to the said bill says that Cecelia 
Halberstadt Hain l1as been duly adjudicated a bankrupt by 
the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Virginia and that the· Honora.ble Horace G. ·Bass, Referee 
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in Bankruptcy for the Danville Division of said court has 
under consideration and within his jurisdiction all matters 
properly touching her status as a·bankrupt and any estate of 
which she may be possessed; that the purpose of this suit is 
to subject amounts which may be due to her from the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company under installment certificate 
No. 18113 to the claims of her rreditors; that this property 
is now ·being held by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany and that the said :Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
asserts no claim thereto adverse to said Cecelia 
page 13 ~ Halberstadt Hain. Under these facts and circmn-
stances this respondent says that the exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the controversy set up in the bill 
of complaint is vested in the United Sta.tes District Court 
for the Vl estern District of Virg·inia and to its agencies sit-
tin~ and acting as a bankrupt court. 
Wherefore this respondent doth plead to the said bill and 
to the jurisdiction of the Corporation Court of Danville. Vir-
ginia, and prays the judgment of the court whether it should 
be compelled to make any further or other answer to the 
said bill and prays to be l1ence dismissed with its reason-
able costs and charges in this behalf most wrongfully sus-
tained. 
A:M:ERICA.N NATIONAL BANK & '!\RUST 
COMP ANY OF DA.t~VILLE, VIRGINIA 
By Counsel 
CARTER & ·wrLLIAMS, f. d. 
By .JNO. ,v. CARTER, JR. 
State of Virginia 
City of Danville, to-wit: 
.Tobu W. Carter, ,Jr., one of counsel for tl1e respondent, 
American National Bank & Trust Company of Danville, Dan-
ville, Virginia, named in the aforementioned bill being duly 
sworn says that the factR and allegations therein rontained 
are trne, except so far as they are therein estated to be upon 
information and that so far as thev are the-rein 
page 14 ~ stated to be upon information, he believes them 
to be true. 
JNO. W. CARTER, ,JR. 
One of Counsel for Americ.an N ati.onal 
Bank & Trust Company of Danville, 
Danville, Va. 
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Taken and sworn to and subscribed before me, Lola Turiler 
Morris, a Notary Public. of and for the city and state afore-
said in mv said citv and state aforesaid this 18th dav of 
]
1ebruary, · 1941. · · 
My commission expires on t]Je 4th day of August, 1942. 
I was commissioned Lola Turner. 
LOLA TUR~ER :MORRIS 
Notary Public 
And, at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville, on Thursday, the 29th day 
of May, in the year A. D. 1941. · 
For reasons app~aring to the Court it is ordered that the 
f oregoiug cause be continued until the next Chancery ~Perm 
of this Court. 
OPINION AS TO PLEAS IN .ABATEMENT. 
June 27, 1941. 
.Judge E·. ,v alton Brown, 
Attorney for the Complainant, 
l\f.r. Grasty Crews, 
Attorney for the '.Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
City. 
Gentlemen: 
In the case of T. BrJ/an Tate, Trustee in bar.-.li~-
page 15 ~ ruptcv a:c. v. 1Jf etrovolitan Life Insurance C"., ,;,,t 
als., I am of the opinion that the Corporation 
Court of Danville has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I 
di~reg-ard tlie form of raising· objection to its jurisdiction b·.r 
plea in abatement. If tl1e Com~:ress has v-ested ·exclusive juris-
diction of such matters in the Bankruptcy Courts its ac.ti:m 
would be within its competency and the ·state courts would 
be divested of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction is a funda-
mental defect. It invalidates the judgment of any court 
which is without it. The method. of raising t~e question i~ 
of no concern or importance. The Court itself iR chu rgerl 
with the clut·y of seeing that it lias jurisdiction. If without 
it, jt should refuse to entertain the proceeding, e:v mero 
motu. 
The question presented scemR to me to be one of comity 
between courts rather than the rig·ht of the particular court 
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to adjudicate. Of course, that court, possessing the neces-
sarv powers, which :first assumes charg·e. of the matters in 
eouh·oversy should be allowed to proceed to their determina-
tion. And it is fundamental that a court which has under-
taken the administration of a. fund, estate or property of 
whatever sort~ must do all that is necessary to aecomplish 
that which it has undertaken, without interference. Here, 
however, it seems,that the thought is advanced that because 
the ba11kruptcy court might by summary proceed-
page 16 ~ iugs compel the defendant, Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company, to pay over to its trustee the in-
stallments due under thq insurance policies, that the state 
court is divested of jurisdiction in the premises. That question 
raises the point as to what is orderly procedure, rather than a 
question of jurisdiction. Due process of law may be involved 
in connection with the bankruptcy court's exercise of its sum-
mHry powers. And the state court mig·ht well refuse to enter-
tain proceedings which on their face plainly indicated that 
the bankruptcy court could effect the object sought by sum-
mary process. I do not say that here the bankruptcy court 
could not have proceeded by summary process. It is not 
ne~essnry to do so. It has seen fit to authorize its agent to 
proceed in the state court. It has not seen fit to procee<l sum-
marily. None seeks to encroach upon its jurisdiction, but to 
allow it to make use of tbe powers of another tribunal to 
as;::ist it in, the aclmini~tration of the bankrupt's estate. Sec-
tion 23 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the State Courts. 
Sc~e also Section 70 of the Act. 
Nor can I conclude that :Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pa11y does not stand in an adverse position to the Trm;tee. 
Its plea says in effect that I have funds which belong- to the 
bankrnpt. yet it makes no offer to pay them over to the Trus-
tee. Its position is not consistent with its plea. It withholds 
from the Trustee funds which be asserts are the proper.ty 
of the Bankrupt, and which therefore passed to 
page 1.7 ~ him upon her adjudication. And justi:fi:es its po-
sition upon the g-round that the bankruptcy ~.<mrt 
should decide to whom the funds belong. 1So it should, but 
before it can properly do so, it should have possession of the 
funds. Defenda.nt, as I understand its contention, sets up a 
theorv that it is a trnstcc holding· funds as such in accordance 
wHh ·a contract made between 'it and a third party. Tha.t 
the l,ankrupt, although the beneficiary under the trust, is not 
the teal party in interest, but the trustor. If this be its <;on-
tention, I tllink that it is an adverse claimant, and that a 
summary order against it would be improper. 
I do not hold at this time that the state court has the rigl1t 
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to decide to whom the funds should ultimately pass. It has 
jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding to ,bring the funds into 
the hands of the trustee. Having passed upon that ques-
tion it should go no further. It would simply adjudicate 
whether or not the Trustee is entitled to recover. If it de-
cides· that he i~, the administration of the fund should be t4e 
function of the bankruptcv court. 
The pleas will be rejected. 
Very truly yours, 
HENRY C. LEIGH 
Judge 
page 18 } And, at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville, on Thursday the 3rd day 
of July, in the year A. D. 1941. 
This dav the comulainant moved the Court to strike from 
the recorci of this iause the three separate pleas of ahB.te-
ment filed therein at rules on behalf of Metropolitan Life 
Insu.rance Company, Cecelia Halberstadt Hain and Ameri-
can National Bank & Trust Company, respectively, which mo-
tion is set down for argument; and the matters of law aris-
ingo thereon being argued by counsel and considered by the 
Court, for reaRons set forth in the written opinion of the 
Court herein filed and hereby made a part of the record in 
tl1is call!se, said motion is hereby sustained and said three 
pleas stricken from the record of this cause, as constituting· 
no defense thereto. · 
.And, at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville, on 1\1:onday the 7th day of 
,Tuly, in the year A. D. 1941. 
This day Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, one of 
the defendants, tendered its separate answer to the plaintiff's 
hill and asked leave to file the same, whic.h is hereby granted 
and the answer accordingly filed. 
page 19} ANSWER. 
The separate answer of Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pa11y, one of the defendants, to a. bill of complaint filed 
against it in the Corporation Court of Danville by T. Bryan 
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Tate, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Cecelia Hal-
berstadt Hain. · 
This respondent reserving to itself the benefit of aJl just 
exceptions to the said bill, for answer thereto, or to so much 
thereof as it is advised that it is material it should answer, 
answers and says: · 
It is admitted that Cecelia Halberstadt Hain filed n. volun-
tary ·petition in bankruptcy as stated in the bill and tlrnt 
~he was duly adjudicated a bankrupt as therein stated; this 
respondent knows nothing of the averment in the bill of 
complaint ·with reference to liabilities of said bankrupt and 
knows nothing with reference to the notes claimed to have 
been listed by the said bankrupt nor as to collateral ~et 
out as being 25 shares of Union Mutual Building· & Loan As-
sociation Stock and title to one 1937 Dodge Sedan, but ca.lb 
for strict proof with reference to such oblfg;ations. 
"\Vith reference to the installment certificate #18113-R of 
l\fotropolitan Life Insurance Company, alleged to he held un-
der some pretended assignment of said installme~t certifi-
eate, this respondent alleg·es that any such pre-
page 20 ~ tended assignment is null and void and of no ef-
fect because the funds held by the Respondent are 
proceeds of Policies Nos. 830032-A, 5081321-A, 5815807-A and 
5927858-A, iRsued respectively on March 22, 1912, September 
28, 1927, May 16, 1929 and l uly 8, 1929, on the life of ,Joseph 
Halberstadt. The first policy was issued on a 57 Year Non-
participating· Endowment plan in the amount of $2,000; the 
second policy on a vVnole Life plan in the amount of $5,114; 
th~ third and fourth polieies on a 29· Year Endowment plan 
on an income basis providing for the immediate payment at 
death of the respective amounts of $28.65 and $57.30, with 
239 subsequent monthly income payments of the same 
amounts. 
Bessie Halberstadt, wifo, was designated as the revocable 
beneficiary at the time of issuance of Policies 830032-A. and 
5081a21-A.. Cecelia. Halberstadt, daughter, was not tmly 
desig1rnted as the revocable beneficiary at the time of issuance 
of Policies 5815807-A and 5927858-A, hut was the beneficiary 
of record at the time of death. On .Tune 6, 1930, the insured 
changed the beneficiary fron1 his wife to his daughter Cecelia 
on Policies 830032-A and 5081321-A.. However he continued 
to reserve to hims{)lf the right to make further changes of 
beneficiary. Thereafter on September 3, 1930, he directed 
the Respondent to retain the proceeds of Policies 
page 21 ~ 830032-A a.nd 5081321-A and make mont.hlv pay-
ments in accordance with the provision of., option 
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#2. In this election he expressly with11eld from the bene-
ficiary, Cecelia Halberstadt, the right at any time to com-
mute, assign or encumber stipulated payments payable to 
her. 
Upon his death on October 19, 1935, the Respondent de-
termined its net liability on all four policies to be $21,183.07 
and as of the date of death issued its i.nHtallmont ccrtifi(~aie 
,#18113-R which provided for the payment to Cecelia Hal-
berstadt of an initial 1fayrne11t of $121.37 and payment there-
after of the same amount on the nineteenth dav of each 
successive month until 239 pavrnonts has been ma.de. The 
Certificate further provides that in the event of t.he death 
of the payee before receiving- all of installment payments, 
the remaining payments shall he commuted at the rate of 
31h% per annum m,d paid in one sum to the Executors or 
Administrators of tlie payee. Among other things the cer-
tificate provides as follows: 
'' This certificate may not be assigned, set over or tranH-
ferrecl, and no obligation will be recognized by the Company 
except to the extent and in tl1e manner as herein set forth". 
A photostatic copy of the certificate is filed as Exhibit 
''A'' with this answer and, prayed to be read as a. part there-
of. 
page 22 ~ The respondent has retained proceeds of poli-
cies. 830032-A and 5081321-.A. in accordancP. with 
the written election of the deceased insured (not the lmnk-
rupt) pursuant to his election under option #2 of the re-
spective contracts, a copy of said election is filed as Exhibit 
"B ", with this answer and prayed to be read as a part there-
of. The proceeds of Policies 581.5807-A and 5927858-A aro 
only payable in installments in accordance with the terms of 
the respective contracts made with the deceased insured dur-
ing- his lifetime. This respondent is ad,1isecl and here cl1ar~e-.; 
that it is bound b~r its contract with deceased insured; that 
the funds now hekl are which the bankrupt bas only a non-
transferable interest hecanse of her inability· to assign, en-
cumber or commute installment pa:vments therefrom and this 
respondent nlleg·es tlrnt these funds are not transferable and 
not attachable and tl1eref ore tl10 interest of the bankrupt 
cannot pass to the Trm~tee in bankruptcy. 
This respondent contends that this is a spendthrift trust 
and under tlle laws of Virg;inia iR not subject to tl1e liabilities 
of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain or to alienation bv her . 
.And now, having fully answered the com11Iainant 's bill 
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this respondent prays to be hence dismissed with its reason-
able costs by it in its behalf expended. 
page 23 ~ ME1.1ROPOLIT~N LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
by Counsel 
CREWS & CLEMENT 
EXHIBIT'' A'' 
METROPOLITAN 
LH,E· INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
(herein called the company) 
First Instalment $121.37 
239 MONTHLY 
Instalments There-
after of $121.37 
Ea<·h 
Total Amount of Instalment Payment& 
$29,128.80 
No. 18113-R Instalment Certificate 
IN CONSIDERATION of the surrender of original Poli-
cies N 6. 830032-A, 5081321-A & 5815807-A, 5927858-A issued 
by the Company on the life of JOSEPH HALBERST ADT 
therein called the Insured, now deceased, and in accordance 
with the condition in said Policies. 
DOTH PAY on the date hereof ONE HUNDRED 
TWENTY ONE A.ND 37/100 Dollars, to CECELIA HAL-
·BERSTADT the bcme:ficiarv of record under said Policies and 
designated herein as Pay~e. 
AND DOTH AGREI~ FURTHER to pay ONE HUNDRED 
TWENTY ONE AND 37/100 Dollars to said Payee if living 
on the NINETEENTH dav of EACH MONTH THERE-
AFTER beg·inning on the NINETEENTH day of NOVEM-
BER 1935 and ending with final payment, conditional on the 
surrender of this certificate, on the NINETEENTH day of 
· September 1955 snch final payment completi.ng a 
page 24 ~ series of TWO HUNDRED FORTY such 
MONTHLY payments. 
In the event of the death of the Payee herein named be-
fore receiving all of the Instalments payable hereunder, the 
remaining· payments shall be commuted at the rate of three 
and one-half per eentum per annum compound interest and 
on legal surrender and release of this certificate shall be 
paid in one sum to the Executors or Administrators of the 
Payee hereunder. 
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When the Company so require, satisfactory evidence must 
l1e furnished that the P.avee is alive at the time an Instal-
ment is payable hereunder, and if not living, the Company 
must be furnished with satisfactorv evidence of a claimant's 
.authority to receive the conunuted°' value of any Instalments 
remaining unpaid. . · • 
This certificate may not be assigned, set over or trans-
_f erred, and no obligation will be reeognized by the Company 
except to the extent ai,.d in the manner as herein set forth. 
This certificate shall, on each anniversa.ry, participate in 
:such distribution of surplus interest earnings, if any, as may 
be declared by the Company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Metropolitan Life Insur-
~nce Company has caused this certificate to be executed this 
NINETlEENTH day of OCTOBER. 1935. 
page 25 ~ W. C. Fletcher 
Secretary Policy Registrar. President 
Examined 
''EXHIBIT ''B'' 
ELECTION OF INSTALMENT SETTLEME1'TT-
OPTION 2 
Policy No. 830032-A 
Policy No. 5081321-A 
Policy No ....... 1 • 
Policy No ........ . 
Amt. of Ins. $2,000. 
Amt. of Ins. $5,114. 
Amt. of Ins. $ ....• 
Amt. of Ins. $ ..... 
To tl1e METROPOLI'.DAN LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
1 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 
In accordance with and subject to the provisions of the 
above numbered policy or policies, I HE·REBY DIRECT 
that the amount payable under the said poliey or policies, 
upon my death, shall be retained by the Company nnd paid 
out as hereinafter provided, instead of in one sum. 
The sum of $40.76 Dollars upon ·approval of proofs of my 
death, and 239 further Monthly payments thereafter of . 
$40.76 Dollars each, until $9,782.40 Dollars in all shall have 
been paid. . · 
In the event that the beneficiarv of record shall die before 
receiving all the payments as stipulated above, the remain-
ing payments shall be commuted at three and one-half per 
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centum (31h%) per annum, compound interest and be paid 
at once in one sum to the executors or aclministra-
pag·e 26 ~ tors of the beneficiary of record. 
-A.ND I HER:EBY FURTHER DIRECT and agree 
that if the amount payable under the said policy or 
policies at the time of my death be less than the face amount 
of the insurance provided for in said policy or policies, the 
payments as hereinbefore stipulated shall he reduced to such 
proportion of said stipulated payments as the reduced 
amount of insurance payable under the said policy or FOli-
ci~s bears to the face amount of the insurance payable under 
said policy or policies; provided, however, that if the pay-
ments so reduced shall be for less than $10 each, all the fore-
going directions sball be null and void and of no effect. 
AND I HEREBY FURTHER DIRECT that the benefi-
ciarv of record shall not l1ave the right a.t anv time to com-
mute, assign or encumber any stipulated pa~rments yet to 
be made. 
Dated at ,vashingion, N. C. this 3 clay of Sep 1980. 
vY. W. SMITH 
(Witness) 
(vVitncss} 
Beneneiary must sign if: 
JOSEPH HALBERSTADT 
(Insured) 
(Beneficiary) 
(1) The rig·ht to clrnnp;e t]1e lleneficiary has not heen re-
served nncler any policy included in this election, written on 
policy form bearin~: No. 802 or a higher number. 
(2) Any policy wns issued prior to ,fanuary 1, 1907. 
page 27 ~ Recorded at Home Office of Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company. 
Dated 9 /8/1.930 
W. C. FLETCHJDH, 
Secreta 1·y. 
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FOR HOME OFFICE USE ONLY 
CHECKED BY 9/8/30 
DUPLICATE RETURNED TO vVashington, N. C. 
Recorded in Policy Reg·ister P. L. 9 /10/30 
DATE SEP. 8 1930 
And, at another clay, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville, on Monday the 10th clay 
of November, in the year A. D. 1941. 
On motion of tlw defendant, Cecelia Hal·berstadt Hain, 
after notice to the complainant in this cause, and for good 
cause shown to the Court, it is Ordered and Directed that 
she be allowed to file her answer in this cause, which is ac-
cording·ly done. 
ANS"WER 0], CECELIA HALBERJSTADT HAIN 
The answer of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain to a bill of com-
plaint exhibited against her and others by T. Bryan Tate, 
Trustee in Bankruptc~r of the estate of Cecelia Halberstadt 
Hain, in the Corporation Court of Danville. 
For answer to said bill of c.ompla.int, or so much thereof 
as she is advised that it is necessary for her to answer, this 
respondent, Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, replies and says: 
page 28 ~ That it is true that on May 16, 1940, she filed 
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the UnihKl 
States District Court for the ·western District of Virginia, 
Danville Division. 
Tba.t it is true that on May 18, 1940, sl1e was duly adjudi-
cated a bankrupt bv saicl United States District Conrt. nnd 
on May 31, 1940, T. Bryan Tate was appointed as 'rrustee 
in Bankruptcy of her estate, the proc.eeding being styled case 
No. 2120. 
That it is true that counsel who prepared her schedules 
showing· her assets and liabilities listed notes to American 
National Bank and Trust Companv of Danville, Virginia, in 
the ag~;regate prinripal sum of $9,000.00. evidenced by three 
notes, one of which, in the amount of $3,000.00, was dated 
December 19, 1939, and secured by a deed of trust on the resi-
dence property of this respondent located at 206 Robertson 
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A,,enue. Danville, Virginia; one of which was for $4,000.00, 
dated December 5, 1939; and the last of which was for 
$2,000.00, dated December 19, 1939. 
~['hat it is true that her schedules, prepared by her attor-
neys aforesaid, show that she owed said three notes aggre-
gating $9,000.00 to the American National Bank and Trust 
Company, and that said indebtedness was secured by certifi-
cate No. 6686 for 25 shares of the stoek of the 
pag·e 29 ~ Union Mutual Building and Loan Association, 
Danville, Virginia; certificate of title to one 1937 
Dodge sedan, Motor No. D5-264091; and one installment cer-
ti:fica te No. 18113-R, issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company, whereby said company is obligated to pay to her 
the sum of $121.37 in 247 monthly installments beginning Oc-
tober 19, 1935, and ending September 19, 1955, but it was 
stated in Schedule A-2 under the subject '' Creditors Holding 
Securities'' that '' the assi~nment of installment certificate 
No. 18113-R, with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
above ref erred to was made notwithstanding a provision in 
the face of said certificate that it may not be assigned, set 
over or transferred, and the assignment in the o~nion r,f 
the petitioner is of doubtful validity". 
That she neither denies nor admits the ailegation of the 
bill that said bank claims to bold the above described in-
stallment certificate as collateral :security for said indebfod-
ness pursuant to the provisions of a letter from her to said 
bank dated July 12, 1937, but requires strict proof thereof. 
That the answer filed by the Metropolitan Life Insuranct, 
Company claims that the alleged assignment of said install-
ment certificate issued bv it is null and void and of no ef-
fect for the reason that it is prohibited by the terms of e,aid 
certificate and for other reasons fully set forth in said an-
swer. 
pa.ge 30 } That she denies that her Trustee in Bankruptcy 
is entitled to collect the installments becoming due 
and payable under said certificate at any time following her 
bankruptcy. 
That it is true that this respondent is denying· that her 
Trustee in Bankruptcy has any right to have and receive 
the monthly installments of $121.37 each which have accrued 
under said certificate since her bankruptcy and which may 
hereafter accrue under said certificate. Under Schedule B-3 
of her bankruptcy Rchedules, p:iven to the subject of ''Choses 
in Action'', respondent describes said certifi~ate and states 
that its assig-nability is doubtful, and under Schedule B-5 
of her schedules, g-iven over to '' Property Qlaimed as Ex-
empt from the Operation of the Act of Congress Relating to 
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Bankruptcy", she clnimccl "that by its terms installment 
certificate No. 19113-R with the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company entitled her to collect 240 monthly installments of 
$121.37 beginning on October 19, 1935, ending on September 
19, 1955, is non-assig·nable and non-transferable, and is 
exempt from the claims of creditors.'' 
That it is true that ~n actual controversy exists betw~en 
the complainant, your respondent, and the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company within the meaning· of Chapter 254A of 
the Code of Virginia. 
That this respondent is advised that the complainant has 
the right to invoke the Court's general equity jurisdiction for 
the determination of the validity or non-validity 
page 31 ~ of said alleged voluntary assignment, and also 
the right to obtain a declaratory judgment which 
will determine the conflicting claims of the parties to this 
suit and be forever binding o~ the complainant and the re-
spondents therein. 
That this respondent denies that under Acts of Congress 
for such cases made and provided, to-wit, Section 70A of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A., Section llO(a), her said 
Trustee in Bankruptcy is, by operation of law, entitled to 
have and receive all monthly installments which may he pay-
able by the l\letropolitan Life Insurance Company under said 
certificate No. 18113-R, either immediately . following her 
bankruptcy or at any other time during the life of said cer-
tificate and prior to her death. 
That it is true that she is denying that the complairnmt 
has any rights or is entitled to assert any benefits 11nder 
said certificate during- her lifetime, and that it is also true · 
that there is an actual controversy between complainant, the 
Metropolitari Life Insurance Company and herself, which the 
Court has jurisdiction to determine under . the Virginia 
declaratory judgment statute. 
For further answer to this bill of complaint this respond-
ent says: 
On March 22, 1912, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany issued to respondent's father, ,Joseph Halberstadt, en-
dowment life policy No. 830032A. in the sum of 
page 32 } $2,000.00, upon the terms and conditions set forth 
in said policy, and on September 28, 1927, the Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Company issued to the said ,Jose'9h 
Halberstadt its whole life policy No. 5081321A, in the amount 
of $5,114.00, upon the terms and conditions of said policy ; 
that he reserved the right in both of said policies to change 
the beneficiaries named and to exercise the options therein 
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given. On June 6, 1930, the beneficiary named in said policy 
No. 830032A and said policy No. 5081321A was changed to 
your respondent, Cecelia Halberstadt, daug·hter of the in-
sured. On September 3, 1930, the said Joseph Halberstadt 
executed with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company a 
written election of installment settlement-Option 2, cover-
ing the above mentioned two policies, whereby the beneficiary 
thereunder should receive $40.76 upon his death and 239 fur-
ther monthly payments of $40.76, until the sum of $9.782AO 
shall have been paid, with the provision that should the bene-
ficiary die before receivhtg· all payments as stipulated, the 
remaining payments should be commuted and paid at once 
in one sum to the executors or administrators of the bene-
ficiary ·of record. A photostatic copy of said written election 
filed with the answer of the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company shows the following provision in regard to the 
rig·hts of the beneficiary named under said election : 
page 33 ~ '' And I herebv further direct that the benefi-
ciary of record "shall not have the right at any 
time to commute, assign or encumber any stipulated pay-
ments yet to be made.'' 
Respondent's father died on October 19, 1935, and. at the 
time of his death she was the beneficiary of record under 
said two policies, No. 830032A and No. 5081321.A., and was 
entitled to the benefits under said written election of install-
ment settlement-Option 2, executed on September 3, 1930. 
On May 16, 1929, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany issued its income policy (39 year endowment), No. 
5815807 A, insuring the life of the said ,Joseph Halberstadt 
and agTeeing upon his death to pay to respondent as bene-
ficia.rv the sum of $28.65 and thereafter a monthlv income of 
$28.6:1 until 239 such payments, ag·gregating $6,876.00, shall 
have been paid, with the rig·ht in the insured to change the 
beneficiary. There was a provision in said policy which pro-
vided that: 
''No beneficiary may assign or commute income payments 
mtlPss the insured has so provided in writing and such pro-
vision has been endorsed on the policy by the company at its 
home office.'' 
At the date of the death of the said Joseph Halberstadt 
on October 1.9, 1935, said policy was in full force and effect 
and no such provisions had been endorsed on the policy by 
the fmmpany at its home office, and the beneficiary of record 
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named therein was your respondent, Cecelia Halberstadt. 
On July 8, 1929, the Metropolitan Life hlsnr-
page 34 }- ance Company issued to Joseph Halberstadt its 
· income policy (39 year endowment), No. 5927858A, 
insuring the life of the said Joseph Hal]?erstadt and agree-
ing upon his death to pay to respondent as beneficiary the 
snm of $57.30 and thereafter a monthly income of $57.30 ·~mtil 
239 such payments, ag·gregating $13,752.00, shall have b(~en 
paid, with the right in the insured to change the beneficiary. 
There was a provision in said policy which provided that: 
· ''No beneficiary may assign or commute income payrnents-
m11esi;; the insured has so provided in writing and such pro-· 
vision lms been endorsed on the policy by the company at its 
home office.'' 
At the date of tl.ie death of the said Joseph Halberstadt 
on Octo·ber 19, 1935, Raid policy was in full force and effect 
and no such provision had been endorsed on the policy bv 
the company at its home office, and the beneficiary of record· 
named therein was your respondent, Cecelia Halberstadt. 
Shortly after the death of ,Joseph Halberstadt on Octohcr 
19, 1935, policies Nos. 83C032A, 5081321A, written election· 
of installme11t settlement-Option 2, a photostatic copy of 
which is filed with the answer of the Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company .and income policies (39 year endowment), 
Nos. 5815807 A a.nd 5927858A afore said, were su r-
pag·e 35 ~ rendered to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, wl1ich in return therefor issued to your re-
spondent, Cecelia Halberstadt, its installment certificate No. 
18113-R, dated October 1'9, 1!)35, and payable to her in one 
.fh·st installment of $121.37, pa.id on or about October 19, 
1935, with 239 installments thereafter of $121.37, with the 
provision tha.t in the event of tl1e death of the payee named 
in said certificate before receiving all of the installments pc:1y-
able thereunder, t11e remaining payments sl1all be commuted 
at the rate of 3% per centum per annum, compound interest, 
and on legal suri~ender and release of said certificate shall 
be paid in one sum to the executors or administrators of the 
payee thereunder and upon the further following terms and 
conditions, as shown on the photostatic copy of said certifi-
cate filed with the answer of the l\Ietropolitan Life Insm -
auce Company : 
'' This certifieate may not be assigned, set over or trans-
ferred, and no obligation will be recog11izecl by the companv 
except to the extent and in the manner as herein set forth.'' 
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All of said insurance policies were issued and executed at 
the home office of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
in the City of New York, in the State of New York, in which 
said company was organized and chartered, and all payments 
and benefits thereunder were payable to the bene-
page 36 ~ ficiary named at the home office of said company 
in the City of New York. The written election 
of installment s~ttlement-Option 2, and said installment cer-
tificate No. 18113-R were completed and executed at the home 
office of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in New 
York City, and all monthly payments and income payments 
mentioned therein were made payable at the home office of 
said company in said city. 
Respondent was a resident of and domiciled in the City 
of New York at the dat~ of the death of her father, Joseph 
Halberstadt, on October 19, 1935. At that time she owed no 
debts, and the debts and liabilities which foi .. ced her into vol-
untary bankruptcy were created subsequent to the date of 
her father's death and after she had taken up her residence 
and domicile in the City of Danville, Virginia. Installment 
certificate No. 18113-R, issued to her by Metropolitan Life 
Insurance ·Company as of the date of the death of her father, 
Joseph Halberstadt, represents the culmination of his ef-
forts to provide her with a living monthly income after his 
death, free of all claims of her creditors and without rig·ht 
of assignment or alienation hy her, in times of adversity 
or success, over a long period of years ending September 
19, 1955, and under any and all changing conditions. Tl,ie 
four above mentioned contracts of insurance were contracts 
between him and the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
page 37 r Company, with respondent named as beneficiary, 
but with no rights or benefits thereunder until the 
death of her father, the said Joseph Halberstadt. Said in-
stallment certificate created upon the surrender of said four 
insurance policies automatically effected upon his death th~ 
purposes fixed in his lifetime to· provide a trust for respond-
ent's benefit, with a living income over a long period of 
years. In effect said policies, followed by said installment· 
certificate, created a spendthrift trust for the benefit of this 
respondent, and the limitations and restrictions upon and 
over the income provided for this respondent were carried 
into the contracts made by J"oscph Halberstadt with Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company so that no assignment could 
be made of the monthly payments or income under said con-
tracts and said installment certificate. The restric.tions con-
tained in said contracts and installment certificate, which 
were executed and a1~e to be performed in the State of New 
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York, to the effect that the benefits thereunder to be received 
hy your respondent could not be assigned or disposed of by 
other oblig·ation, are recognized as valid restrictions by the 
laws of the State of New York, are not prohibited by the laws 
of the State of Virgfoia, and such provisions and restrictions 
are not against the public policy of the State of Virginia. 
Both the laws of the State of New York and the laws of the 
.State of Virginia. make ample and liberal pro-
page 38 } visions for spendthrift trusts, and the restrictions 
against assignment or transfer of the rights to 
your respondent to a monthly income of $121.37 over a period 
of 239 months are valid under the laws of the iState of New 
York and the laws of the State of Virginia, both as a bind-
ing· contract and as a spendthrift trust. This respondent 
admits and so states that such part of the monthly payments 
or income under said installment certificate as may be due 
in the event of her death and payable in one lump sum to 
her executors and administrators, after having been com-
puted in accordance with the provisions of said certificate, is 
a contingent right which she is entitled to assign or dispose 
of in her lifetime or by will at her death, and that said con-
tingent right or estate may have passed to the American 
National Bank and Trust Company by virtue of the pro-
visions of her letter to it under date of July 12, 1937, and/or 
may have passed to her Trustee in Bankruptcy upon her ad-
judication. 
Respondent was twenty-three years of age at the death 
of her father, and sometime thereafter moved from the State 
of New York to Danville, Virginia, to live. She attempted 
to operate a business in the City of Danville, Virg·inia, with 
the assistance of Simon Hain, whom she married on August 
23, 1937. On July 12, 1937, she signed a letter addressed to 
· American National Banic and Trust Company and 
page 39 } a part of which is quoted in the bill of complaint. 
This letter was written hv the .American •National 
Bank and Trust Company and at the suggestion of the said 
Simon Hain she signed it and delivered it to said bank. Said 
letter recog·nized the restrictions contained in said install-
ment certificate and the refusal of the l\1etropolitan Life In-
surance Company to accept said assignment if brought to 
its attention. In this letter respondent agTeed to place or 
have placed to her credit in said hank the proceeds from the 
checks representing her monthly income payments under 
said installment certificate. The proceeds from said monthly 
allowance or payments were placed to the credit of respond-
ent in American National Bank and Trust Companv until 
August 19, 1940, since which time no payments have been 
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made. The proceeds from all monthly payments under said 
installment certificate up to said date of August 19, 1940, 
have been used and disposed of by this respondent, and no 
part thereof has been requested or applied to the payment 
of any indebtedness owed by her to said bank. 
The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was not noti-
fied of respondent's letter of July 12, 1937, until on or about 
August 26, 1940. On or about August 2B, 1940, the com-
plainant notified said Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
of respondent's bankruptcy and made claim to all future 
installments payable under said installment cer-
page 40 ~ tificate, and no payments have been made to re-
. · spondent since said date of August 23, 1940. The 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company on or about August 
29, 1940, notified the complainant that this respondent at the 
time of her bankruptcy had no transferable interest in saicl 
installment certificate, had no right to assign, encumber or 
commute installment payments due thereunder; that said 
payments could not be attached; and that the interest of re-
spondent therein did not pass to respondent's Trustee in 
Bankruptcy. In its answer duly filed in the above styled cause 
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company states that it is 
bound by its contract with respondent's father, Joseph Hal-
berstadt; that the funds held by it are neither transferable 
nor attachable; that the interest of respondent cannot pass 
to her Trustee in Bankruptcy; and that said .installment cer-
tificate represents a spendthrift trm,t under the laws of Vir-
gfoia and is not subject to the liabilities of respondent or to 
alienation by her. 
Respondent further answers and says that her Trustee 
in Bankruptcy has no claim to the monthly income payments 
accruing to her under said installment certificate, for they 
represent provisions made for her support and the support 
of her family hy her father by valid and enforceable con-
tracts with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, with 
valid and enforceable restrictions against assign-
page 41 ~ ment and alienation, so that she had no rig·ht, 
power or authority to assign, alienate or transfer 
her rights to receive from month to month such income pay-
ment checks and use the same for tl1e support and mainte-
nance of herself and her family; that any writing or instru-
ment purporting· to be an assignment of that part of said 
installment certificate which entitles respondent to receive 
monthly income payments strictlv in accordance with the 
terms and nrovisions of Raid certificate are null and void and 
of no effect; that insofar as respondent's letter of .Tulv 12 
1937, to the American National Rank and Trust Compa113; 
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is claimed to be an assignment of respondent's rights to re-
ceive said monthly income payments aforesaid, the same is 
null and void; that the provisions in said contracts between 
Joseph Halberstadt and the l\fotropolitan Life Insurance 
Company for the benefit of this respondent by which she is 
denied the right to assign, alienate and transfer her inter-
est in the monthly income installments payable under said 
certificate, are recog-nized as reasonable, proper and valid 
under the laws of the State of New York and under the laws 
of the State of Virginia, and that in effect the provisions 
made for the monthly payment of income installments, with 
protection against assignment or alienation, create a spend-
thrift trust for the benefit of this respondent insofar as the 
monthly income installments are c·oncerned, and 
page 42 ~ that such a trust is recognized as valid under both 
the laws of ,the State of New York and the laws 
of tne State of Virginia. 
Respondent claims that the aforementioned contracts anq 
installment certificate are to be construed and are governed 
by the laws of the State of New York; that the proceeds ac-
cruing under said contracts upon the death of her father, 
Joseph Halberstadt, and payable to her in monthly in~me 
installments as provided for in said installment certificate 
were left with the said l\Ietropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany under a trust or agreement between t)J.e said company 
and the said Joseph Halherstadt, with benefits accruing there-
under within the meaning of the statute of New .York here-
inafter set forth at length and under which the benefits ac-
cruing thereunder are not transferable nor subject to com-
mutation or encumbrance nor to leg·al process, and iR not a 
right or estate, title to which passed to the complainant upon 
her bankruptcy. 
Respondent admits that the letter of July 12, 1937, from 
her to tl1e American N at.ional Bank and Trust Company in 
effect assigns to said bank as collateral the only rig·ht and 
estate which she in law had the rig·ht to assign or alienate, 
namely, the right to dispose of by deed or will any install-
ments remaining unpaid at the time of her death, ,vhich in-
stallments in the event of her said death must be 
page 43 ~ commuted according to the terms of said install-
ment certificate and paid at once in one sum to 
her executors pr administrators for application to the pay-
ment of her debts and thereafter to the beneficiaries named 
in her will 01· the distributees of hm· estate. 
The following is a New Yoric ~tfltute found under the sub':" 
ject of personal property law, .Seetion 15, page 68, in 40 l\fo-
Kinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Annotated: 
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'' 1. The rig·ht of the beneficiary to enforce the perform-
ance of a trust to receive the income of personal property, 
and to apply it to the use of any person, can not be ·trans-
f ened by assig'llment or otherwise. But the right and in-
terest of the beneficiary of any other trust in personal prop-
erty, including the beneficiary of a trust in personal prop-
erty under a plan of reorg·anization pursuant to chapter 
seven hundred forty-five of the laws of nineteen hundred 
thirty-three, as enacted or amended, and/or pursuant to 
chapter nineteen of the laws of nineteen hundred thirty-five, 
as enacted or amended, and/or pursuant to sections one hun-
dred nineteen to one bundrecl twenty-three, both inclusive, 
of the real property law or pursuant to section seventy-
seven-b of the national bankruptcy act, may be transferred. 
Provided, however, that when the proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy, becoming a claim by ~eath of the insured, are left 
with the insurance company under a trust or other 
page 44 ~ ag-reement, the benefits accruing· thereunder after 
the death of the insured shall not be transferable, 
nor subject to commutation or incumbrance, nor to legal 
process except in an action to recover for necessaries, if the 
parties to the trust or other agreement so agree. 
"2. The provisions of this section shall not impair or af-
fect any right existing on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hun-
dred and three, nor impair or affect the rights of creditors 
under section fifty-two of the domestic relations law." 
The insurance policies, optional ag-reement and installment 
certificate hereinbefore mentioned and issued by the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, were issued in the light of 
the above quoted. New York statute, and the restrictions 
against assig'llillent, alienation and other obligations of re-
spondent and the exemptions provided for as to such assign-
ment, alienation and other obligations as contained in said 
policies, optional agreement and installment certificate, were 
agreed upon by said Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
and respondent's father, Joseph Halberstadt, and the rights 
of respondent should be construed and enforced in accord-
ance with the terms thereof and the provisions of said 
statute. 
And now having fully answered, this respond-
pag·e 45 ~ ent prays to be hence dismissed with her costs in 
this behalf expended. 
CECELIA H.ALBEHSTADT HAIN .. 
MEADE & TALBOTT, 1Utorneys. 
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.And, at another day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville, on Thursday the 27th day 
of November, in the year · A. D. 1941. 
For reasons appearing to the Court it is ordered that the 
foregoing cause be continued until the next Chancery term 
of this Court. · 
A.nd, at another day, to-wit: 
-Corporation Court of ))anville, on Saturday the loth day 
of January, in the year .A.. D. 1942. 
On motion Qf the defendant, Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, by 
counsel, the complainant is required and directed to take and 
file his depositions in this suit on or before February 10, 
1942, and the defendants are required and directed to take 
and :file their depositions within thirty days after the com-
plainant's depositions are filed; and the complainant shall 
have :fifteen days after the depositions of the defendants are 
filed, within which to take and :file any depositions he may 
desire in rebuttal of the testimony of the defendants. 
page 46 ~ In the Corporation ·Court of Danville, Virginia. 
T. Bryan Tate, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, Complainant, 
v. 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, et als., Defendants. 
DEPOSITIONS. 
The depositions of "\Vayles R.. Harrison and others taken 
before me, Marie York, a Notary Public in and for the City 
of Danville, State of Virginia, at the office of Brown and 
Garrett, Masonic Building, Danville, Virginia, on January 
31st, 1942, pursuant to the attached notices, to be read in 
evidence on behalf of complainant in the above styled chan-
cery cause pending in the Corporation Court of Danville .. 
Present: E. Walton Brown of Brown and Garrett, Coun-
sel for -Complainant. Grasty Crews, Esq., of Crews and Clem-
ent, Attorneys for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 
Edwin B. Meade, Esq., of Meade and Talbott, Attorneys for 
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Mrs. Cecelia Ilalberstadt Hain. 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain. The American National Bank 
and Trust Company by Wayles R. Harrison, President. 
The plaintiff called the defendant, 
MRS. ·CECELIA HALBERSTADT H.AlN, 
as an ~dverse witness and, after being duly sworn, she de-
poses and says as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Brown: 
Q. Please state your name, age and place of residence. 
A. Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, 30 years old, Danville, Vir-
ginia·. 
Q. What is the date of your birth? 
A. January 28, 1912. 
Q. Your maiden name, I believe, was :Mis~ Cecelia Hal-
berstadt? 
A. That's right. 
pag·e 47} Q. Your father's name was Mr. Joseph Halber-
stadtt 
A. That's right. 
Q. Whom did you marry and when T 
A. I married Simon Hain on August 22, 1937. 
Q. Where were you married f 
A. Roanoke, Virginia. 
Q. 'What is the date of your father's death? 
A. October 19, 1935. 
Q. I herewith hand you copy of application, dated May 2, 
1936, reading as follows : 
"Danville, Virginia, May 2, 1936. I hereby apply for reg-
istration in the 3 ward. I am 24 years of age. I was born 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania State, on January 28, 1912 
Date. I have been living in Danville 1 years, in the 3 ward 
1 years, in the State 1 years. M:y residence is Hotel Dan-
ville. My occupation is None. I have never registered be-
fore. 
(Signature) Cecelia Halberstadt" 
This copy bears the certificate of C. L. Booth, Registrar 
of the City of Danville, that '' This is a true copy of her 
application". Please state whether you are the same person 
who, under your maiden name of Cecelia Halberstadt, made 
that application so that you could reg·ister to vote. 
A. I don't remember th~ date exactly or about it, but I 
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Mrs. Cecelia Halbcrstadt Hain. 
believe I did register to vote because I had been voting. 
Q . .Are the facts stated in that application true f 
page 48 ~ A. The age is correct and the birthplace and 
where I was living at the Hotel Danville is cor-
rect and I had been living here less than one year at that 
time. I had come here after mv father's death in October. 
While it says one year it was "'a .fraction of a year that I 
had been Ii ving here. 
Q. Do you mean that the statement as to the fact that you 
had been a resident of the State for one year is not truef 
A. If you mean by that · a resident-
Q. I mean by that a legal resident of the State of Vir-
ginia as you stated in your application . 
.A. I would say that's not true if that is to be interpreted 
as 12 months. , 
Q. Mrs. Hain, I now hand you herewith a copy of your reg-
istration oath, ~ated May 2, 1936, certified as a true copy by 
C. L. .Booth, Registrar of the City of Danville, Virginia, 
which reads as follows: 
''Registration Oath (E,emale) (To be filed with the Reg-
istrar and preserved with the Books of R,egistration) I, 
Cecelia Halberstadt do solemnly swear ( or affirm) that I am 
entitled to register under the act of assembly of Virginia ex-
tending the right of suffrage to women, and that I am not 
disqualified from exercising the right of suffrag·e by the said 
act. 
(Signed) Cecelia Halberstadt 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 day of May, 
1936. 
C. L. Booth, Registrar.'' 
Will you look at that and refresh your memory and stat! 
whether or not the facts stated in the application as to your 
residence are not true? 
page 49 ~ A·. I don't remember ever seeing this and this 
isn't my signature. 
Q. Mrs. Hain, I should have stated to you that this was 
of course not the original paper that you signed but that it 
was a certified copy of the paper which you did sig;n which 
is on file in the office of C. L. Booth, Registrar of"=the City 
of Danville. I merelv show vou that to refresh vour mem-
ory and give you an"' opportunity to- .. 
A. I don't quite understand what this means. Are you 
asking me if I registere~? 
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Q. Mrs. Hain, it is a perfectly simple matter. I first showed 
you your application to register, a copy of it, and asked you 
if the facts stated as to your residence, and the other facts 
stated, were true and you didn't seem to remember clearly 
whether you had lived in Danville or had been registered 
in the State of Virginia for one year. 
A. I beg your pardon, I remember exactly how long I have 
been living in Danville. 
Q. So I understand that after having seen copy of affi-
davit made at that time you still insist that the fact that 
you had been a resident of the State for one year is not 
true? 
A. You see, I came here after Daddy died. 
Mr. Brown: We offer in evidence, to be marked as Ex-
hibit ''A", the copy of the application; also a copy of the 
registration oath to be marked as Exhibit "B". 
Q. Where was your father, Mr. Joseph Halberstadt, re-
siding at the time he made the election of installm~nt settle-
ment under Option 2 of policies No. 830032-.A and 5081321-A. 
of $2,000.00 and $5,114.00, respectivelyt This is dated Sep-
tember 3, 1930, photostatic copy of which I now 
page 50 ~ hand you. 
A. He was living at Belhaven, North Carolina. 
Q. In what county is Belhaven Y 
A. Beaufort County. 
Q. Is the town of Washington, North -Carolina, in Beau-
fort County Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long had _your father lived in Beaufort County, 
North Carolina, prior to September 3, 1930, the date of this 
application? · 
A. I'd say about 7 years. 
Q. .About 7 years? 
A. I think that's correct. 
Q. Where did your father reside at the date of his death f 
A. Belhaven, .North Carolina. · 
Q. Was he conducting any business in Washington, North 
Carolina? 
A. No, ·sir. 
Q. Where was his business 7 
A. Belhaven, North Carolina. 
Q. Approximately how many years then did he live in 
Belhaven, .North Carolina f 
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A. I'd say 12, I guess. 
Q. About 12 years? ! · 
A. I think so. 
Q. In other words, he died in 1935 and he went to. Bel .. 
haven to live in 1927? 
A. Well., that would be 1923 wouldn't it 1 
Q. I understand he went to live there in 1923 f 
pag·e 51 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did your mother die Y 
.A.. April, 1929. . 
Q. Did s4e die in Belhave~ toot 
A . .She was in a hospital in ·washington. There was no 
hospital in Belhaven. She had been living in Belhaven, be. 
came ill and was taken there. 
Q. Did your father and mother maintain their residence at 
Belhaven, North Carolina., from the time they moved there 
until the time of his death and her death Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did they have any home in New York State 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. No place of residence in Virgi.nia 1 
A. No, sir. , 
Q. As I understa~d, Mrs. Hain, your registration in Dan-
ville, Virginia, for the purposes of exercising your elective 
franchise was your first registration for that purpose? 
A. First registration in Virginia. 
Q. Then, as I understand, it was your first registration 
anywhere¥ 
A. No, .sir. I had previously registered and voted in New 
York City; rather Brooklyn. 
Q. Then, as I understand, your registration in Danville, 
Virgi.nia, was not your first registration for the purpose of 
voting? 
A. No, sir. It was my :first registration in Danville. 
Q. Where, during what period of time, did you live in 
New York? · 
A. ·From the time I finished college in 1931 until 
page 52 ~ my father died; then I had to look after the es. 
tate and I came down here-and went back to 
New York-and came back down here. I lived in -New York 
for 4 years. 
Q. Did yo~r father have any places of business other than 
Beaufort County, North Carolina Y • 
A. He had a partnership interest in several stores which 
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were operated by Mr. ~u.rge~s and t~e~ 'Yere ~ocated ~ ~an-
ville, Petersburg·, Martmsv1lle, V1rgnna, and Re1dsv1lle, 
North . Carolina. 
Q. Did you come to Danville prior to your father's death 
to look after the. store 1 
A. 'No, sir. I had never been ,in Danville. 
Q. Never been in Danville before your father's death 0l 
A. No, sir.· 
Q. Do you: recall the exact date of your coming to Dan-
ville to live Y 
A. I came to Danville shortly after my father died and 
stayed just one night and then went to Belhaven and stayed 
one or two nights and then went back to Danville. 
Q. I am not interested in casual trips back and forth. I 
am interested to :find out when you came to Danville to make 
your home, or Danville your residence. 
A. You see, I didn't come to Danville to look after the 
business. Mr. Burgess was the partner who looked after the 
business. 
Q. When did you come to Danville to live f 
A. My intention when I came here was not to live here right 
away but just to settle up the estate. I had to be here pa rt 
of the time and in North Carolina part of the time. I didn't 
know until the stores were divided and I received my share 
of the business just where I would have my in-
page 53 ~ come and that wasn't done until April, 1936. That 
was the time I had definite]y made up my mind I 
would live here. I wasn't drawing any income from the busi-
ness. .All I had was the income from the policy, no matter 
where I lived. 
Q . .After you registered in :M:ay, l 936, did you vote in the 
election? 
A. No, sir. I don't think so. It so happened tha:t I had 
to go to New York on election day. 
Q. What day is election day? 
A. It is the first Tuesdav in November. 
Q. Did you vote in any focal election in J unc, 1.936 Y 
A. I don't 1·emember . 
. Q. W~ll, what I. am t!·ying to get c~ear is that since you 
chd reg~ster, certamly smce you married Mr. Hain. he and 
you have made your home here in tl1e City of Danville, have 
resided here and claimed citizenship in the State of Vir-
ginia? 
A. What was that-I'm sorry-Yes, sir, I have been a resi-
dent here certainly since the time I registered. 
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Q. You and he have lived together and made your home 
in the City of Danville, Virginia¥ · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hain, I hand you herewith the original of 
your petition and schedules in bankruptcy No. 2120, United 
States District Court of the vVestern District of Virginia, 
Danville Division in the matter of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, 
trading as Danville Shoe Market; this petition being dated 
May 13, 1940, and having been filed on May 16, 1940. Are. 
you the Mrs. Cecelia Halberstadt Hain whose name is signed 
to this petition, to each of the schedules thereto 
pag·e 54 r attached, and to the oaths to schedules A and B 
attached to this petition "2 
A. Yes. 
Inquiry made to Mr. Meade: :Mr. Meade, we are perfectly 
willing to introduce the entire petition and all attached sched-
ules but I would suggest that we might agree simply to in-
troduce the copy of the petition and the pages of the sched-
ules that are material to this controversy. Is that agreeable 
or not? 
A. It is agreeable to us to introduce the copy of the peti-
tion and verification thereto, a copy of schedule A-2, a copy 
of schedule H-3 and a copy of schedule B-5· in the place of all 
of the original petition, together with schedules, or a copy 
of such petition and all of said schedules. 
Mr. Brown: Pursuant to this agreement we offer the pe-
tition and schedules in evidence with the understanding that 
all may be referred to if necessary but only the ones as 
designated will be copied unless otherwise directed by some 
party. 
Q. I assume yon will admit as true the statement which 
appears in your p~t~tion in bankruptcy that as of May 13, 
1940, you were res1dmg at No. 206 Robertson Avenue in the 
City of Danville, County of Pittsylvania, .State of Virginia, 
and that you had resided or had had your domicile in Dan-
ville, Virg·inia, within the above judicial district for a lon~er 
portion of the six montl1s immediately preceding the filing 
of this petition than in any other judicial district? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just for the record I show you a copy of an order en-
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tered by the United States District Court of the 
page 55 r Wes tern District of Virginia at Danville, on March 
, 5, 1928, which admits to United States citizenship 
your husband, Simon Hain. As I understand, your husband 
has been a legal resident and domiciled in the State of Vir-
ginia from the time he was admitted to United States citi-
zenship? 
A. I didn't know him prior to 1935. Since I first met Mr. 
Simon Hain, w horn I afterwards married, which was in the 
fall of 1935 after my father died, he has, to my knowledge, 
been a citizen of the State of Virg·inia, and domiciled in said 
State and a resident of Danville. 
Mr. Brown: We offer in evidence a copy of that order and 
ask that it be marked Exhibit "0". · 
Mr. Crews: I don't see that it has a particle of bearing 
on any phase of the case. 
Q. Mrs. Hain, it appears from a photostatic copy of the 
certificate. issued to you under the ·name of Cecelia Halber-
stadt by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, date.d 
October 19, 1935, that this Company agreed to pay you the 
first installment of $121.R7 and thereafter 239 monthly in-
stallments of the same amount. Where have these install-
ment payments under this certificate been made to you and 
in what manner Y 
A. They were mailed to me. 
Q. In the form of drafts or checks made payable to your 
order? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they were mailed to you by the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company from its home office, addressed to you 
in Danville, Virginia Y 
A. Wherever I was living·. Whenever you move you just 
notify them where to send the checks. 
Q. Well, what I am trying to get clear is as to 
page 56 r which State they addressed these and sent them,. 
the installment payments? 
A. They sent them to me at my address here. 
Q. In the City of Danville, Virginia¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you have resided here since soon 
after your father's death and since these monthly install-
ments became payable T 
A. I ha~e stayed here most of the time .. 
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Q. Do you recall ever receiving· any of these monthly 
checks any other place than the State of Virginia ij? 
.A.. No, sir. . 
Q . .A.t what bank did you deposit these monthly checks f 
.A.. I cashed them any place. 
Q. .A.ny bank in Danville f 
.A.. Not necessarily a bank. 
Q. Did you deposit most of them in tl1e American National 
Bank and Trust Company f 
.A.. I don't recall. I- spent them. 
Q. Do you of your own knowledge know the last month for 
which you or the .American National Bank and Trust Com-
pany as assignee, received the last installment Y 
.A.. No, I don't recall That was about the time of-
Q. Of bankruptcy? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Do you have copies of any assignments made by you 
of the installment benefits under this certificate to the Ameri-
can National Bank and Trust Company? 
A. I don't think the policy is assignable. 
page 57 ~ Q. Mrs. Hain, I am asking you do you have 
copies to save my getting it somewhere else, of 
the actual paper you signed, whatever it amounts to f 
.A.. I don't know what papers my husband has. He took 
care of all of those things. 
Q. However, you did deliver the certificate issued by the 
Metropolitan, No. 18113-R, copy of which is :filed with the 
answer in this suit, to the American National Bank and Trust 
Company and authorized the Bank to apply the monthly 
chooks toward discharg·e of your obligation at the Bank! 
A. No, sir. I don't recall doing that. · 
Q. You mean they got you and you didn't even know about 
itf .· 
A. I tell you, Mr. Brown, all of the insurance policies were 
kept in the safe. My husband looked after the business. I 
have the children.· 
Inquiry made to Mr. Meade and to 1\fr. Crews: Can we 
stipulate that this be :filed as Exhibit, properly identified, the 
photostatic copy of the election installment settlement signed 
by Mr. Joseph Halberstadt, dated September 8, 1930,-that 
this is a true copy of the original application or election? 
Mr. Meade: Name your policy numbers and we will agree 
to it. 
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Election of installment settlement-Option 2, policy num-
bers 830032-A and 5081321-A for $2,000.00 and $5,114.00, re-
spectively. 
Mr. Cre,,rs : We stipulate that that is a true copy. 
Is that satisfactory, Mr. Meade! 
Mr. · Meade : Yes. 
Mr. Brown: We offer this election iu evidence marked 
· Exhibit "D", and we also stipulate and offer in 
page 58 ~ evidence as Exhibit, properly identified, install-
ment certificate No. 18113-R issued by the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, dated October 19, 1935, which 
was filed with and made a part of the answer of Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company filed herein as a true photo-
static copy of the original certificate. Is that agTeeahle? 
Mr. -Crews: Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Meade: 
Q. Mrs. Hain, who was your attorney in preparing the pe-
tition and schedules in bankruptcy filed by you f 
.A. John Carter. 
Q. The late Mr. John W. Carter of Danville, Virg'inia t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q . .And he prepared these papers and advised you some! 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Did your mother survive your father? 
.A. No. 
Q. When did sl1e die f 
Mr. Brown: That's in the record. 
A. April 19, 1929. 
Q. Did your father marry the second time? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Brown: .All of these questions are objected to as be-
ing . immaterial. 
It was in the summer of, I believe, 1930. 
Q. Where were you at the time of your mother's death? 
A. I was in college at Greensboro. 
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Q. How soon after your mother's death did you 
page 59 } finish college in Greensboro, North Carolina! 
A. I :finished in June, 1931. 
Q. Did you go back to Belhaven, North ,Carolina, to live 
with your father and step-mother 1 
A. I went back and staved some that summer and then I 
went to ,New York. ., 
Q. You stayed some in the summer of 1931 with your 
father and step-mother f 
A. Yes, except when I went to summer school. 
Q. When did you go to New York, approximately? 
A. September or October, 1931. 
Q. Did you live in .New York from that date until your 
father's death? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an occupation there in New Yorkf 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was iU 
A. The first year I went to social work school and then I 
worked. 
Q. Who was your employer? 
A. Well, for the last year or year and a half I believe I 
worked for the City or the City and State. We got our pay 
from both. 
Q. Did you do welfare work in the City of New York, or 
in the City of Brooklyn t 
A. Well, I work.ed in both-in the Bronx, in Long Island 
and Brooklyn. It's all New York. 
Q. Prior to your father's death had he told you that he 
had made provision for you through these insurance policies 
in question here f 
A. Yes. He would come to New York every once in a while 
to buy and to see me and I remember clearly how 
page 60 r thrilled he was ·with this arrangement about the 
insurance he left me and he told me that I would 
get it monthly for 20 years and that he thought that was 
best for me and asked me if I were satisfied because he wanted 
m~ to be taken care of and while it wasn't a. large income he 
felt that it would always be something I could fall back on. 
He also left me his partnership interest in this store and all 
of the other interest in the stores in Belhaven to his wife, 
but he thought that since I was young and didn't know what 
might happen that I would always have some income for the 
next 20 years. 
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Q. With whom were you lh1ing at the time of your father's 
death! 
A. I was living with my mother's sister, Mrs. Soiffer, in 
Brooklyn. 
Q. I believe you told Judge Brown that you were qualified 
in New York to vote and that you had voted in New York? 
A. Yes. I voted in the ward on East 19th Street, Brook-
lyn. 
Q. Did you consider, at the time of your father's death, 
Belhaven, .North Carolina, or Brooklyn, as your residence? 
A. I considered Brooklyn. 
Q. Did your father die unexpectedly! 
A. Yes, very. He died very suddenly. 
Q. Were you named as one of the executors in his will Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you say you came to Danville to look after his 
interest here in Danville or to be here with Mr. Burgess, who 
ran the partnership 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. When was the partnership wound up and when was 
your interest in the property turned over to you f 
A. I believe it ,vas April 30, 1936. I don't think 
page 61 ~ that was when the estate was settled but that was 
· when my interest was given to me. 
Q. Was your interest determined on or about that datef 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was application made for your benefits under 
these policies issued by the Metropolitan Liie Insurance Com-
pany! 
Mr. Brown: Those applications, being in writing, should 
be produced for a copy, otherwis~ we object. . 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Do you remember where you were when you got-the first 
check from the Metropolitan Life Insurance ,Company? 
A. I don't remember that either. I imagine I must have 
been here. 
Q. Whereabouts in Danville. were you staying? 
A. I stayed at Mrs. Halperin 's, had a room there for a 
while. I don't remember until exactly when. Then I moved 
to a room in the Hotel Danville. As soon as I came here I 
got appendicitis and was in the hospital · about two weeks. 
From there I went to Mrs. Halperin 's. Believe I stayed about 
a month. 
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Q. I believ:e you say you had not known Simon Hain before 
you came to Danville in the fall of 19'35 J 
A. No, sir. I had never seen him. 
Q. After your interest in these partnerships between your 
father and Mr. Burgess had been determined, did you then 
stay on here in Danville and operate the business? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who assisted you in operating that business? 
A. Well, my husband operated them for me. 
page 62 }, Q. Mr. Hain Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And about when did he take over and begin operations 
for you? 
A~ About May 1, or April 30. 
Q. What year! 
A. 1936. 
Q. Had you eyer had any business experience prior to that 
time! 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you ever operated. or assisted in operating any 
kind of retail or mercantile store? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you rely on Mr. Hain to advise you and make all 
financial arrangements in the operation of your business Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did I understand you to ·tell Judge Brown that it was 
not until on or about April 30, 1936, that you definitely made 
up your mind to change your residence from 'New York to 
Danville?· 
A. I would think so. That was about the time that I knew 
definitely I would be staying here. 
Q. Did you subsequently to that da.te move some of your 
belongings and personal things from New York to Danville 7 
A. Well, when I first came I didn't bring· anything. I had 
gone to the funeral in Philadelphia and my uncles thought 
it advisable that I immediately go to Belhaven to look after 
my interest. From there I went to Danville and, as I tried 
to tell before, then I went back to Belhaven and back to Dan-
ville all in one week. I went back to New York and when I 
came back I brought a suit-case that time. Then I 
page 63 ~ wrote my aunt to send me my clothes. 
Q. When did you cut away from New York and 
make up your mind to reside in Danville indefinitely? 
A. I would say until I got_ my share of the stores I didn't 
know what '\ve were going to do because Simon didn't have any 
, 
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business and didn't have any money and he had talked of 
getting a job in Baltimore or some place and we didn't know 
what would happen. Possibly my interest would have been 
sold and we would have taken that money and gone into busi-
ness some place. 
Q. During that time, prior to your g;etting your interest 
in the businesses in Danville, did you consider that you were 
still a resident of the State of New York? That is, up to 
April 30, .1936! 
Mr. Brow1i: This question is objected to because the wit-
ness is estopped to deny the application for registration and 
verification thereof made before the Registrar of the City 
of Danville. 
A. If I stopped to consider it, I suppose I would still con-
sider New York as my home. 
Q. Do you recall going over to Mr. Booth's office in the 
Municipal Building to register in the spring of 1936 T 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who took you over there? 
A. I imagine my bus band. I don't recall going over there. 
All I remember is that I did go. There was one man there. 
I just happen to remember seeing him there. 
Q. You think you went over there with Mr. Simon Hain? 
A. I am almost sure I did. 
Q. Do you know at whose suggestion you went 
page 64 ~ over to register to vote? Was it on your own mo-
tion, or somebody else's suggestion? 
A. I don't remember that. 
Q. All you remember is being before 1\fr. Booth in bis 
office? 
A. I just remember being· over in the ·Courthouse and I 
remember this great, big Greek up at the G. S. K. was there 
and they asked him some questions. 
Mr. Meade: I think tlrnt 's all we want to ask Mrs. Hain 
at this time. 
(Examination of this witness concluded and deposition 
sig'Iled, pp. 20-21.) 
J 
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The witness, 
MR. WAYLES R. HARRISON, 
being .first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Bro"in: 
Q. Your name is Mr. Wayles R~ Harrison and you are 
President of the American National Hauk and Trust Com-
pany of Danville, Virginia Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Harrison, how long have you beei1 connected with 
that Bank? 
A. Since 1929. 
Q. Does your Bank hold an alleged assignment from Mrs. 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain of Installment Certificate . No. 
18113-R issued to her by the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does your Bank have actual possession of this Certifi-
cate¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Harrison, is the paper I show you, which purports 
to be a photostatic copy of this Certificate which your Bank 
holds, a true copy of that Certificate¥ 
A. Apparently so. . 
Q. Please state how long your Bank has had possession of 
tl1at installment certificate f 
page 65 ~ A. Since July 12, 1937. 
Q. By what authority does your Bank hold that 
certificate ? 
A. Under letter of assignment g·iven us by Miss Cecelia 
Halberstadt on July 12, 1937. 
Q. Will you exhibit the original of this letter, dated July 
12, 1937, addressed to your Bank by Miss Cecelia Halber-
stadt so that we may make a copy of it and file a copy as an 
exhibit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·We offer copy of this assignment in evidence as Ex-
hibit ''E"? 
Mr. Meade: Yes. 
Q. Mr. Harrison, under authority of this assignment or 
paper dated July 12, 1937, how many of the monthly checks 
has your Bank received and applied to Mrs. Hain 's indebt-
edness? 
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A. We did not apply or receive any of these checks until 
a few months before Mrs. Hain took bankruptcy. In the 
bankruptcy proceedings there was an order-ordering cer-
. tain of these checks to be applied as a credit on the indebt-
edness. The remaining three which we hold as shown in this 
order are still held by the Bank. 
Q. Mr. Harrison, do I understand your answer to be that 
although you had this ass.ignment of July 12, 1937, of this 
Installment Certificate and had possession of the. Certificate 
since that date that .your Bank actually did not collect any 
of" these monthly installments except those mentioned in the 
order entered by the Referee in bankruptcy? 
A. That's correct. We had the letter and the policy as 
collateral and as a rule we do , not cash in on the collateral 
until it becomes necessary to do so. 
Q. You merely held this assignment and this 
page 66 ~ Certificate as collateral security for Miss Halber-
stadt 's, afterwards Mrs. Hain, indebtedness to 
your ·Bank? 
A. We held it as collateral security for her indebtedness. 
Yes. 
· Q. And to make the record clear, for what months did you 
actually collect these checks and apply them as a credit on 
her indebtedness T 
A. The checks for the months of February, March and 
May, 1940, in the sum of $121.37 each were delivered to us 
and by order of the bankruptcy court credited on her indebt-
edness. , 
Q. These checks were actually signed by Mrs. Hain? 
A. These checks were received by Mrs. Hain. She in turn 
endorsed them and delivered them to us. 
Q. Do you still hold uncollected any checks representing 
the monthly payments under this certificate, if so, pleas~ 
A. Yes, we hold checks for lune, July and August, 1940. 
Q. Are a:11 of these endorsed hy Mrs. Cecelia Halberstadt 
Hain? · 
A. Yes. They were sent. to her by the insurance company. 
She endorsed them and delivered them to us through her hus-
band. 
Q. What has become, Mr. Harrison, of the checks for the 
monthly payments which accrued from September, 1940, to 
J" anuary, 1942, both inclusive? 
A. Presumably they are held by the :Metropolitan. I don ''t 
know. 
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Q. Did or not the Metropolitan advise your Bank that 
they were holding your checks and refuse to pay them be-
cause of the bankruptcy proceeding? 
A. In a letter from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, dated August 29, 1940, they state "while it is not the 
intention of this Company to determine the validity of this 
purported assignment as between yon and the certificate 
holder, it is the intention of the Company to suspend the pay-
ment of future installments when, as and if they accrue, pend-
ing a 'judicial determination of the respective 
page 67 } rights of the certificate holder, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy and your . institution''. 
Q. Do you have the original obligations evidencing your 
debt for which this certificate was held as collateral se-
curity? 
A. We have them at the ban~ I don't have them with 
me. 
Q. Will yon please file a copy of Mrs. Hain 's obligations 
to the bank and a statement showing all credits thereon f 
A. vVouldn 't it be just as well if I ref erred you to the same 
bankruptcy order in which it is stated that the American 
National has filed a-
. Mr. Brown: No. 
Mr. Harrison: You want dummies of the notes we have? 
Mr. Brown: Yes. 
Q. I believe you have filed your claim with the trustee in 
bankruptcy? 
.A.. Yes. 
Mr. Brown: I believe that is all I want to ask Mr. Har-
rison. 
CROSS EXAMIN.ATION. 
Bv Mr. Meade: 
.. Q. Did I understand you ·to say that the three checks of 
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company which yon hold in 
the amount of $121.37 each were delivered to your Bank 
throug·h l\tir. Simon Hain, the husband of Mrs. Cecelia Hal-
berstadt Hain, after they had been endorsed by her? 
A. I am quite sure tliat was the case. I had very few con-
tacts with Mrs. Hain. The missing check there in April I 
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am quite sure was cashed by l\fr. · Hain because afterwards 
he told me he had used that money. 
Q. Wouldn't this situation be all the more indicated by 
the endorsements of Simon Hain on the back of each one of 
these three checks! 
A. I should think so. 
Q. You .say you had very little contact with Mrs. Hain 1 
A. Most all of the banking business is tended to by Simon 
Hain. · 
. Q. Did he attend to furnishing you with the 
page 68 ~ alleged assignment of this Certificate from Mrs. 
Hain about which you have just testified? 
A. I don't remember but I am sure that we must have 
seen Mrs. Hain and talked with her at the time. We very 
probably talked with Mr. Hain when we requested it. 
Q. This alleged assignment is dated July 12, 1937. By 
whom was it prepared! 
A. By me. 
Q. It was dictated by you 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at the time it was dictated and at the time it was 
signed ·by Miss Halberstadt were either your Bank or Mrs. 
Hain represented by any attorney? 
.A. Not in this particular transaction, I shouldn't think 
so. 
Q. Yv as there any attorney advising either the bank or Miss 
Halberstadt at the time in regard to this particular alleged 
assignment? 
A. Not so far as I know. 
Q. Did you read this installment certificate No. 18113-R be-
fore you accepted the letter from Miss Halberstadt under 
date of July 12, 1937? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You saw that the policy provided that the benefits there-
under could not be assigned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I ·believe the letter of July 12, 1937, signed by her 
and prepa~ed by you states that the Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company would not accept an assignment of the 
policy and provided that the Company be directed to for-
ward the installment checks to vour bank each month to 
be placed to her credit: Is that correct? 
page 69 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. Did you or your bank send a copy of this 
letter of alleged assignment to the :Metropolitan Life In-
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surance Company prior to the controversy which arose be-
tween the trustee in bankruptcy and the bank as to who was 
entitled to the benefits under this¥ 
A. No. 
Q. Did you or your bank request the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company to send these monthly checks, payable 
to Miss Cecelia Halberstadt, to your bank to be placed to 
her credit prior to the date of this controversy mentioned? 
A. No. 
Q. Did your ·bank ever receive directly from the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company any check covering monthly 
installment under this certificate! 
.A. No. 
Q. Did your bank ever make demand on Miss Halberstadt, 
or Mrs. Hain after she was married, to hirn over her checks 
issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company monthly 
to be applied on her indebtedness? 
A. Not until the early part of 1940. 
Q. Was that after or about the time of her bankruptcy? 
A. No, that was prior to her bankruptcy. 
Q. Was this demand made on her husband who had been 
transacting financial affairs for her? 
A. I imagine it was. Most of our transactions were with 
him. 
Q. Do vou recall whether tl1e three checks which were 
actually cashed and the proceeds from which were applied on 
Mrs. Hain 's indebtedness were endorsed prior to 
page 70 ~ their collection in the same manner as the three vn 
which vou now l1old in vour files are endorsed? 
A. I couldn't s·ay. · 
Mr. Meade: I think I am through with Mr. Harrison. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Brown: 
Q. Mr. Harrison, your bank appeared by counsel in this 
suit and filed a plea in abatement to tlJe jurisdiction of the 
Court. Since that time no formal answer has been filed and 
you have, as I understand, no counsel of record. Does your 
bank claim to hold this installment certificate as assignee 
under and by virtue of that letter of July 12, 1937? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I notice that the assignment or letter of July 12, 1937, 
is addressed to your bank and signed by Miss Cecelia Hal-
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berstadt. Mr. Meade has asked you whether her husband, 
Mr. Hain, arranged for that ':assignment. Do yon recall 
whether this transaction transpired before she was married 
or after her marriage? 
A. Before she was married, but Mr. Hain as manager 
of her stores transacted her ·business. 
Q. But not Mr. Hain as husband and agent? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you authorize this notary to sign your name to this 
deposition after it is written ouU 
A. Yes. 
And further this deponent says not. 
s/ WAYLESR.HARRISON, 
By Notary. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Brown : 
Q. Mrs. Hain, it appears that the three ·monthly checks 
which have been exhibited by Mr. Harrison cover-
page 71 ~ ing months of June, July and August, 1940, are 
made payable to Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, 307 
Main Street, Danville, Virginia, Post Office Box 458. The 
original certificate, as stated, was issued in · your maiden 
name and your assignment or claimed assignment to the 
bank is made in your maiden name. When and how did 
you arrange to have the checks issued in your married name? 
A. Enclosed in the envelope with each monthly check is 
a slip asking you to notify them of any change of address 
and exactly when I had them to cha.nge I don't know. 
Q. You filed that with the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company?· 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you authorize this notary to sign your name to this 
deposition after it is written out? 
A. Yes. 
And further this deponent says not. 
S/ MRS. CECELIA HALBERlSTADT HAIN, 
By Notary. 
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being first duly sworn., deposes and says as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Brown : 
Q. Please state your residence and occupation. 
A. Danville, Virginia, Attorney at Law. 
Q. Are you now, and were y9u in the year 1940, Referee 
in Bankruptcy of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Virginia at Danville, Virginia Y 
A. I am the Referee in Bankruptcy for the United States 
District Court of the Western District of Vir-
pag·e 72 } ginia, Danville Division, and I have been the 
. Referee since December 1, 1938. 
Q. Please state whether Mrs. Cecelia Halberstadt Hain was 
adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt pursuant to her debtor's 
petition which was filed in said Court on. May 16, 1940. If 
so, what was the date of her adjudication Y 
A. She was adjuclica ted a bankrupt on May 18, 1940, by 
Hon. A. D. Barksdale, Judge of the United States District 
Court. 
Q. Who was appointed Trustee in Bankruptcy of her estate? 
A. T. Bryan Tate, Danville, ;virginia. 
Q. Please state whether any order was entered by said 
bankruptcy Court authorizing said T1~ustee to institute this 
chancery suit against Cecelia Halberstadt Hain and the other 
def end ants Y 
A. An order was entered to that effect ·by the bankruptcy 
Court on January 21, 1941. 
Q. Will you file a certified copy of this order as Exhibit 
Bass #l with your deposition? 
A. I will. 
Q. Is T. Bryan Tate still acting as Trustee of said bank-
rupt's estate¥ 
A. He is. 
Q. Will you please state the total receipts of this bankrupt's 
estate? 
.A. The total receipts thus far realized by the Trustee are 
$4,166.39. 
Q. What have been the total disbursements for adminis-
tration expenses to January 16, 1941.Y · 
.A. $590.42. · 
Q. What is the total paid creditors having priority? 
.A. Wage elaims paid amounted to $120.00, tax claims 
$394.11, rent claims $405.00, making a total paid to 
page 73 ~ priority creditors up to January 16, 1941, of 
. $919.11. 
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Q. Wbat dividend has been paid to date on the claims of 
general creditors? 
A. A dividend of ten per cent, amounti11g to $1,385.49, was 
paid to general creditors, whose claims had been allowed on 
January 16, 1941, so that the claims of the creditors which 
were allowed as of that data amounted to $13,854.81. 
Q. As I understand, deducting all disbursements, including 
the ten per cent dividends of general creditors from re-
ceipts left a. balance in the hands of the Trustee as of January 
16, 1941, of $1,271.37. Is that. correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Since that time have any other disbursements been au-
thorized to ·be made from this balance Y 
A. Yes. Additional tax claims have been paid amounting 
to $47.41. A bond premium of the Trustee has been paid 
amounting to $10.00 and certain costs have been paid in 
connection with this amounting to $14.50, which leaves a 
balance in the hands of the Trustee today of $1,199.46. 
Q. Y.las this dividend of ten per cent paid to the American 
National Bank and Trust Company on its claim T 
A. No dividend has been paid on the claim of the American 
National Bank and Tq1st Company which has been filed with 
the Court in this case. An order of distribution was entered 
by the Court on January 16, 1941, which sets forth the facts 
regarding the assets, claims of the creditors and the distri-
bution in full. As sho"rn by this order the American National 
Bank and Trust Company filed a. claim with the Referee on 
three notes aggregating $9,000.00 and $58.33 interest which 
the· Bank claimed was secured bv Installment Certificate No. 
18113-R with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
page 7 4 ~ pany, copy of which is filed with the answer of said 
Insurance Company in this chancery suit, under 
which certain moneys were payable to the bankrupt each 
month by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; also, 
certain life insurance policies on the life of the bankrupt 
which had a total cash value of $947.36, and a lien on the 
title to a Dodge automobile of the bankrupt which was sold 
for $250.00, a deed of trust on certain real estate on Robert-
son Avenue, Danville, Virginia, in tlie name of Simon Hain, 
the husband of the bankrupt, 25 shares of stock in the Union 
Mutual Building and Loan Association, in the name of Simon 
Hain, worth about $360.00, and assignment of life insurance 
policy for $10,000.00 on the life of Simon Hain with the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company which had a cash Yalue of 
about $360.00. The notes held by the Bank were signed '' Dan-
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ville Shoe Market", by Simon Hain, and endorsed by Cecelia 
Halberstadt Hain and Simon Hain. The Referee in the order 
of January 16 authorized and directed the Bank to apply 
on its debt the total cash surrender values of the life insurance 
policies on the life of the bankrupt which had been assigned 
in the sum of $947.36, the sum of $250.00 obtained from the 
sale of the Dodge automobile and three checks of $121.37 each 
which had ·been issued by the :Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company under the Installment Certificate No. 18113-R for 
the months of February, March and May, 1940, prior to the 
date of bankruptcy and endorsed and transferred by the bank-
rupt to the Bank prior to the date of bankruptcy. The total 
credits authorized on the Bank's claim was $1,561.47 as of 
January 16, 1941. The Referee did not allow the balance of 
the Bank's claim as a general claim to share the dividends 
at that time because the Bank claimed to hold additional se-
curity of the ·bankrupt eonsisting of the Installment 
page 75 ~ Certificate of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany under which the bankrupt was entitled to 
$121.37 a month and the claim could not be allowed until the 
amount of its security could be determined. The claim has 
therefore never been allowed and cannot be allowed until the 
value of the security held by the Bank has been determined in 
this suit. There may also be some question whether the Bank 
should later be required to apply on its debt also the security 
held consisting of real estate, building and loan stock, and life 
insurance policy in the name of Simon Hain, which will be 
decided after this suit is concluded. 
Q. Will you please file as Exhibit Bass #2 with your de-
position a copy of the bankruptcy Court's order of distri-
bution, entered as of January 16, 1941? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Bass, will you please state whether the unpaid claims 
of general creditors which have ·been proved and allowed in 
this bankruptcy proceeding, showing the g-ross amount of each 
claim without interest and the amount of the ten per cent 
dividend paid thereon are correctly shown in that order? 
A. The claims of creditors which are set forth in the order 
of distribution of January 16, 1941, on which the ten per cent 
dividend, as shown thereon, have been paid, have a.ll been 
allowed by the bankruptcy Court and are all of the unpaid 
claims except that of the American National Bank and Trust 
Company which have been proved in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. 
Q. Will you please file a certified copy of the proof of debt 
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filed by the American National Bank and Trust Company of 
Danville, Virginia? 
A. I will. 
Mr. Brown: ,v e offer this in eYidence marked Exhibit Bass 
.#3. 
page 76 ~ Q. Mr. Bass, please state whether Mrs. Cecelia 
Halberstadt Hain was examined on oath at the 
meeting of her creditors held before you as Referee in Bank-
ruptcy on July 16, 19401 
A. She was. 
Q. Do you have in your possession as Referee in Bank· 
ruptcy a transcript of her evidence which was then taken be~ 
fore you? 
A. I do. 
Q. Will you please ref er to Page 7 of her evidence and read 
into the record what Mrs. Hain stated in reference to the trust 
fund of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 
A. '' Question : Do you know anything about a trust fund 
in the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company? 
Answer : Yes, sir. 
Question: Who owns that Y 
. Answer: I do. My father left it to me. 
Question: You own that trust fund in the Metropolitan-
what is the value? 
Answer: Around twenty thousand, I think. I get so much 
a month over a period of 20 years. I have been getting 'it 
since he died. ' ' 
Q. Will you please ref er to Page 12 and top of pag·e 13 and 
read into· the record the questions and answers relating to 
the Installment Certificate No. 18113-R? 
A. ''Question: ln Schedule B-3 you list one Installment 
Certificate No. 18113-R with the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company of 240 installments of $121.37, beginning October 
19, 1935, and ending September 19, 1955. Do you have such 
a contract? 
Answer: I do. 
Question: ·where did you secure it from? 
page 77 ~ Answer: It was left to me when mv father died.'' 
Q. Please state whether or not there is attached 
to Mrs. Rain's deposition as Exhibit'' A" ·a statement dtlted 
March 5, 1939, showing assets and liabilities as of that elate, 
addressed on the reverse side to J. W. Carter Company, 
Nashville, Tennessee t 
T. Bryan Tate, Trustee, etc., v. C. H~ Hain, et als. 103 
Mr. Horace a. Bass. 
A. There is. 
Q. Is that statement signed by Mrs. Hain? 
A. It is. 
Q. Please ref er to Page 8 of the evidence· and state whether 
that paper was filed in evidence as Exhibit ''A''? 
A. It was. 
Q. Will you please ref er to Page 3 of the evidence and read 
into the record what Mrs. Hain said in reference to that state-
ment? 
A. '' Question : May I ask you, Mrs. Hain, if you signed this 
statement-if that is your signature there Y 
Answer : Yes, sir. 
Question: Now at the time you signed that statement you 
knew it was addressed to J. W. Carter Company did you not? 
Answer: Well, when my husband told me to sign things I 
signed them. 
Question: Well, you can read, can't you Y 
Answer: Yes, sir. 
Question: And you knew it was addressed to J. W. Carter 
Company? 
.Answer : If I read it. 
Question: It is there in rather bold type-'' J. W. Carter 
Company"-where you would have seen iU 
.Answer : Yes, if I read it. 
Question: You mean you would sign a statement 
page 78 } with a figure of $86,460.16 on there and not read 
iU . 
Answer : I had complete confidence in my husband. I don't 
know whether I read it or not. If he told me to sign it, 
I did." 
Q. What does that statement, Exhibit "A", show as to 
assets as of January 1, 1939? 
A. It ,ghows total assets of $78,050.03 . 
. Q. What are the total liabilities? 
A. $13,107.40. 
Q. Among the listed assets is any reference made to the 
Metropolitan 's Installment Certificate? 
A. There is listed among assets '' Trust fund, Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company-$26,350.00. '' 
· Mr. Brown: We offer in evidence that Certificate and ask 
that copy be made and filed Exhibit Bass #4. 
Q. Mr. Bass, state whP-ther there was also filed with her 
evidence, marked Exhibit "B ", the :financial statement of 
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Cecelia Halberstadt, sometimes known as Cecelia Halbert, t/a 
Danville Shoe Market, 307 Main Street, Danville, Virginia, 
dated August 8, 1936 t 
A. It was_ 
Q. How is that statement of assets and liabilities signed 
and by whom! 
A. It is signed '' Cecelia Halberstadt'' and also '' Cecelia 
Halbert''. 
Q. I believe she was known ·by both of those names, accord-
ing to . tha.t evidence 1 
A. According to this statement, she was. 
Q. ·what did the statement show as to total assets and total 
liabilities f 
A. It showed total assets of $54,950.00 and total liabilities 
$5,500.00. 
Q. Among· the liabilities was any mention made 
page 79 ~ of the Metropolitan Installment Certificate t 
A. Among the assets there is set forth '' Trust 
Fund, Sole Beneficiary" $25,000.00. This statement does not 
refer to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 
Q. On the left-hand margin of this statement appear the 
followinginiti.als and date: "J. H. D. 8-10-36." Do you recall 
who that was or to what creditor that statement was sent 7 
A. I don't recall from the statement what the "J. H. D." 
referred to or to whom the statement was sent but I suppose 
the evidence explains that. 
Q. Did I ask you whether that statement was :filed with her 
evidence and marked Exhibit "B"! 
A. It was. 
Q. Will you ref er to Page 9 of her evidence and read into 
the record what she testified with reference to this 1936 state-
ment? 
A. "Question: Do you recall signing this statement on Au-
gust 8, 1936, signed by you? 
Answer: I don't recall doing it but that looks like my sig-
nature. 
Question: Will you state whether or not it is your signa-
ture? · 
Answer : Yes, sir. 
Question: It is your signature? 
Answer : Yes, sir. 
Question: You don't recall signing that statement. 
Answer : I don't recall. '' 
Q. Will you please ref er to Page 11 of evidence and read 
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into the record her statement as to when she came to Dan-
ville to live? 
page 80 ~ A. "Question: Your occupation was that of a 
social worker. When did your father die? 
Answer: October, 1935. 
Question: When did you come to Danville? 
Answer: A week later." 
Q. J\fr. Bass, without referring specifically to the evidence, 
unless these gentlemen request it, please state how Mrs. Hain 
came into possession of the shoe stores located in Virginia. 
A. It is my understanding from the evidence which has 
been presented in the bankruptcy proceeding and from the 
bankruptcy records that Mrs. Hain 's father died in October, 
1935, and he had an interest in several stores in Danville, a 
store in Reidsville and possibly ·some other places. I believe 
that he was in partnership at the time of llis death with Mr. 
C. M. Burgess and Mr. Burgess agreed with l\Iiss Cecelia 
Halberstaclt upon a di vision of the partnership property and 
Miss Cecelia Halberstadt by that agTeement with Mr. Burg•ess 
came into possession and ownership of two shoe stores here 
in Danville and a shoe store in Reidsville, North Carolina. 
Q. I believe that the debt of the American National Bank 
and Trust Company should be credited some time by the value 
of some building and loan stock paid as collateral. Has that 
been determined by the bankruptcy Court? 
A. I think the question of the building and loan stock is cov-
ered along with other security held by the Bank in order filed 
by the Referee on January 16, 1941. 
l\fr. Brown: We offer this Exhibit '' B'' in evidence, copy of 
which is to be filed as Exhibit Bass #5. 
page 81 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Meade : 
Q. Mr. Bass, was it shown in the evidence taken before 
you as Referee, that is the testimony of Mrs. Hain, who pre-
pared that statemP-nt filed as Exhibit "B ", about which you 
testified and a copy of which you filed as an Exhibit? 
A. Mrs. Hain testified on her examination, as shown by tl1e 
transcript of the evidence, that her husband took care of all 
the business affairs and that she signed this statement but that 
she didn't prepare it. She answered this with reference to the 
statement sent to the Consolidated Shoe Company, which I 
believP. iR a statement filed with the evidence as Exhibit ''B". 
She testified that her husband took care of all of the business 
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affairs and she had implicit confidence in her husband and 
left it all up to him. I don't believe she stated who did prepare 
the statement but she stated that she did not do so. 
Q. Did this evidence taken before you, or any of the exhibits 
or records in the bankruptcy prqceedings show that this state-
ment marked Exhibit '' B.'' was prepared by Simon Hain, her 
husband? 
A.. The answer that I have given covers that c1uestion about 
as well as I can. 
Q .. Mr. Bass, did you follow the criminal proceedings in the 
United States District ·Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia in the name of the United States against Simon Hain f 
A. I was present at a part of that proceeding but I didn't 
hear all the evidence by any means. 
Q. Well, is it or is it not a fact that he was charged in those 
proceedings with prepa1·ing and mailing false statements in 
regard to this Exhibit" A." and Exhibit "B" which you have 
identified Y 
A.. As I understand it, he was charged with using the mails 
'to defraud hy mailing several false :financial state-
page 82 ~ ments. I am not prepared to say whether these 
two statements were included. 
Q. So far as you know, were there any charges against Mrs. 
Cecelia Halbe1·stadt Hain for defrauding creditors or mailing 
false statements and that sort of thing! 
A.. I don't think there were any charges against Mrs. Hain. 
Q. Was Mr. Hain convicted? 
Mr. Brown: All of this evidence is objected to as being 
wholly irrelevant and immaterial to this issue. 
A. He was. 
Q. Is he now serving time under conviction in some federal 
penal institution Y 
A.. I understand tliat he is. 
Mr. Brown: I object to any evidence to Simqn Hain being 
indicted or convicted on the indictments ref erred to. 
Q. Do you authorize this notary to sign your name to this 
deposition after it is written ouU 
A. Yes. 
And further this deponent says not. 
S/ HORACE. G. BASS, 
By Notary .. 
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being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Brown: 
Q. Please state your name, residence and occupation. 
A. My name is Doris Burrell. I reside in Danville, Virginia, 
and I am Deputy Clerk of the Corporation Court of Danville. 
Q. Is that office the legal repository of the official 
page 83} lists regularly issued by the Treasurer of the City 
of Danville, ·virginia, which certifies and shows the 
poll taxes· which have been paid as indicated thereon six 
months prior to the date of the election shown on each list 
as a prerequisite to the right of such person to vote in the 
ensuing election as thereon shown? 
A. Yes. Such lists are kept in the office of the Clerk of the 
Corporation Court of Danville, Virginia. 
Q. Have you examined the poll tax lists which were issued 
for the November elections in the years 1936 to 1941, both in-
clusive, to ascertain what such poll tax lists show as to poll 
taxes paid by :Miss Cecelia Halberstadt, or Mrs. Cecelia Hal-
berstadt Hain? 
A. I have. 
Q. Please state what such tax lists show. 
A. The list issued for the November, 1936, general election 
showing persons who had paid poll taxes for the years 1933, 
1934 and 1935 six months prior to the second Tuesday in 
November, 1936, do not disclose either the name of Cecelia Hal· 
l1erstadt or Cecelia Halbersta.dt Hain. . 
The list issued for the November, 1937, election shows that 
1936 poll taxes have been paid by Miss Cecelia. Halberstadt 
six months prior to the second Tuesday in November of 1937. 
The official list issued for the November, 1938, election 
showed that Miss Cecelia Halberstadt had paid poll taxes for 
the years 1935, 1936 and 1937 and that such taxes had been 
paid six months prior to the second Tuesday in November 
of 1938. 
The official list issued for the second ·Tuesday in June, 
1938, local election shows that Miss · Cecelia Halberstadt had 
paid poll taxes for the years 1936 and 1937, six 
page 84 ~ months prior to said election. 
The official list for the November, 1939, general 
election held on the first Tuesday in November showed that 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain had paid poll taxes for the years 
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1936, 1937 and 1938, six months prior to the date of said elec-
tion. 
The official list for the June, 1940, election held on the second 
Tuesday in June, 1940, showed that Cecelia H. Hain had paid. 
taxes for the years 1938 and 1939, six months prior to such 
election. 
The poll ta.x list for November, 1940, election held on the 
first Tuesday in November, 1940, also showed that Ceeelia 
H. Hain had paid poll taxes for the years 1938 and 1939, 
six -months prior to the date of said election. 
The poll tax list for the November, 1941, election held on 
the first Tuesday in November, 1941, showed that Cecelia H. 
Hain had paid poll taxes for the years 1938, 1939 and 1940, 
six months prior to the date of said election. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Meade: 
Q. Mrs. Burrell, where did your office obtain the official list 
about which you have testified? 
A. From E. H. :Marshall, City Treasurer. 
Q. Do the records of your office show whether the poll tax 
for any particular year is charged to any resident of Dan-
ville or paid by them f 
A. It does not. 
Q. Do you have in your office any record of the application 
made by Miss Cecelia Halberstaclt for the right to vote in elec-
tions in the City of Danville? 
A. We do not. 
page 85 ~ Mr. Brown: The law does not require these to 
be filed in the Clerk's Office but does require them 
to be kept by the City Registrar. 
Q. Have you compared your official list or lists from which 
you obtained the information a.hout which you have just testi-
fied with the records in the office of E. I-I. Marshall, Treasurer! 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Have you discussed these lists with him? 
A. I have. 
Q. Did he advise yon as to what his records showed as to 
the 1935 poll tax which you sny was paid by Cecelia Halber-
stadt as shown by the records in your office? 
:M:r. Brown: This question is objectctl to as hearsay. 
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Mrs. Doris Burrell. 
A. Mr. Marshall states that after examining the books in 
his office that Cecelia Halberstadt was neither charged with· 
nor paid the 1935 polJ tax. · 
Q. Do you authorize this notary to sign your name to this 
deposition after it is ,vritten out t 
A. Yes. 
And further this deponent says not. 
S/ MRS. DORIS BURRELL, 
By Notary, 
page 86 ~ State of Virginia, 
City of Danville, to-·wit: 
I, Marie York, notary public in and for the City and State 
aforesaid do hereby certify that the foregoing depositions of 
vY ayles R. Harrison and others were duly taken before me at 
the time and place mentioned in the caption hereto and that 
the name of each witness was signed by me to his or her 
deposition as directed by them, as witness my hand and 
seal at Danville, Virginia, this 7th clay of February, 1942. 
My commission expires Nov. 3, 1944. 
S/ MAR.IE YORK, 
Notary Public. 
Due Notary: 49 Pages, $19.60. 
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Copy of application for registration-
Copy of registration oath-
Copy of Debtor's Petition and verification 
Copy of Schedule A-2 
Copy of Schedule B-3 
Copv of Schedule B-5 
Copy of Order en terecl bv the U. S. Dis-
- ·trict Court of the Western District 
of Virginia. at Danville, on March 5. 
1928, admittine: Simon Hnin to 
United States citizenship-
Photostatic copy of Instalment Settle-
ment-Option 2-
Exhibit " .... i\.'' 
Exhibit "B" 
Exhibit "C'' 
JiJxhibit '· D '' 
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Letter of assignment, elated July 12, 
1937, given the American National 
Bank & Trust Company by Miss Ce-
celia Halberstadt- Exhibit ''E'' 
Copy of Order Authorizing Employment 
of .Attorneys by Trustee, January 
21, 1941- Exhibit Bass # 1 
Copy of Order of Partial Distribution, 
January 16, 1941- Exhibit Bass #2 
Copy of Proof of iUnsecured Debt-filed 
by the American National Bank and 
Trust Company- Exhibit Bass #3 
Copy of Certificate, signed by Cecelia H. 
Hain, da.ted March 5, 1939, addressed 
to ,T. W. Carter Co.- Exhibit Bass #4 
Copy of Financial Statement of Cecelia 
. Halberstadt, T / A Danville Shoe 
Market, dated August 8> 1936- Exhibit Bass #5 
Certificate of C. C. Duke, Register of 
Deeds of Beaufort County, North 
Carolina, sig-ned February 3, 1942, 
under his official seal 
Certific.fiate of N. Henry Moore, Clerk 
Superior Court of Bea:ufort County, 
North Carolina, signed February 3, 
1942, under -Seal of the court 
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DEBTOR'S PETITION. 
In the District. Court of the United States for the Western 
District of Virginia, Danville, Virginia. 
In the matter of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, In Bankruptcy 
Bankrupt. No. . ...... . 
PETITION. 
To the Honorable A. D. Barksdale, 
Judge of the District Court of the United States for the 
Western District of Virginia. 
The petition of Cecilia Halberstadt Hain, Trading as Dan-
ville Shoe Market, residing at No. 206 Robertson Ave., Street 
in Danville, County of Pittsylvania, State of Virginia, bv 
occupation a retail shoe merchant, and employed by self ( or 
T. Bryan Tate, Trustee, etc., v .. C. H. Hain, et als. 111 
engaged in the business of .................. ) respectfully 
represents : 
1. Your petitioner has had his principal place of business 
( or has resided, or has had his domicile) at 307 Main Street, 
Danville, Virginia, within the above judicial district, for a 
longer portion of the six months immediately preceding the 
filing of this petition than in any other judicial district. 
2; Your petitioner owes. debts and is willing to surrender 
all his property for the benefit of his creditors, except such 
as is exempt by law, and desires to obtain the benefit of the 
Act of Congress relating to bankruptcy. 
3. The schedule hereto annexed, marked Schedule A, and 
. verified by your petitioner's oath, contains a full and true 
statement of all his debts, and, so far as· it is possible to 
ascertain, the names and places of residence of his creditors, 
and such further statements concerning said debts as are 
required by the provisions of said Act. 
4. The schedule hereto annexed, marked Schedule B, and 
verified by your petitioner's oath, contains an accurate in-
ventory of all his property, real and personal, and such fur-
ther statements concerning said property as are required by 
the provisions of said Act. 
Wherefore your petitioner prays that he may be adjudged 
by the court to be a -bankrupt within the purview of said Act. 
SJ CECELIA HALBERSTADT HAIN, 
T /a Danville Shoe Market, 
S/ CARTER & WILLIAMS, 
JNO. W. CARTER, JR., Attorney. 
DEB'I'OR'.S PETITION-·Continued 
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County of Pittsylvania, ss: 
City of Danville. 
Petitioner. 
L Cecilia Halberstadt Hain, the petitioner, named in the 
foregoing petition, do hereby make solemn oath that the state-
ments contained therein are true according to the best of my 
knowledge, information, and belief. 
CECELIA HALBERSTADT HAIN, 
Petitioner. 
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Subseribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of May, 
1940. 
My Commission Expires August 4th, 1942. 
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SJ LOLA TURNER, 
Notary Public. 
CREDITORS HOLDING SECURITIES. 
SCHEDULE A-2. 
(N. B.-Partieulars of securities held, with dates of same,. 
and when they were given, to be stated under the names of 
the several creditors, and also particulars concerning each 
debt, as required by the Act of Congress relating to bank-
ruptcy, and whether contracted as partner: or joint contractor 
with any other person; and if so, with whom.) 
One note dated December 19, 1939, payable to the 
American National Bank and Tmst Company of 
Danville, Danville, Virginia, secured by a deed of 
trust on property located at 206 Robertson Ave-
nue, Danville, Virginia, to W. R. Harrison, trus-
tee, from Simon Hain and Cec.i1ia H. Hain, his 
wife 3,000.00 
One note dated December 5, 1939, payable to the 
American National Bank and Trust Company of 
Danville, Danville, Virginia 4,000.00 
One note dated December 19, 1939, payable to the 
American National Bank and Trust Company of 
Dan ville, Danville, Virginia 2,00().00 
The three notes above described totaling $9,000.00 
are secured in addition to the deed of trust above-
mentioned by assignment of the following: 
Twenty-five shares '#6686 Union Mutual Building 
and Loan Association 356.25 
Title to one 1937 Dodge Sedan, motor No. 
D5-264091 350.00 
One installment certificate #18113-R with 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of 
two hundred forty installments of $121.37, 
beginning October 19, 1935, and ending 
September 19, 1955. 
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Policy # 11253098 for $10,000.00 with Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, dated 
December 30, 1936. 
Policy #5387227 for $1,000.00 with Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, dated 
June 20, 1928. 
Four limited payment Insurance policies 
with Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany: 
Policy #4847 4937, dated August 25, 
1913. 
Policy #·67 401202, dated July 31, 1922. 
Policy #69546486, dated April 16, 1923. 
Policy #69546485, elated April 16, 1923. 
Cash Surrender value· 1,000.00 
The assignment of installment certificate 
#18113-R with the Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company above ref erred to was 
made notwithstanding a provision in the 
face of said certificate that it may not be 
assigned, set over or transferred and the 
assignment in the opinion of the petitioner 
is of doubtful validity. 
Total 1,706.25 9,000.00 
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S/ CECELIA HALBERSTADT HAIN, 
Petitioner. 
COPY. 
SCHEDULE B-3. 
One installment certificate #18113-R with Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. of 240 installments of 
$121.37, beginning Oct. 19, 1935, and ending Sept. 
19, 1955. (Assignability doubtful.) 
Policy #11253098 for $10,000.00 with Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. dated December 30, 1936. 
Policy #5387227 for $1,000.00 with Metropolitan 
. Life Insurance Company, dated June 20, 1928. 
Four limited payment Insurance policies with Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company: 
Policy #48474937, dated August 25, 1913 
Policy #67401202, dated July 31, 1922 
Policy #69546486, dated April 16, 1923 
Policy :#69546485, dated April 16, 1923 
Cash Surrender Value 1,000.00 
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All of the above policies are assigned to the Ameri-
can National Bank & Trust Company of Danville, 
Danville, ,Virginia to secure the payment of three 
notes totaling $9,000.00. 
Interest in an undetermined number of dividends 
due Mrs. Bessie Halberstadt (deceased), motµer 
of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, from Louis Halprin, 
Receiver, for Brithacllim Building and Loan Asso-
ciation, Commonwealth Building, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
Balance in American National.Bank & Trust Com-
pany of Danville, Danville, Virginia, to the credit 
of Danville Shoe Market, Danville, Virginia 
Total 
18.41 
$1,018.41 
S/ CECELIA HALBERSTADT HAIN, 
Petitioner. 
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SCHEDULE B-5. 
Property claimed as exempt from the operation of the act 
of Congress relating to Bankruptcy. 
Petitioner claims that bv its terms installment certificate 
# 18113-R with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company en-
titling her to collect 240 monthly installments of $121.37 be-
ginning October 19, 1935 and ending on 1September 19, -1955 
is non-assignable and non-transferable ~nd is exempt from 
the claims of creditors. 
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S/ CECELIA HALBERSTADT HAIN, 
Petitioner. 
COPY. 
Danville, Virginia July 12, 193', 
American National Bank & Trust Company 
Danville 
Virginia 
Gentlemen: 
In consideration of your continuing to carry indebtedness 
totaling $8,500.00, which you have previously loaned me, and 
which I originally agreed to pay at a faster rate than I now 
find myself able to, I hereby assig·n and set over to you as 
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S'ecurity for this indebtedness, or any other indebtedness that 
I may owe your institution, all of my rights, title and interest 
in and to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company contract No. 
18113-R, Installment Certificate, in the principal amount of 
$29,128.80, payable at the rate of $121.37, in 239 monthly pay-
ments, beginning October 19, 1935. 
Since the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company will not 
accept an assignment of this policy, I am directing that they 
forward these installment checks to you each month to be 
placed to my credit. · 
I hereby contract and agree with you that I shall, when-
ever requested to do so ·by you, endorse these checks over to 
you, and allow the entire proceeds to be applied as a credit 
on my indebtedness to your bank until such indebtedness is 
paid in full. 
In making this agreement, assignment and contract, it is 
my intent and purpose to pref er your bank ahead of any other 
creditors I may have in. the disposition of this insurance, and 
it is my desire that all income to be derived from this policy ·be 
paid to you until my indel~tedness to you is liquidated in full, 
and I hereby agree to hereafter make such fur.ther contracts 
as may be necessary to legally perform this contract. 
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Your very truly, 
SI CECELIA HALBERSTADT. 
, CECELIA HALBERSTADT. 
EXHIBIT ''E''. 
COPY. 
In the District Court of the United States for the ,v estern 
District of Virginia. -
In the Matter of 
Cecilia Halberstadt Hain 
t/a Danville Shoe Market 
Bankrupt 
In Bankruptcy No. 2120. 
At Danville, in said District, on the 21st day of January, 
1941. 
Upon consideration of the verified petition of T. Bryan 
Tate, Trustee herein, filed· this day, asking that he be au-
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thorized to employ the firm of Brown & Garrett, Attorneys, 
Danville, Virginia, to represent said Trustee in a suit against 
Cecilia Halberstadt Hain, the American National Bank & 
Trust. Company, Danville, Virginia, and the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company of New York, in order to determine the 
Trustee's interest in a certain installment certificate of insur-
ance with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, payable· 
to Cecilia Halberstadt Hain, the bankrupt, and assigned by 
the bankrupt to the American National Bank & Trust Com-
pany of Danville, Virginia, as security for a certain indebted-
ness of the bankrupt to said bank, it appearing to the Refel'ee 
that the .said Brown & Garrett, Attorneys, represent no in-
terest ·adverse to the trustee or the estate in the matters upon 
which they are to be engaged, and that their employment is 
for the best interest of the estate and necessary in order to 
determine the Trustee's interest in said installment insul'anie 
certificate and in other matters in connection therewith. 
IT IS ORDERED that t.he said T. Bryan Tate be, and he 
hereby is authorized to employ the firm. of Brown & Garrett, 
Attorneys, Damrille, Virginia, to represent said trustee in a 
suit and claim against Cecilia Halberstadt Hain, the bank-
rupt, the American National Bank & Trust Company of Dan-
EXHIBIT BASS #1. 
ville, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of 
page 95 ~ New York, and other necessary parties in order to 
.determine and establish the trustee's interest in 
said installment insurance certificate with the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, payable to said bankrupt, and as-
sig·ned by the bankrupt to the American National Bank & 
Trust Company as security for certain indebtedness of the 
bankrupt to said bank, and said tmstee is hereby authorized 
to bring such suits or actions in equity or at lmv against the 
persons mentioned aforesaid, and other necessary persons, and 
in such courts as may he proper in order to establish and de-
termine the trustee's intereRt in said installment insurance 
certificate with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company pay-
able to said bankrupt and other matters in connection there-
with. 
S/ HORACE G. BASS, 
Referee. 
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Western District of Virginia. 
In Bankruptcy No. 2120. 
fn the Matter of 
Cecilia Halberstadt Hain, 
t/a Danville Shoe Market 
Bankrupt 
At a meeting of creditors of said estate in bankruptcy held 
at the office of the Referee, No. 503 :Masonic Temple, Danville, 
Virginia, on December 21, 1940, at 10 o'clock A. M., pursuant 
to notice hereto attached mailed to all creditors 10 days prior 
to said meeting, and continued and held at the office of the 
Referee on January 16, 1941. 
Present: John W. Curter, .Jr., attorney for the bankrupt; 
T. Bryan Tate, Trustee; Samuel _t\... Kushner, attorney for 
various creditors; Horace G. Bass, Referee. 
It appearing to the Referee that T. Bryan Tate, Trustee, 
has realized thus far the sum of $4,166.39 from the assets of 
this estate and that there is a poi;;sibility of additional assets 
being realized by the ']~rustee by virtue of a claim of the Trus-
tee to the installments payable under Certificate No. 18113-R 
with the l\tletropolitnn Life Insurance Company to the bank-
rupt, but which haB a proYision therein against assignment 
and which the bankrupt has pmportedly assigned. to the 
American National Bank & Trust Company, Danville~ ,Vir-
ginia, to secure her indebtedness to said bank, and jhat it 
is proper that a partial distribution of the assets thus far 
realized by the Trustee should now he made. 
IT IS ORDERED t1mt the said T. Bryan Tate, Trustee, 
first pay out of the fnuds in his possession the unpaid ex-
penses of administration of this estate, as shown on summary 
EXHIBIT BASS #2. 
statement attached l1creto, including a fee of 
page 97 ~ $100.00 to ,John VV. Cal'ter, Jr., attorney for the 
bankrupt, for servire~ herein, which is hereby al-
lowed, and commissions to the Trustee of $90.00, which are 
partial commisRions calculated on clisbursements by the Trus-
tee of $2,500.00 only. 
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It is further ordered that said Trustee next pay the claims 
of creditors having priority, consisting of wage claims and 
tax claims, as set forth on said summary statement, which 
are hereby allowed, the pref erred rent claims shown on said 
' statement having been heretofore allowed and paid, and the 
allowance of the claim of N. B. Early, Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, and the Unemployment Compensation Commis-
sion of Virginia for taxes which have been filed herein, being 
withheld until the proper amount thereof can be determined. 
It is further ordered that the said Trustee pay to the gen-
eral creditors, as shown on said summary statement, the sum 
of $1,385.49 as a dividend of 10% on their claims which have 
been filed herein and which arc hereby allowed. 
It appearing to tho Referee that the American National 
Bank & ·Trust Company, Danville, Virginia, has filed a claim 
herein for $9,058.33, evidenced by three notes in the sum of 
$3,000.00, $4,000.00 and $2,000.00, plus interest of $58.33, said 
notes ·being signed by Danville Shoe Market by Simon Hain, 
and endorsed by Cecilia Halberstadt Hain, the bankrupt, and 
Simon Hain, her husband, and that said indebtedness is se-
cured by five life insurance policies on the life of t11e bank-
rupt, having an aggreg;ate cash surrender value on the date 
of bankruptcy of $947.36, and a Dodge automobile of the bank-
rupt which has been sold and for which the sum of $250.00 
was obtained, and three checks of $121.37 each, payable to 
the bankrupt by the lV[etropolitan Life Insurance Company 
under installment certificate no. 18113-R for the months of 
February, March and May, 1.940, and endorsed and trans-
ferred ·by the bankrupt to said bank prior to the date of bank-
ruptcy, and further secured by certain property of 
page 98 ~ Simon Hain, consisting of a deed of trust on real 
estate owned by Simon Hain on Robertson Ave., 
Danville, Va., 25 shares of stock in the Union Mutual Building 
and Laon Assn., owned by Simon Hain, and a life insurance 
policy with the Metropolitan I.life Insurance Company for 
$10,000.00, dated Deeember 30, 1936, on the life of Simon Hain, 
and that said bank further claims as sec.uritv for said debt 
the installments payable to said bankrupt by the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company of $12U37 each, under certificate No. 
18113-R, after the date of hankruptcy under an alleged as-
signment to said bank, dated July 12, 1937, to which install-
ments T. Bryan Tate, Trustee, is also making claim, and that 
it cannot now be fully determined to what extent said claim 
is secured by property of the bankrupt. 
It is ord~red that the American National Bank & Trust 
Company a.pply on ib, claim filed herein the cash surrender 
value of the five life insurance policies on the life of the bank-
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rupt in the sum of $947.36, the sum of $250.00 realized from 
the sale of the Dodge automobile of said bankrupt, imd ihe 
three checks of $121.37 each payable to the bankrupt by the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company under Installment Cer-
tificate 18113-R for the months of February, March and May, 
1940, and endorsed and transferred by the bankrupt to said 
bank prior to the date of the bankruptcy, or the total sum 
of .$1,561.47. · 
It is further ordered that said bank be not required at this 
time to apply on its claim the value of the security held as 
aforesaid on the property of Simon Hain or the cash surren-
der value of the life insurance on his life, but said Bank is 
hereby authorized to reduce to cash the security it holds as 
afore said on the real and personal property of Simon Hain 
and the life insurance policy on his li_f e in the manner pro-
vided by law, and to apply the proceeds on said claim and in-
debtedness, if said Bank desires to do so to protect its in-
terests, and said Bank is ordered and directed not 
page 99 } to release said security without determining and 
. obtaining the value thereof and -applying same on 
said indebtedness as aforesaid until the further order of this 
Court. 
It is further ordered that the allowance of said claim of. 
said Bank for the purpose of participating in the dividends 
to general creditors herein be deferred until a full determi-
nation of the security on the property of the bankrupt held 
by the Bank for same, and that the said T. Bryan Tate, Trus-
tee, retain in his possession a sum sufficient to pay said Bank 
its proper dividend in the event it is determined that said 
bank is not fully secured by property of the bankrupt. 
It is further ordered that the Trustee report to the Court 
how he has executed the provisions of this order. 
S/ HORACE G. BASS, 
Referee in Bankruptcy. 
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· Wes tern District of Virginia 
In the Matter of 
Ceoilia Halberstadt Hain 
t/a Danville Shoe Market 
Bankrupt 
In Bankruptcy No. 2120 
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SUMMARY STATEMENT 
RECEIPTS: 
Stock of Shoes, 307 Main St. 
Furniture and Fixtures, 307 Main St. 
Stock of Shoes, 207 N. Union tSt. 
Furniture and Fixtures, 207 N. Union St 
Accounts collected 
Total 
Cash in ,Bank of Reidsville, N. C. 
DISBURSEMENTS: 
1. Administration expenses. 
H.P. Green, -appraiser 
R. C. Thompson, appraiser 
H. P. Green, making inventory 
B. W. Sams, making inventory 
L. P. Perkins, making inventory 
Patton, Temple and Williamson, Inc. 
insurance for trustee 
Patton, Temple and Williamson, Inc. 
Rent Main St. and N. Union St. 
for trustee 
J. D. Ley, Inc. auctioneer 
Patton, Temple and ·wmiamson, Inc. 
bond prem. trustee 
Register Publishing Co., adv. sales 
Lavinder & Howze, signs adv.-- sale 
McDaniel Printing· Co. handbills adv. 
sales 
T. Bryan Tate, Trustee's commis-
sions on $2,500.00 
John W. Carter, atty. for bankrupt, 
fee 
Horace G. Bass, Referee, fee · 41 
claims filed 
Horace G. Bass, Referee, commis-
sions on $1,900.00 
Horace G. Bass, Expense Account 
$5.00 
5.00 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
16.62 
179.99 
75.00 
21.00 
9.90 
6.00 
3.50 
90.00 
100.00 
10.25 
19.00 
4.06 
$3,500.001 
138.15 
4-f,5.00 
64.75 
9.991 
$4,162.89' 
3.50 
$4,166.3H· 
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(Over) 
Eunice H. Davis, sten. report-
page 101 } ing and transcribing min-
utes and evidence at first 
meeting of creditors 21.20 
City of Danville, water, gas and el. 
for Trustee 1.40 
Total $590.42 
2. Creditors having priority: 
a. Wage claims. 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Epps 
Carter 100.00 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Philip 
H~n ~~00 
120.00 
b. Tax claims. 
W. L. Gibson, City Collector, Dan-
ville, taxes, 1939 and 1940 304.73 
W. L. Gibson, City Collector, Dan-
ville, excess sales tax, 1940 7.23 
R .. H. Tucker Deputy Tax Collector, 
1939 taxes, Rocking·ham County, 
N.C. . 4&~ 
.T. L. Womack, tax collector, R.eids-
ville, N. C. 1939 taxes Reidsville, 
N. C. 39.11 
394.11 
c. Rent Claims. 
Patton, Temple and Williamson, Inc. 
307 l\fain St. 3 months 300.00 
Patton, Temple and "'Williamson, Inc. 
No. Union· St. 3 months 105.00 
405.00 
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Total amount of· priority claims paid 
at this time · 919.11 
3. General Creditors, 1st Dividend, 
10% 
. Name 
Retail Merchants Assn. Danville, Va. 
Claussner Hosiery Co. Paducah, Ky. 
,Golo: Slipper Co. Inc. New York City 
Bona Allen, Inc. Buford, Ga. 
Amount 
of Claim 
27.25 
4.36 
517.50 
626.10 
Dividend 
2.73 
.44 
51.75 
62.61 
(Continued Next Page) 
Name 
Stephen Putney 1Shoe Co. 
page 102 ~ Richmond, Va. 
The Pilot Shoe Co. Balti-
more, Md. 
. Crews and Clement, attys. for D. 
Myers & Sons Co., Inc. 
The Review Co. Inc. Reidsville, N. C. 
Richmond Dry Goods Co. Inc. 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Nathaniel 
Fisher & Co~ 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Philip 
Hain 
Gardner Motor Co. Danville, Va. 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Joseph 
M. Herman Shoe Co. 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Ker-
noodle est. 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Hood 
Rubber Co. Inc. 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Langer-
Lippman Co. 
Samuel A. Kushner, atty. for Eppes 
Carter 
Herman G. Koplen, atty. for Endicott, 
Johnson Corp. 
Great Atlantic Shoe Co. Inc. Knox-
ville, Tenn. 
Beckerman Shoe Corp., New York City 
Kennon C. Whittle, atty. for J. W. 
Carter Co. 
Amount 
of Claim Dividend 
140.04 
379.50 
700.50 
29.40 
629.06 
212.10 
1,000.00 
60.45 
175.50 
560.30 
102.00 
543.51 
50.00 
1,262.50 
721.64 
382.50 
138 .. 67 
14.00 
37.95 
70.05 
2.9+ 
62.91 
21.21 
100.00 
6.05 
17.55 
17.55 
10.20 
54.35 
5.00 
126.25 
72.16 
38.25 
13.87 
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' 
City of Danville, Va. "'\Vater, gas and 
elec. dept. 56. 70 
Kushner and Kushner, attys. for Bond 
Shoe Co. . 50.40 
Ches. and Pot. Tel. Co. of Virginia., 
Danville, Va. 35.44 
Malcolm K. Harris, atty. for Register 
Publishing Co. Inc. 70.68 
Alfred C. Blake, atty. for . Roberts-
Hart, Inc. 151.20 
Crews and Clement, a ttys. for Wingo, 
Ellet and Crump 1Shoe Co. Inc. 302.60 
Crews and Clement, a ttys. for Consoli-
dated Shoe Co. 2,195.87 
Whittle and Whittle, attys. for Wil-
liam Iselin and Co. Inc. · 2,522.34 
American Products Co. Inc. Reidsville, 
N. C. 4.20 
Patton, Temple and Williamson, Inc. 
Bal. rent, 307 ]\fain St. 150.00 
Patton, Temple and Wiliiamson, Inc. 
·Bal. rent, 207 N. Union St.- 52.50 
Total 
Total dividend to general creditors 
Total distributed 
$13,854.81 
Balance reserved in possession of Trustee 
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PROOF OF UNSECURED DIDBT 
In the District Court of the United States 
For the . . . . . . . . District of Virginia 
In the matter of 
Cecelia H. Hain, Bankrupt. 
No. . ... In Bankruptcy. 
5.67 
5.04 
3.54 
7.07 
15.12 
30.26 
219.59' 
252.23 
.42 
15.00 
5.25 
$1,385.49 
z,895.02 
1,271.37 
At Danville, Virginia, in said District of Virginia on the 
6th day of July, A. D. U)40 came Wayles R. Harrison, Vice-
President & Cashier of the American National Bank & Trust 
Company of Danville in the County of Pittsylvania in said 
District of Virginia and made oath, and says that Cecelia 
H. Hain, the person by ( or against) whom a petition for 
l 24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Adjudication of Bankruptcy has been filed, was at and be-
fore the filing of said petition, and still is, justly and truly 
indebted to said American National Bank & Trust Com-
pany deponent of Nine Thousand Fifty-Eight and a3/100 
($9,058.33) . . ................................... Dollars ; 
that the consideration of said debt is as follows: Note dated 
December 19, 1939, $3,000.00, and $19.00 interest to May 16, 
1940, · total $3,019.00; note dated December 3, 1939, $4,000.00,. 
and interest to May 16, 1940, $26.67, total $4,026.67; note 
dated December 19, 1939, $2,000.00, interest to May 16, 1940, 
$12.66, total $2,012.66, secured by the following collateral: 
chattel mortgage on Dodge touring sedan; assigned :Nletro-
politan Life Insurance Company Installment Certificate of 
Cecelia H. Hain, No. 18113-R, having no. cash value; assi~ed 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company policy No. 5387227 of 
Cecelia Halberstadt, cash value approximately $498.00; as-
signed Metropolitan Life Insurance Company polic~y No. 
48474937 of Cecelia Halberstadt, cash value approximately 
$55.00; assigned Metropolitan Life Insurance Company policy 
No. 69546485, Cecelia Halberstadt, cash value approxirrw.tely 
$200.00; assigned Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
Policy No. 69546486, Cece-
lia Halberstadt, cash vnlue 
that no part of said debt has been approximately $66.00; as-
paid ( except NONE· signed Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company Policy No. 67 401202, Cecelia HaJ.ber-
stadt, cash value approximately $100.00; assigned Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company policy No. 11253098, Simon 
Hain, cash value approximately $t360.00; note of :Simon Hnin 
for $3,000.00 
that there are no set-offs or counter claims to the same ( ex-
cept ( Collateral as Noted) secured by second 
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PROOF OF UNSECURED DEBT-Continued 
pa~·e 104 ~ mort~·a~·e on Simon Hain 's real estate; 2!5 slmres 
Union lV[ntnal Building· & Loan Association stock 
in the name of Simon Hain, valued at approximately $BG0.00. 
and that deponent has not, nor has any person h:v his order, 
or to llis 1rnowlec1g-e or belief, for llis use had or received anv 
manner of security for said debt whatever, and that 110 note 
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has been received for said debt and no judgment rendered 
thereon. 
S/ W. R. HARRISON 
Creditor 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of ~July, 
A. D. 1940. 
Seal 
S/ LOUISE F. WELI;S 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires July 7, 1943. 
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COPY 
PROPERTY STATEMENT 
OF Cecelia I-I .. Hain 
ADDRESS 3 Stores Office 307 Main St. 
TRADING AS ·Danville Shoe Market, Danville, Va. 
TO .T. vV. CARTER CO. 
0 
For the purpose of obtaining merchandise from you on 
credit, .I (we) mal\e· the following statement in writing, in-
tending that you should rely thereon respecting my (our) 
:financial condition as of (Date) January 1st, 1939 . 
Cash in Bank-
Cash on hancl-
.ASSETS 
:rvrdse. on hand ( invoice price) 
Accounts receivable-not pledged 
Note receivable-not pledged-
Stocks and Bonds (good)-
Furniture and fixtures-
Real estate-
All other assets-Trust },und Metropolitan Life In-
542.~l2 
300.00 
39,115.75 
453.84 
8,600.00 
2,688.12 
surance Co.- 26,35G·.OO 
TOT AL ASS1~TS- 78,050.03 
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LI.ABILITIES 
Owe for merchandise ( not due) 
Owe for merchandise (past due) 
Owe banks for borrowed monev 
Others, including relations and friends 
Mortgage on real estate 
Lien or chattel mortgage on mdse. 
· Other liabilities, including rent 
Owe for taxes-due 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
TOT.AL NET WORTH 
N 
0 
N 
E 
6,107.40 
7,00U.1JU 
13,107.4.0 
64,942.63 
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PROPERTY STATEMENT-Continued 
page 106 ~ We bank with AMERICAN NATIONAL BK. & 
TRUST CO. 
Annual business 
Annual expense 
Fire insurance 
86,460.16 
17,170.85 
Fully covered 
If an individual or part~ership, I or we a.re of legal age. 
The fore going statement has been carefully read (both the 
printed and written matter), and is in all respects complete, 
accurate and truthful. It discloses to you the true state of 
my (our) :financial condition on the 1st day of January, 1939. 
Since that time there has been no material unfav01·able 
change in my ( our) :financial condition; and if any such 
ebange takeg place I (we) will give you notice. Until such 
notice is given, you are to regard this as a continuing state-
ment. 
Name of Individual, firm 
or corporation . DANVILLE SHOE MARKET. 
Signed by CECELIA H. HAIN 
Date of Signing Statement . 
3/5/39 Street MAIN Town DANVILLE State Va. 
IF PAR,TNERSHIP, NAME PARTNERS. IF CORPORA-
TION, NAMES OF OFFICERS. . 
P .AGE 2,. EXHIBIT BASS #4 
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]'INANCIAL STATEMENT OF CECELIA H.A.LBER-
STADT, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS CECELIA HAL-
BE·RT, T/A DANVILLE SHOE MARKET 
307 M.AIN STREE.T, DANVILLE, VIRGINIA 
~,or the purpose of the extension of credit, I submit my finun-
cial statement: 
ASSETS 
PAGE 2, EXffi·BIT BASS #4 
LIABILITIES 
Cash on hand 
Cash in bank 
M.erchandise (at 
cost) 
$ 250.00 Accts. Payable for $ 
4,000.00 merchandise (past 
due) None 
24,000.00 Accts. Payable for 
merchandise ( not Fixtures and other 
equipment :-- less 
depreciation 
Other assets ( trust 
fund) Sole bene-
ficiary 
due) 3,500.00 
L700.00 Notes navable at 
. bank-=none 
Misc. Loans & liens 
25,000.00 -none 
Conffingent 
TOTAL ASSETS $54,950.00 ties 
liabili-
2,000.00 
TOTAL LIABIDI-
TIES $5,500.00 
NET WORTH $491,450.00 
Fire Insurance on Merchandise? Full coverage. 
Amount of merchandise on consignment? None. 
Sales preceding· year? $100,000.00 
Amount of sales last montl1 f 
Type of business? Shoes for cash only. 
A vera~e monthly expense? $1,100.00 
Number of stores operated Three. 
Location of stores? 1. 307 Main Street, Danville, Virginia. 
2. 207 Union Street, Danville. Virginia. 
3. 217 Scales Street, Reidsville, North 
Carolina 
Own or lease property? 
Duration of leases? 
Lease. 
Three (3) years. 
128 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Principal office location Y 
Bookkeeping 1System Y 
Name of bank! 
307 Main Street, Danville, Vir-
ginia 
System installed by certified 
public accountant . 
.American National Bank & 
Trust Co., Danville, Va. 
N. B. 
These three (3) stores were formerly a part of the partner-
ship group of six (6) stores operating in the name of Hal-
bert's Credit Clothing Company, of Danville, Virginia, con-
sisting·-of three (3) shoe stores and three (3) credit clothing· 
stores, and are exclusively owned by me. The three (~) shoe 
stores are· now operating under the guidance and direction 
of l\fr. Simon W. Hain, General Manager. Mr. Hain _wa~ 
formerly manager of the Harnsberger Company, Incorpo-
rated, a store in the chain of the American Department Stores 
Corporation. 
J. H. D.) 
Respectfully submitted, 
SJ CECELIA HALBERSTADT 
S/ CECELIA HALBERT 
8/10/36) (Pencil Notation) 
August 8, 1936 
EXHIBIT BASS #5 
page 108} In the Corporation Court of Danville, Virginin. 
T. Bryan Tate, Trustee in bankruptcv of the estate of Ce-
cilia Halberstadt Hain, Complainant 
1). 
Cecilia Ha]berstadt Hain, et als., Defendants 
DEPOSITIONS. 
The depositions of Walter W. BridR.·es and otherR taken 
before me. L. T. Woody, a Notary Public in and for th~ City 
of Danville. State of 'Virufoia. at tl1e office of Crews & Cle-
ment, M:ascnic Building-. Danville, Virginia, on February 25, 
1942, pursuant to the attached notice, to be read in evfrlence 
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Walter W. Bridges. 
on behalf' of defendants in the above styled chancery cans~ 
pending in the Corporation Court of Danville. 
Present: E. Walton Brown, of Brown and Garrett, Coun-
sel for Complainant. 
Grasty Crews, of Crews & Clement, Attorneys for :Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company. 
Edwin B. Meade, of Meade and Talbott, Attorneys for 
Cecilia Halberstadt Hain. 
The American National Barik and Trust Company. No 
appearance. 
page 10'9' ~ The witness, 
WALTER W. BRIDGES, 
being first duly sworn, states as follows: 
Mr. Crews: 
I believe you are l\Ir. "\Valter W. BridgesY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ,v11at is your occupation! 
A. l\fanag·er Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Dan-
ville, Virginia. 
Q. How long have you been manag·er of the company, and 
how long- have you lived in Danville? 
A. I have been manager of the company approximately· 
fourteen vears. 
Q. How long- in Danville? 
A. Since 1934, last time. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, I hand you a photostatic copy of pron.r of , 
dt~ath of the late Joseph Halberstadt, and ask if you can tell 
us~ first, whether that is a true copy, and al~o explain your 
memoranda, or memo. on the back of the third page? 
Judge Brown: Let me see it. 
A. These are reg'UJar photostatic copies of the reg-nl;.i.r 
death claim papers; regarding the comments on the reverse 
side, statement of :M:anager-
Judg;e Brown: We object to any evidence that ex1-ilains 
or varies the statement which appears on the photo~tat_ic 
copy. 
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.A. Question 3. When was last premium paid Y Ordinarily 
if the policy was in force in our own district, we would give 
exact date that premiums were last paid. As the premiums 
were being paid in the Washington, N. C. District, was the 
reason for comment D. K. (means, don't know). Policy in 
force in the Washington, N. C. District is reason for it. 
Q. So I understand that any and all policies in 
page 110 ~ force on the life of the assured you ref er to the 
place of his death, whether the policies were 
written there or elsewhere 7 
A. That is right. 
· Q. I notice on those proofs the name of H. B. Kushner. 
Who is Mr. Kushner? 
A. He is one of our company~s representatives. 
Q. In Danville? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I am asking you to file these proofs of death-Proofs 
of Death numbered 1, 2 and 3, and the reverse side of Part 
3, marked '' Exhibit Bridges Proof 1' '. 
·A. I will. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, I hand you policies Nos. 5927858-A, 
5815807-.A, 5081321-A, 830032-A, issued by the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company on the life of Joseph Halberstadt; 
I also hand you wha.t purports to be photostatic copies of 
each of these policies with what purports to be photostatic 
copies of each of the endorsements thereon. Please state 
whether these photostatic copies are true and accurate copies 
of the policies which you have in your possession 7 
A. They are true copies. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, I ask that you file the photostatic copy of 
each of these four policies as exhibits, as follows: Photostatic 
copy Policy #830032-A, marked "Exhibit Policy 1"; pho-
tostatic copy of policy #5081321-A, marked "Exhibit Policy 
2''; photostatic copy policy #5815807-A, marked ''Exhibit 
Policy 3"; and photostatic copy of policy #5927858-A, 
marked "Exhibit Policy 4". 
Judge Brown: The plaintiff objects to the in-
pag·e 111 ~ troduction of these four photostatic copies of the 
four policies; not upon the gTound that they are 
not true copies of the original policies, but upon the ground 
that they are immaterial and irrelevant and have no bearing 
on the issue before the court in this case. 
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A. As requested, I herewith file the photostatic copies of 
the four policies mentioned as exhibits. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, on the policy #5815807-A issued by the 
Company May 16, 1929, and. on the policy issued July 8, 1929, 
#5927858-A, there appears a prov:ision as follows: 
"No Beneficiary may assign or commute Income payments 
unless the Insured has so provided in writing and such pro-
vision has been endorsed on the Policy by the Company at 
its Home Office.'' 
This provision being contained in Sec. 14, under Provisions 
and B~ne.fits unnm:nbered paragraph, under .Section 14. Will 
you please examine the policies and tell us whether there is 
any writing or provision on the policies in compliance with 
this provision f . 
A. I have carefully reviewed the original policies and there 
are no endorsements on either of these two policies author. 
izing the beneficiary to make any assignment. 
Judge Brown: 
Q. Mr. Bridges, please look at the original policy dated 
May 16, 1929, No. 5815807-A, face value $6,876.00, and state 
whether the application for the policy attached 
page 112 } thereto does not show that the assured, Joseph 
Halherstadt 's place of residence, date of the ap-
plication, and the issuance of the policy was at Belhaven, 
Beau£ ort County, North Carolina? 
A. Yes, it does. . 
Q. Does the application also show that the original bene-
ficiary in this policy was Cecilia Halberstadt, daughter of 
the assured, age 18, whose occupation was g·iven as "stu. 
dent", and whose place of residence was stated as Belhaven, 
North Carolina,-is that right 1 
A. I assume that is North Carolina,-it does not have the 
''North Carolina'' opposite. 
Q. In the ord~nary course this policy would, of course, be 
issued at the Home Office .of your Company and delivered 
~o your agent or manager located in Beaufort County, and 
delivered by him to the assured there, upon the payment of 
the first premium? 
A. The policy would normally be forwarded to the district 
where the insured resided. 
Q. In what district in the State of North Carolina was 
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the policy issued to by your Company for delivery to the in-
sured t 
A. At Washington, North Carolina. 
Q. Does the original policy provide that after it is issued 
and sent to the company's representathre, that it shall not 
take effect unless or until the · first premium therefor has 
been entered on a receipt form provided on the policy, and 
that the premium has been actually paid in cash? 
A. The contract is not in force until the first premium is 
paid; each policy is due to be countersigned for the pi·emium 
paid. We find policies occasionally where, due to an over-
sight, the agent might not countersign the policy 
page 113 ~ for the first premium, but the policy is still in 
force because the premium has been paid. 
Q. I believe a reference to the outside cover of the policy 
#5815807-A dated May 16, 1929, sl1ows the provision to which 
my question referred and shows that the· policy was counter-
signed on May 31, 1929, by Mr. Noble, Agent of your com-
pany, who delivered the policy . 
.A. I assume that is our representative's signature,-yes, 
it shows it is countersigned. 
Q. Mr. Bridg·es, when this policy, and the other policy 
#5927858-A, dated July 8, 1929, became payable by reason 
of the death of the insured, did your company require any 
further application or election or statement from the bene-
ficiary before the installment contract was issued to :Miss 
Cecilia Halberstadt? 
A_. Only the usual death claim proofs. 
Q .. In other words, no papers, statements or affidavits were 
required of the beneficiary and there were no other papers 
submitted other than the claimants statement; #1, Statement 
of a Friend to which is appended the statement of the Min-
ister or other person who officiated at the Interment, and 
the Statement of the physician attending. Of course, you 
understand please, l\fr. Bridges, tliat I refer to the Photo-
static copy which you filed, which also includes not merely 
what is on the front of each page, but what is on the revers·e 
side thereof, all of which have been filed hy yon as ''Exl1ibit 
Bridges, Proof One". 
A. The only proofs filed are those,-first the Claimant's 
Statement, Part 1, Physician's Statement, Part 2, Friends, 
Minister, or Undertaker's state. mfft R, and t1ie mannger's 
statement on the reverse side of Part 3. 
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Q. Do you know whether a.ny letter or any 
page 114 ~ other communication was received by the Com-
pany from the beneficiary, or her agent or rep-
resentative? 
.A.. Not that I know of. 
Q. For the benefit of the Court, Mr. Bridges, you hav~ 
pointed out the provisions of the· 7th paragraph unnumbered 
of Sec. 14, headed '' l\fanner of Settlement at Death or Ma-
turity as an Endowment" which appears on both of the poli-
cies issued in 1929,-is there any other provision in the policy 
which gave the insured the right to change the beneficiary 
during his lifetime 7 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. Point that provision out, please, to the Court. 
A. Yes, refer to Section No. 6, headed ''Change of Bene-
ficiary". 
· Q. How many different methods of settlement on the ma-
turity of these two policies by death of the insured are pro-
vided in the policies to be exercised by the beneficiary. 
Mr. Meade: May I ask which policy you refer to·t 
Judge Brown: The question refers to these two policies 
about which questions have been propounded, meaning those • 
· dated in 1929. 
A. One installment payment. 
Q. Where does that provision appear f 
A. On the face of tho policy. 
Q. That provision provides for the payment, after due 
proof of death of the insured, of the sum of $57.30 and there-
after a monthly payment of the same amount until 239 pay-
ments, including the first payment have been made, is that 
correct? 
A. That is correct. 
page 115 ~ Q. What does the following provision-"The 
commuted value of all of the above payments is 
$10,000.00'' mean 1 . 
A. It only required that amount of insurance to pur-
chase the stated amount or income for the period of time. 
Q. I was interested, Mr. Bridg·es, in having- the record 
show when, and by whom the right to receive $10,000.00 as 
the commuted value of this policy could be exercised. The 
policy was certainly not worth $10,000.00 when it was written, 
was it? . 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, was it a sing·le premium policy f . 
A. No, sir; it was worth $10,000.00 in case of death, if 1t 
was paid in a lump sum payment. · 
Q. What I am trying· to get clear is, what does the lan-
guage quoted, mean? Does it not mean that at the death 
of the insured, the beneficiary would be entitled either to 
receive $10,000.00 which was stated to be the commuted value 
of the policy, or that the beneficiary could receive the monthly 
installment payments referred to in the policy! 
A. No, not in this case~ 
Q. Why? 
A. It does mean that if the insured had given the benefi-
ciary the right to accept that. 
Q. The insur,ed could, as I understand it, at any moment 
during· his life, have changed the beneficiary without her con-
sent? 
A. Yes, subject to the company's endorsement. 
Q. You mean, of course, he would have been required to 
notify the company, and they would have made the endorse-
ment on the policy as requested by her. · 
.A. Yes, sir. 
" page 116 ~ Q. Now it appears that the other two policies, 
Nos. 830032-1\., dated March 22, 1912, face amount· 
$2,000.00, and policy No. 5081321-A, dated Sept. 28, 1927, in 
the amount of $5,114. did require some election or direction 
by the insured as to the niethod of settlement when the policy 
would become a claim,-is that correct? I refer you to "Ex-
hibit D, a photostatic copy of Election of Installment Set-
tlement Option 2, dated September 8, 1930, marked ''Ex-
hibit D~' with plaintiff's depositions, signed by Joseph Hal-
berstadt? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. I observe that Policy #5927858-A, dated July 9, 1929, 
does not have attached the application on which the policy 
was issued. Will you explain why that application is not 
available! 
A. Apparently it was lost or misplaced. 
Q. What I am trying· to arrive at is where was this policy 
issued, and through which district of your company was it 
delivered to· the insured f 
A. The policy was issued to the ·w ashington, North Caro-
lina District. 
Q. Is there any difference in the provision of this policy 
No. 5927858-A and the policy No. 5815807-A, as to the manne
0
r 
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of settlement at death or maturity as an endowment under 
Sec. 14, or under Sec. 6 of Provision and Benefit covering 
change of beneficiary f 
A. They are both the same. 
Q. It appears that the original policy #5081321-A, dated 
Sept. 28, 1927, was made payable to Bessie Halberstadt, wife 
Beneficiary, who is described as the wife of the insured. 
Please look at the application and state whether it does not 
show that Mrs. Bessie Halberstadt, and also the insured 
were residents of Belhaven, Beaufort County, 
page 117 r North Carolina, when the policy was issued and 
delivered. 
A . .According to the photostatic copy they were both resi-
dents of Belhaven, .North ,Carolina. 
Q. Under what date did the Company, at the request of 
the insured, change the beneficiary from insured 's wife to 
his daughter, Cecilia Halberstadt 1 
A. June 6, 1930. 
Q. When that change of beneficiary was effected, did the 
insured reserve the right to further change the beneficiary? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. It appears that Poli~y No. 830032-A in the amount of 
$2,000. dated March 22, 1912, was also made payable to the 
wife of the insured, Mrs. Bessie Halberstadt, as beneficiary 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Under what date did the insured change the name of 
the beneficiary from his wife to his daughter? 
A. June 6, 1930. 
Q. Did he, in making that change, reserve the right to make 
future changes of beneficiary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, the Installment Certificate which I assume 
also is a contract issued to l\fiss ()eeilia Halberstadt on Oc-
tober 19, 1935, photo~t.atic copy of which is filed with the 
plaintiff's evidence, and also attached· to the answer of the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Oompany, represents the obli-
gation of your company with reference to payment of the 
amounts which became due after all four policies became 
claims ;-is that correct¥ · 
p~g·e 118 ~ A. Yes, sir, that is correct. 
Q. I refer to this Installment ·Certificate, dated 
October 19, 1935, issued by the Company to Miss Cecilia Hal-
berstadt. Will you point out what language in this contra.ct 
or certificate, makes it, under your theory, any contract of 
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insurance rathe1~ than an obligation to pay money in monthly 
installments. 
Mr. Meade: Objection is made to this question upon the 
ground that all insurance contracts, payable not in a lump 
sum upon the death of insured are installment obligations 
of insurance companies to pay money. It is one and the same 
thing. · 
Judge Brown: This suggested explanation is wholly un-
necessary, as the witness knows as much about the provisions 
of the insurance contract as does counsel. 
A. This is not a contract of insurance but a certificate un-
der which the Company is obligated to make payment to the 
beneficiary in monthly installment payments in accordance 
with the election of installment settlements under Option 2, 
which the insured, Joseph Halberstadt elected on the 3rd 
day of Sept., 1930. 
Q. For the convenience of the Court, won't you please, in 
view of the fact that the election of installment settlement 
ref erred to, which was signed by Joseph Halberstadt, and 
accepted by the Companv on Sept. 8, 1930, only applies to 
two of the policies, those ·numbered 830032-A, and 5081321-A, 
point out the provisions in the two 1929 policies, which in 
effect are an election to receive the benefits in 
page 119 ~ installment payments after the policies mature as 
claims? 
A. That is correct. The election complc~ted on the 3rd day 
of Sept., 1930, only refers to the two above numbered poli-
cies, as the other two policies in question were originally 
written on the monthly income basis to the beneficiary. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, do you have any records or can you fur-
nish the Court with any information relative to the place of 
delivery of the. ~nstallment Certificate #18113-R by your 
Company to Cecilia Halberstadt? Was that Installment Cer-
tificate delivered by your Danville, Virginia, Office? 
A. I am of the opinion it was. 
Q. Would you not have some records wl1ich would show 
definitely the place of delivery of this certificate f 
A. I would not have any official records. 
Q. Would not your file, ·w11ether you refer to it as official, 
or otherwise, show when and by wl1om so important a paper 
was delivered to the holder of this certificate? 
A. ::M:y records are kept in the office for a period of five 
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years, and we had those records for five years, but it will 
probably be impossible to obtain those records now. 
Q. Were you in Danville with the Metropolita:n Life In-
surance Company as of October, November and December, 
1935! 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. Do you personally have any independent recollection 
of handling the transaction? 
.A.. Ot'ly the completion of these death claim proofs. 
. Q. It appears that the death claim proofs which 
page 120 ~ you have exhibited were notarized in Danville, 
Virginia, on December 19, 1935·; this applies to 
the statement of Miss Cecilia Halherstadt, the claimant. It 
further appears from the date of the Installment Certificate 
that it was issued by your ,Company on Oct. 19, 1935. As a 
matter of fact would the Installment Certificate have· been 
delivered by your Company, through your office, until after 
the proofs of death filed by you as ''Exhibit Bridges Proofs 
1 '' have been received hy the Company? 
.A. No. 
Q. So that, it is obvious, is it not, that the Installment 
Certificate issued to Miss Cecilia Halberstadt was delivered 
after December 19, 19B5, is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Does it not appear from the affidavit made bv Miss 
Cecilia Ha.lberstadt on December 19, 19-35, filed as a· Proof 
· of Death, that as of that date her address was Caswell Apart-
ment, Danville, Virginia, % Halperin? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, would the delivery of the Installment Cer-
tificate have been made to any person other than Cecilia Ha.1-
berstadt? 
A. No. 
Q. ·would you not require some receipt or form to be fur-
nished your Company showing the actual receipt by her of 
this Installment Certificate? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Would your District Office here merely report back to 
the Home Office that the InstalJment Certificate had been de:.. 
livered 1 · 
A. That is ·correct. 
Q. And you would not have any papers or records or files 
wl1ich would show the actual date of the delivery of the Cer-
tificate. 
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A. No, sir. · . 
page 121 r Q. How long in ordinary course of business 
would have passed after the execution by the 
claimant of the Proof of Death before the settlement by de-
livery of the Installment Certificate would have been made! 
A. The Installment Certificate following the Proof of 
Death are usually issued in ten days, and they are usually 
delivered on the same day received by my office. 
Q. I observe that the Installment Certificate shows that 
the first payment of $121.37 was to be made as of the date 
of the certitlcate, or I assume as of the time of the delivery 
of the Certificate, and that thereafter the installments were 
to mature monthly, would not your company have possession 
of some voucher, check or receipt evidencing the original pay-
ment which was made when the Installment Certificate was 
delivered? 
A. No doubt a paid check. 
Q. You do not have that here? 
A. No. 
Q. If it won't be too much trouble, will you request a pho-
tostatic copy of thaU 
A. Yes. 
Q. It appears that the Installment Certificate is dated on 
the same date on which the insured died. Please explain 
why this is so 1 
A. It is the practice of our company where the contract 
is payable on the monthly Installment Basis that the first· . 
check be payable to the beneficiary, effective the day of the 
death of the insured, and monthly installment checks each 
month thereafter. 
Q. I understand that you mean tl1e date of the first check 
bears the same date as of the death of the in-
page 122 ~ sured? 
A. Yes, that is rig-ht. 
Q. Then, as a matter of fact, the delivery of these checks 
is, of course, effective after proper proofs of death are re-
ceived and approved by the Company? 
A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. As of December 19, 1935, wheu the proofs of death was 
completed- by Miss Cecilia Halberstadt, the three monthly 
payments due on the 19th of October, November and Decem-
ber had been issued and readv for deliverv? 
A. All monthly payments which were dtie up to that time 
accompanied the supplementary certificate. I find that the 
files of our counsel show that on Nov. 19, 1941, the Home 
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Office of the Company in New York City wrote that their 
records disclosed that the Supplementary Contract was for-
warded to Danville for delivery to Cecilia Halberstadt on 
Jan. 6, 1936; I would assume that the Certificate was deliv-
ered by my office within two days of its receipt in Danville. 
Q. Mr. Bridges, insofar as subsequent monthly payments 
which matured under this Installment Certificate are con-
cerned, were they made through your office or direct by mail 
to the beneficiary¥ 
A. Direct to the beneficiary. 
Mr. Meade: 
Q. Will you state whether or not the policies of 1912 and 
1927 show that the election exercised by the insured in re-
gard thereto was executed after the change in beneficiary 
was made from Mrs. Bessie Halberstadt to insured 's daugh-
ter, Cecilia .Halberstadt f 
.A. Yes, sir, they were made following. 
Q. Do you know whether or not Mrs. Bessie 
page 123 }- Halberstadt, the wife of Joseph Halberstadt, died 
. prior to the date of this change in the beneficiary 
to his daughter t 
A. I do not personally know, but I assume that she did. 
Q. Did the insured, ,Joseph Halberstadt, give his benefi-
ciary, Cecilia Halberstadt, the right under any one or more 
of the four Metropolitan Life Insurance Company policies to 
accept a lump sum in settlement upon his death? 
.A. No. 
Judge Brown: This is a matter of construction of the 
contract and is objected to. 
Mr. Meade: 
Q .. Mr. Bridges, does your company deny liability under 
the four policies mentioned and the Installment Certificate 
supplemental thereto? 
.A.. No, sir,-a.nxiomi to pay. 
Q. It is just a. question of not knowing whom to pay it to . 
.A.. Yes. _ 
Judge Brown: 
Q. Mr. Bridges, I overlookecl asking you about the appli-
cation attached to policy #830032-A. Please state where, ac-
cording to that application, Joseph Halberstadt had his place 
of residence at the time of the issuance and delivery of that 
contract? 
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A. Philadelphia, Pa. 
1\fr. Crews : Q. Do you authorize the Notary to sign your name to this 
deposition? 
page 124 ~ · A. I do. 
And further this deponent says not. 
_ 8/ "\V ALTER W. BRIDGES, 
By Notary. 
The next witness, 
MR. E. H. M.A."RSHALL, 
Treasurer of the City of Danville, being duly sworn, states 
as follows : · 
Mr. Meade: 
Q. You are Mr. E. H. Marshall, Treasurer of the City of 
Danville! 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you served continuously as Treasurer 
for the City of DanvUleY 
A. Fifteen years. 
Q. Mr. Marshall, :M:rs. Doris Burrell, Deputy Clerk of the 
Corporation Court of Danville, heretofore testified in this 
suit and stated that the Official Voting List issued for the 
1938 election showed that Miss Cecilia Halberstadt had paid 
poll taxes for the years 1935, 1936 and 1937, and that such 
taxes had been· paid six months prior to the second Tuesday 
in November, 1938. Was this official list filecl in the ,Clerk's 
Office of the Corporation Court of Danville prepared by you 
as Treasurer of the City of Danville and sent to that Clerk's 
OfficeY 
A. It was not prepared personally by me. 
· Q. Was it prepared in your office? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you checked your list in your office to see if the 
, Official list issued for the November, 1938, election shows 
that the poll t~~es for the years Hl35, 1936 and 1937 have 
been paid by Miss Cecilia Halherstadt? · 
· Judge Brown: This question is objected to 
page 125 ~ because the list referred to filed in the Clerk's 
Office of the Corporation Court of Danville is a . 
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list of male and female persons in the City of Danville, Vir-
ginia, who have paid their State poll taxes for the years 
1935, 1936 and 1937, six months prior to the regular election 
to be held in November, 1938. This official list is certified 
as required by law by E. H. :Marshall, Treasurer, and under 
date of May 2.S, 1938, the record shows that there is attached 
to the Official list a verification by E. H. Marshall, Treasurer 
of the City of Danville, that the list "Is a true and correct 
list of all male and female persons iu the City of Danville, 
Va., who have paid their State capitation taxes for the years 
1935, 1936 and 1937", that oath having been taken before 
C. G. Bagley, Deputy Clerk of the Corporation Court of Dan-
ville on May 28, 1938; therefore, whether the list is right 
or w1·ong, it is as a matter of law, conclusive evidence of 
the facts therein contained and particularly of the personal 
payment of the poll taxes by :Miss Cecilia Halberstadt for 
the years 1935, 19·36 and 1937, therefore that official list can-
not be altered or varied by any testimony from E. H. Mar-
shall, Treasurer. 
:Mr. Meade: ·while this official list may or may not be con-
clusive as to the rights of persons to vote, or not to vote, it 
is not conclusive against the proof by adequate and sufficient 
evidence that a mistake was made in the list after 
page 126 ~ the payment of poll taxes for the year 1935 of 
Cecilia Halberstadt, and it is permissible to show 
this mistake for the purpose of establishing in this Equity 
suit the fact that Cecilia Halberstadt was not a resident of 
the City of Danville in 1935. . 
Judge Brown: The plaintiff also objects upon the gTound 
that Miss Cecilia Halberstadt is estopped to deny that she 
had not resided in Danville for two years prior to l\fay 2, 
1936, when she made oath before tl1e Registrar of the City 
of Danville that sl1e had heen living- in Danville in the Third 
VVard one year and in the State of Virgfoia one year. 
A. The statement of Mrs. Burrell as to the Voting List, 
itself, is correct. I have persona11y checked all of the records 
in my office and there is no record ·whatever of having col-
lected at any time a. payment of the 1935 poll taxes from 
Miss Cecilia Halberstadt. 
Q. Do your records show any . place where Miss Cecilia 
Halberstadt was charged with tl1e poll taxes for 1935 Y 
A. The record does not show any charge. 
Judge Brown: Same objection. 
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::M:r. Meade : 
Q. What provision, if any, is made for the correction of 
the Official Voting· List which is deposited or filed in the 
Clerk's OfficeY 
Judge Brown: That question is objected to because that 
is a matter of law and now a matter of evidence: 
page 127 r A. The law recognizes the chance for error in 
these voting· lists and there is a provision in the 
law by which correction can be made prior to the day of 
voting. The law requires that this list be posted at each 
voting precinct so many days prior to an election in order 
that any errors may be discovered, in order that voters may 
have an opportunity of discoYering the error. 
Mr. Meade: 
Q. The law makes provision for the correction of this Vot-
ing List after it has left your office and has been filed in the 
Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of Danville, provided 
the correction is made before the voter actually votes at any 
. particular election? 
A. That :is right. The presumption being that after the 
list is posted any such errors may be discovered. 
Mr. ·Crews : · 
Q. ]\fr. Marsha.11, is it often the fact that people will be 
denied a vote because the list does not show that they have 
paid their taxes, whereupon, you are requested to recheck and 
on your supplying· the tax receipt, under the law, that voter 
proceeds to cast his ballot. 
A. That is correct. 
!fr. Meade: 
Q. Have you checked the Official List which was filed in 
the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of Danville and 
issued for the second Tuesday in ,June, 1938, local election, 
to see what is shown as to the payment of poll tax by Miss 
Cecilia Halberstadt ! 
A. I have. 
Q. Does this list show that she paid a poll tax for the year 
1935! 
page 128 ~ A.· It does not. I ha.Ye also examined the card 
kept on all taxpayers and this does not show that 
a payment was made for the year 1935 at any time. 
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Q. Is it your opinion that the Official List issued for the 
November, 1938, Election showing- that Miss Cecilia Halber-
stadt has paid poll taxes for the year 1935 is, in fact, in 
error? 
Judge Brown: Same objection . 
.A. It is clearly an error. 
Judge Brown: 
Q. Mr. Marshall, assume for the sake of the record that 
Miss ·Cecilia Halberstadt registered in Danville on May 2, 
1936, and certified to the Registrar, under oath, that she had 
been a resident of Danville for one year prior thereto, would 
she, as a matter of fact, have been liable for the 1935 poll 
taxes, unless she had, in fact, been a resident of the .City 
-0f Danville as of January 1, 1935 7 
A. She would not. 
Q. In checking your record as to the prepayment of the 
capitation tax, which we refer to as poll tax, for what years 
does your record show that Miss .Cecilia Halberstadt, after-
wards Mrs. O'ecilia Halberstadt Hain, paid capitation tax? 
A. 1936 through 1941, inclusive. 
Q. Both inclusive! 
A. Both inclusive. 
Q. Was she apparentlv assessed at 707 Main Street and 
later assessed as Mrs. Hain at 206 Robertson StreeU 
A. Yes. 
l" ! ' I : ; 
page 129 ~ Mr. Meade: I offer herewith certified copy of 
the will of Joseph llalberstadt, certified by the 
Clerk of the Corporation Gonrt of Danville, to be filed as 
''Exhibit Copy Will'' and to be read as a part of the evidence 
in the record in this case. 
,Judge Brown: The evidence is objected to because it does 
not include the order of probate of the will made by the Cor-
poration Court of Danville on December 7, 1935, which is the 
only material part of the record. Subject to the above ob-
jections, the plaintiff offers in evidence a certified copy of 
the Order of Probate of the Will dated Dec. 7, 1935, to be 
marked as "Exhibit with the Will''. 
Mr. M:eade : Counsel for Cecilia Halberstadt Hain has no 
objection to this exhibit. 
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Co-qnsel for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has no-
objection to this Exhibit . 
.And further this dep,onent says not. 
SJ E. H. MARSHALL, 
By Notary. 
No other witness appeaifog, the further taking of these 
depositions is continued until February 28, 1942, at the same 
place, and between the same hours. 
S/ L. T. W.OODY, 
Notary Public. 
page 130 ~ Office of Crews & Clement, in the City of Dan-
ville, Virginia, this 28th day of February, 1942 : 
Present: E. Walton Brown, of Brown and Garrett, Coun-
sel for Complainant; Grasty Crews, of Crews & Clement, 
Attorneys for Metropolitan Life Insurance .Company; Ed-
win B. Meade, of Meade and Talbott, Attorneys for Cecilia 
Halberstadt Hain; The American National Bank and Trust 
Company, no appearance. 
Mr. Crews: We herewith offer in evidence, documents 
marked '' Exhibit New York Law'' consisting of affidavit of 
William H. Barnes, of the New York Bar, together with 
· '' Exhibit Barnes 1, Exhibit Barnes 2, Exhibit Barnes 3, and 
Exhibit Barnes 4". 
Judge Brown: Plaintiff consents that the affidavits and 
exhibits may be offered without any further proof; and waives 
the rig-ht to eross examine the witness, Wm. H. Barnes, 
thereon. 
Plaintiff, however, excepts to any evidence, and the intro-
duction of this evidence, upon the ground that the New York 
Law is wholly irrelevant and immaterial to this issue. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Danville, to-wit: 
I, L. T. ·woody, a Notary Public in and for the City and 
State aforesaid do herebv certify that the fore-
page 131 ~ going depositions of Waiter vV. ·Bridges and E. 
H. Marshall ,vere dulv taken before me at the 
time and place mentioned in the caption hereto and that the 
name of each witness was signed by me to his deposition as 
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directed by them, as witness my hand and seal at Danville, 
Virginia, this 28th day of February, 1942. 
:My commission expires November 13, 1944. 
S/ L. T. WOODY, 
Notary Public. 
Due Notary: 22 pages ........ $] 1.00 
4 hours . . . . . . . 4.00 
$15,00 I 
... 
page 132 ~ To T. Bryan Tute, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the 
Estate of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, 
-American National Bank and '11rust Company of Dan:. 
ville, Virginia, and l\Ietropolitan Life Insurance 
Company: 
Take notice that on the 25th day of February, 1942, at the 
office of Meade and Talbott, Attorneys at Law, ~16 Masonic 
Building, in the City of Danville, Virginia, between the hours 
of 9 a. m. and 1 p. m. of that day, I shall proceed to take the 
depositions of John Doe and other~, to be read as evidence 
in my behalf, in a certain chancery suit depending in the Cor-
poration ·Court of Danville, Virginia, wherein I and others 
are ·defendants and you, the said Trustee, are plaintiff, and if 
from any cause the taking· of the said depositions be not com-
menced, or, if commenced, be not concluded on that clay, the 
taking thereof will be adjourned from da.y to day at the same 
place, and between the same- hours, until the same shall be 
completed. 
Given under my hand this 16th day of February, 19'42. 
page 133 ~ 
,CECELIA_ HALBERSTADT HAIN, 
By l\fE~DE & TALBOTT, 
Her Attorneys. 
Joseph Halberstaclt, Dec 'd. 
''WILL'' 
I, Joseph Halberstadt, some times known and doing busi-
ness as Joseph Halbert, being of sound a.nd disposing mind 
and memory, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be 
my last will and testament, hereby revoking any and all wills 
by me at any time heretofore made. 
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ITEM O.NE: I desire that my Executors hereinafter named 
shall ·pay all of my just and honest debts and obligations. 
ITEM TWO: I nominate, constitute and appoint my 
daughter, Cecelia Halberstadt, who is now at 1669 East 
Nineteenth Street, Brooklyn, New York, and C. M. Burgess, 
of Danville, Virginia, Executrix and Executor, respectively, 
of this, my last will and testament. If, in their opinion, they 
believe it to be for the best interest of my estate, they may 
appoint a third person who shall be Co-Executor with them 
to aid in the administration of this estate. Because of the 
utmost faith and confidence which I have in the integrity of 
my daughter, Cecelia Halberstadt, and my good friend, C. M. 
Burgess, I desire that no bond be required of them or of 
the aforementioned Co-Executor, should they select one. . 
ITEM THREE: I direct that the cash money which I may 
have at my death be divided in the following manner: 
One-sixth (1/6) to my sister, Yenta Leah Mine, at No. 15 
Yuppernika, Warsaw, Poland; one-sixth (1/6)· to my sister, 
Emma Halberstadt, at No. 15 Kupernika, Warsaw, Poland; 
one-third (1/3) to my :wife,. Yetta H alberstadt, of Belhaven; 
North Carolina; one-third (1/3) to my daughter, Cecelia Hal-
berstadt, at 1669 East Nineteenth Street, Brooklyn, New 
York. 
''EXHIBIT .COPY WILL'' 
page 134 ~ Should my wife predecease me, then I desire 
that her said one-third (1./3) share of cash money 
be proportioned and distributed thusly: One-ninth (1/9) to 
my daughter, Cecelia Halberstaclt; one eighteenth (1/18) to 
my sister, Yenta Leah Mine; one-eighteenth (1/18) to my 
sister, Emma Halberstadt, and the remaining two-eig·hteenths 
(2/18) equally divided between my wife's two (2) children 
by ber former marriage. · 
· :Should either of my two (2) sisters predecease the other, 
then such sister's share of said cash money shall be paid to 
th~ Hurviving sister. 
Should both of my sisters die hefpre my death, then I di-
n1ct said Ex<.\cutrix and Executor to pay the aggTegate shares 
of my ~aid sisters to the child or children of my sister, Y enta 
Leah 1\linc. ' · . 
ITEM ·FOUR: I give, devise and bequeath all of mv in-
terest in Ilalbert's· Credit Clothing Company to my daugh-
ter, Cecelia Halberstadt, in fee.· 
ITEM ~"'JVE: I direct my said Executrix and Executor to 
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sell all of my estate, real, personal and mixed, which may 
b.e in Belhaven, North Carolina, subject to the following op-
tion: It is my wish that Walton C. Burgess should have the 
first option.for the purchase of the merchandise and :fixtures 
located in my storehouse in Bell1aven, North Carolina, and 
for the rental of this building, at a price and payment plan 
to, bo determined by my said Executrix and Executor. In 
the event said Walton C. Burgess shall faithfully accomplish 
the terms and conditions. of the purchase of the merchan-
dise and :fixtures as prescribed by .said Executrix and Execu-,1 
tor, · then said Executrix and Executor shall also give said 
'\Valton U. Burgess the first option for the purchase of said 
storehouse located in Belhaven, North Carolina. Having dis-
cussed my wishes in this regard with my daughter, Cecelia 
Halberstadt, and said 0. M. Burgess and they being fully 
cog·nizant of my wishes and desire in the matter, 
page 135 r in the execution of these sales to the aforesaid 
_ Walton C. Burgess, said Executrix and Executor 
shall have the sole discretion and :finality of decision. Upon 
sale of the merchandise and :fixtures and the property, as ,a 
whole, of which I die seized located.in Belhaven, North Caro ... 
Iina, and subject to the hereinabove provisions of sales to 
Walton C. Burgess left within the sole discretion of said Ex-
ecutrix and Executor, my Executrix and Executor shall pay 
seventy-five (751%) per centum of the proceeds· of said sale 
to my wife and twelve and one-half per centum (121h%) to 
each of my said sisters as promptly. as payments are made 
by such purchaser. 
In the event that my wife predeceases me and/or the death 
or deaths of my sister or sisters, then the following pro-
visions shall apply to the proceeds of sales included in this 
Item Five: · 
In the event tha.t my wife predeceaseH me, then I desire that 
one-third (1/3) of her said share of seventy-five (75) per 
centum shall go to my daughter, Cecelia Halberstadt; one-
sixth (1/6) to my sister., Yenta Leah Mine; one-sixth (1/6) 
to my sister; Emma Halberstadt, and the remaining one-third 
(1/3) equally divided between my wife's two (2) children 
by lier former marriage. · - · 
Should either of my two (2) siHters predecease the other, 
then such ·sister's share shaff go fo the surviving sister. 
Should both of my sisters die hef ore my -death, then I 
direct said Executor and. Executrix to pay the aggregate 
shares of my said sisters to the child or childr·en of my sis-
ter, Yenfa Lea~ ~inc. · · · -
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ITEM SIX: I give, devise and bequeath three hundred 
dollars ($300.00) to be paid to the Odd Fellows' Orphanage 
located in Goldsboro, North Carolina. 
page 136 r ITEM SEVEN: I give, devise and bequeath 
all of the furniture in our home at Belhaven, 
North Carolina, to my wife, in fee simple, free from the 
claims and demands of any one whomsoever. 
ITEM EIGHT: I give, devise and bequeath the residue 
and remainder of my real, personal and mixed estate, of what-
ever nature, kind or description, to my Executrix and Execu-
tor to be by them administered in accordance with the pres-
ent existing law of descents and distributions of the State 
of Virginia. 
Given under my hand and seal this 14 day of February, 
1935. 
JOSEPH HALBERST.ADT (Seal) 
State of Virginia, 
City of Danville, to-wit: 
The above signature of the testator was made and the fore-
going- will was acknowledged to be his last will and testa-
ment by said testator, in the presence of us, three competent 
witnesses present at the same time; and we, said witnesses, 
do hereunto subscribe said will on the date last above written, 
in the presence of said testator and of each other, at the re-
quest of said testator, who was then of sound mind and over 
the age of twenty-one (21) years. 
J\·fRS. vV. H. SNELL 
MRS. W. H. DODD 
MRS.F. R.ALLEiN 
Copy-Teste :-
S/ C. STU.AR.T vVHEATLE,Y, Clerk. 
page 137 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of Danville, 
on the 7th clay of December, l 935. 
An authenticated copy of the last will and testament of 
.T oseph Halberstadt, cleceasecl, which was proved and admitted 
to probate in the -Superior Court of Beaufort County, North 
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Carolina, was this day presented to the Clerk of the Cor-
poration Court of Danville, Virginia, for probate in said 
Court, and it appearing to said Clerk from said .copy, that 
the original will was proved in said foreign Court of pro.:. 
bate to have been so executed as to be a valid will in the 
State of Virginia, by the laws thereof, doth order that the 
said authenticated copy of said will be admitted to probate 
in this Court. 
And on the motion of Clyde l\L Burgess, and Cecelia Hal-
l)erstadt, the only :Executor and Executrix respectiveti 
named in the authenticated copy of said will, who made oath 
as the law directs, and entered into a bond in the penalty of 
Fifteen Thousand Dollars, payabh~ and conditioned accord-
ing to law, (but without security, the said authenticated 
copy of will directing that none should be required of them). 
and which said bond being acknowledged by the obligor~ 
therein, is ordered to be recorded. Certificate is granted the 
said Clyde :M:. Burgess and Cecelia Halherstadt for obtain-
ing· a probate of said authenticated copy of said will in due 
form. 
page 138 ~ 
OTIS BRADLEY, Clerk. 
dopy-Teste :-
S/ C. STUART WHEATLEY, Clerk. 
''EXHIBIT "WITH THE WILL''. 
COURT'S OPINION. 
The Metropolitan Life Insurance .Company, its Home Of-
fice being in the City of New York, issued four policies of 
insurance on the life of ,Joseph Halberstadt, a.11 providing 
that payments to the beneficiaries were to be made at its 
Home Office. 
No. 830032-A was issued on March 22, 1912; had a face-
value of $2,000.00 and was payable to Joseph Halberstadt 
on the 22nd day of March, 1969, if ]1e were then living, and 
if not, to Bessie Halhe1·stadt, his wife. Application for this 
policy was made at Philadelphia, Pa., where the insured then 
resided. The record is silent as to whether it was delivered 
to insured in that city. and as to what acts were done there 
to complete the execution of the ~on tract. I inf er, however, 
that in accordance with the usual ,mstom of insurance com-
panies, the policy was sent to Philadelphia and there deliv-
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ered to insured by some representative of the company upon 
payment of the first premium . 
.No. 5081321-A was issued on September 28, 1927; had a 
face value of $5,114.00, and was payable to Bessie Halber-
stadt, wife of the insured. Application for it was made at 
Belhaven, N. C., where the insured then resided, and was 
domiciled. Premium receipt covering the first premium was 
countersigned by one, Noble, '' Agt.' ', and it ap-
page 139 ~ pears that this was done in North Carolina, since 
the policy was handled through the Washing-ton, 
N. C., District. 
No. 5815807-.A. was issued on May 16, 1929. It provided for 
one payment of $28.65 to the insured, if living, on the 16th 
day of May, 1968, and for two hundred and thirty-nine 
monthly payments thereafter of like amount, or upon his 
death for like payments to his daug·hter, Cecelia. This policy 
was applied for at Belhaven, N. C., and I infer that it was 
there delivered by some representative of the Insurer upon 
payment of the first premium. 
No. 5927868-A was issued on July 8th, 1929, and is similar 
to No. 5815807-A, except that the monthly payments provided 
for are in the sum of $57.30. This policy was applied for 
at Belhaven, N. C., and it is to be inferred that it was deliv-
ered there by some representative of the Insurer upon pay-
ment of the first premium. 
Insured also resided in North Carolina and was domiciled 
there when the two last mentioned policies were issued. See 
exhibit, Certificate of Clerk of Beaufort County, N. C., filed 
with depositions. Both of these policies contained a pro-
vision reading as follows: '' Any income payments yet to 
be made, commuted at the rate of three and one-half per 
centum per annum, compound interest, may be required to 
be paid in one sum as follows : ( a) To the insured, if the 
Insured is the payee, but only with the written 
page 140 r consent of the Beneficiary, if the right to change 
the Beneficiary has not been reserved, or (b) To 
the beneficiary after the death of the Insured, if such rig·ht 
has been given to the Beneficiary by the Insured. No Bene-
ficiary may assign or commute income payments unless the 
Insured has so provided in writing and such provision has 
been endorsed on the Policy by the Company at its Home 
Office.'' No such provision was made by the Insured. 
Bessie Halberstadt died in 1929. 
Cooelia Halberstaclt was born .January 28, 1912, and was 
the only child of Joseph and Bessie Halberstadt. 
On June 6, 1930, Joseph Halberstadt made Cecelia the bene-
ficiary under policies Nos. 5081321-A and 830032-A, and on 
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September 3, 1930, he executed as to both of these policies 
'' An Election of Installment Settlement----Option 2'' at Bel-
haven, North Carolina, by which he directed that the amount 
payable under policies upon his death should be retained by 
the Insurer, and paid out in. monthly installments instead 
of in one sum. These elections contain a paragraph read~ng 
as follows: 
'' And I hereby further direct that the Beneficiary of Rec-
ord shall not have the right at any time to commute, assign 
or encumber any stipulated payments yet to be made.'' 
It is a matter having some bearing on the decision of the 
case that in the form signod by the Insured after the words 
'' Beneficiary of Record'' appearing in the quoted 
page 141 ~ paragraph, there is a blank space with directions 
in parenthesis under it as follows: ''Fill in 
either 'shall' or 'shall not'.'' 
Joseph Halberstadt died in 1935. 
Cecelia Hain, then Halberstadt, registered as a voter in 
Danville, Virginia, in ,1936 ; mar1·ied Simon Hain, who was 
domiciled ancl residing in Danville, Virginia, in 1937 ; and 
was domiciled in and a resident of Virginia when she filed a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bank-
rupt in 1940. 
Through the agency of her husband she operated a. busi-
ness in the City of Danville, Va., under the style of Danville 
8hoe Market, after she was married, and had conducted the 
same business with him as Manager after her father's death 
and prior to her marriage. In 1936 she ma.de a financial 
statement for the purpose of obtaining- credit in which there 
was listed as an asset a trust fund of the value of $25·,000.00. 
In March, 1939, she made a property statement to J. Vl. Car-
ter Co. for the purpose of olltaining· credit in which she listed 
among her assets : '' Trm;;t Fund Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. . ..... 26,350.00. '' . 
At Danville, Va., on July 12, 1937, she made an agreement 
witl1 the American National Bank & Trust Co. of that city, 
evidenced by a letter reading as follows: 
page 142 } "In consideration of your continuing· to carry 
indebtedness totalling $8,500.00, which you have 
previously loaned me, and which I originally agreed to pay 
at a faster rate than I now find myself able to, I hereby as-
sign and set over to you as security for this indebtedness, or 
any other indebtedness that I may owe your institution, all 
.of my rights, title and interest in and to Metropolitan Life 
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Insurance Company contract No. 18113-R, Installment Cer~ 
tificate, in the principal amount of $29,128.80, payable at the 
rate of $121.37, in 239 monthly payments, beginning Octo-
ber 19, 1935. · 
'' Since the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company will not 
accept an assignment of this policy, I am directing that they 
forward these installment checks to you each month to be 
placed to my credit. 
'' I hereby contract and agree with you that I shall, when-
ever requested to do so by you, endorse these checks over 
to you,, ~d allow the entire proceeds to be arjplied as a credit 
on my indebtedness to your bank until such indebtedness is 
paid in full. 
'' In making tliis agreement, assignment and contract, it 
is my intent and purpose to prefer your bank ahead of any 
other creditors I may have in the disposition of this insur-
ance, and it is my desire that all income to be derived froni 
this policy be paid you until my indebtedness to 
page 143 ~ you is liquidated in full, and I herehy ag·ree to 
hereafter make such furthe.r contracts as may be 
necessai~y to leg·ally perform this contract.'' 
. After the . clea.th of Joseph Halberstacit the Insurer issued 
to Cecelia the certificate refe.rred to in the agreement with 
the Bank above quoted, by which it agreed in accordance with 
the provisions of the policies and .the options exercised by 
the insured to pay her the suin of $121.37 a month. This 
certificate contained a provision against assignment, etc. It 
also provides that in the event o.f the de.ath of the payee be-
fore receiving all the payments the remaining payments shall 
be commuted at the rate of three and. one half pe:r centum 
per annum compound interest and to be paid to the execu-
tors or administrators of the payee. . . 
With these facts as the basis for determination the ques-
tion is: did the payments clue the bankrupt and to becpm~ 
due to· her in her lifetime pass to her truste.e in hankruptcyT 
In my opinion its answer: determines the rights of the Ameri-
can National Bank & Trust. Co., .although sQme .incidental 
questions arh1e in this connection which will be briefly touched 
upon hereafter. . . . 
Whether she could have transferred the payments due l1er 
from the. Metropolitan Life Insuranc~ Co. is a. question o.f 
. . . . state law~ Eaton ,~. Bo~·ton., elk, Safe Deposit 
page 144 ~ Co., 240 U.S .. 427, 36 S .. Ct. 391; Hull v. Farmer's 
. Loan Co., 245 U. S. 312, 38 S. Ct. 103; 8u,skin d!; 
Berry, Inc~, v. James Rumley, Trustee, 37 Fed. (2d) 304; 
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Remington on Bankruptcy, Vol. 3, Supplement, 4th E., Sec. 
1189. 
A New York Statute reads in part as follows: 
'' Provided, how·ever, that when the proceeds of. a life in-
surance policy, becoming· a claim by death ·of the insured, are 
left with the insurance company undor a trust or other agree-
ment, the benefits accruing· thereunder after the death of 
the insured shall not be transferable, nor subject to com-
mutation or incumbrance, nor to legal process except in an 
action to recover for necessaries, if the parties to the trust 
or. other agreement so agree.'' 
Three cases are strongly relied upon by Mrs. Hain in sup-
port of her contention that her right. to the payments due by 
the Metropolitan did not and do not pass to her trustee in 
bankruptcy. They are ... Jnnis v. Pilkewitz, 267 Mich. 68; 282 
N. vV. 905; Michaelson v. Sokolove (Md.), 182 At. 458, and 
The Citizens & Southern National Bwnk v. Mrs. Frank Palmer 
and Aetna Life Insurance Co., an unreported decision made 
by the :Municipal Court of Savannah. They are pretty closely 
in point with this case, although the facts are somewhat dif-
ferent. In the Michigan case tlie agreement by which the 
funds were left with tlrn company was made spe-
page 145 ~ ci:fically with reference to the New York Statute. 
The point was made by the attaching creditor 
that exemptions had no extra-territorial effect, but were of 
the remedy, not the right; the Court denied this claim, stat-
ing that the rights of the parties were established by con-
tract. That, although the contract creating ihe exemption 
was authorized by statute, that nevertheless the exemption 
arose from the act of the parties and not out of the statute. 
The holding is to the effect that as tlie ag1·eement contra-
vened no public policy of the state of Michigan, and was 
made with intent that it shou]d be governed by New York 
law and in accordance therewith the l\.fichigan courts must 
recognize that law as controlling. The Georgia case follows 
the decision in the l\Iichig·an case. The Maryland case bases 
its decision upon the reasoning· tllat the result of the ag·ree-
ment was in effect a spendthrift trust; that such trusts were 
recognized as valid in Maryland and that; therefore, the funds 
left in the hands of the insurance company were not assig11-
a.ble. It gives no consideration to tlle conflict of laws ques-
tion. . 
In these three cases the agreements were plainly made 
with reference to the laws of other states. That point is not 
quit~ so clear in the instant case. If Halberstadt contracted 
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with reference to the law of New York, I think that the re-
sult is that the payments due his daughter do 
page 146 ~ not pass to her trustee in bankruptcy. 
''Rule making· intent of Parties Determinative. Under 
one theory the conflict between the various rules and theories 
that have been stated is more apparent than real, since the· 
majority of them, perhaps may be reconciled by the appli-
cation of another rule, namely, that the true test for the 
de.termination of- the proper law of a contract is the intent 
of the parti~s and that this intent whether express or im-
plied, will always be given effect except under exceptional 
circumstances evincing a purpqse in making· the contract to 
commit a fraud on the law.'' 
. Am. Jur., Vol. 11, -Sec. 119, Conflict of Laws. Many au-
thorities are cited in support of the text among them the 
Virginia decision of Pool v. Perkin.s, 126 Va. 331, 101 S. E. 
240. See also Minor's Conflict of Laws, Sec. 159, wher.e this 
appears: 
'' The locits solutionis of a contract primarily depends upon 
the intention of the parties. It is a part of the principle of 
freedom of contract to choose the place where a contract 
shall be performed. This choice may be expressed in the 
contract itself; if not, it may be inf erred from the surround-
ing circumstances.'' 
There was no express reference made to the law of New 
York in the policies or in the option elections. 
page 147 ~ True it is, that the proceeds of the policies were 
payable in N cw York. . A fact. of considerable 
import in this case when taken in connection with its other 
facts. See Minor on Conflict of Laws, Section 166. I enter-
tain some doubt, though, as to whether this isolated fact 
in all cases should carry any particular weight. Certainly 
it would seem to go pretty far to hold that a buyer of in-
surance should be bound by the laws of a State about which 
he knew nothing·, merely because the policy contained such 
a provision. See .Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Benton, 
56 Ga. App. 298, 302. J..,et us look to the other facts pre-
sented by the record. Halberstadt had one daug·hter, ·Cecelia. 
He owned other property, a part of which he devised her. 
Shortly after two of the policies were bought he exei·cised 
the elections providing for installment payments. The poli-
cies originally made payable to his daughter after his death 
contain~d restrictions against assignment of the payments 
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or their commutation. There is no doubt in my mind that 
a man of business considered these propositions and that' he 
had a well formed purpose to insure his daughter a monthly 
income for a period of twenty years after his death. One, of 
which she could not be deprived. The option election left the 
determination of this matter to the insured. It was not a 
conventional stipulation ag·ainst assig-nment with-
page 148 } out consent of one of the parties. It was not in-
serted as a mere convenience to the Insurer with 
respect to ascertaining the validity of assignments, the iden-
tity of assig11ees, &c. The restrictions as to the payments 
were imposed with a definite object. The fund, the debt, 
whatever you may call it, had its situs, from a practical stand-
point, in New York. Anctit is an inescapable inference that 
Halberstadt did not intend that the proceeds of his insur-
ance, so far as his daughter was concerned, should be depend-
ent on the laws of any jurisdiction in wl1ich she might later 
reside or be domiciled. To accomplish his purpose, definite-
ness as to the law governing the rights and .interests of the 
object of his bounty were of the very essence of his scheme. 
She was then a young- gfrl. It is to b.e deduced that there 
were no strong ties of affection between her a.nd her step-
mother. This was no doubt known to Halberstadt. The facts 
surrounding her movements after her father's death bear out 
this conclusion. All the facts show that Halberstadt had 
110 reason to think that bis daughter would continue to live· 
in North Carolina. All in all, it seems plain that the agree-
ments between him and the Metropolitan were made with 
intent that the .New York law should govern them, and fur-
ther with reference to· the provisions of its statute affording 
an exemption. 
The question a·rises as why the contracts be-
page 149 ~ tween Halberstadt and his Insurer did not follow 
the language of the statute with reference to ex-
~mption from legal process. Not that failure in this respect 
changes the legal result. See the case of Cross·man v. Rauch, 
263 N. Y. 264, 188 N .. ,E. 7 4~, holding that as the payments 
could not be voluntanlv assigned they could not be subject 
to levy by execution. This reason for its conclusion was not 
based on the statute. It appears to be the law of New York, 
and if the contracts in h;sue are g-overned by it. it. is con-
trollin~ in thii:; case. But the omission may lead to doubt as 
to what law the parties intended to contract with reference 
to. Some amount of doubt arises about almost evervthirn.r. 
T n the absence of doubt there is no room for decisi~n, and 
I think it plain that on tl1e whole the parties intended that 
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New York should be the place of performance of their con-
tracts. Consequently they are governed by its laws. . . 
If the agreements be held to create a trust relat10nsh1p 
other questions arise. The trust would be subject to the 
laws of North Carolina, the domicil of the settlor; the laws 
of New York, or the laws of Virginia, the domicil of th~ cestui 
que tmst. Decisions are in conflict on this point. See Hutch-
ins.on v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65, 89 A. L. R. 1007 
and note appended. . 
If the result of the ag-reement is a trust it. would 
page 150 ~ be a spendthrift trust. And if subject to the 
laws of Virginia it would be invalid as to credi-
tors of Cecelia Hain. Code of Virginia, Section 5157. Vir-
ginia does not recog11ize the validity of spendthrift trusts 
in their technical significance. Trusts for the support of the 
beneficiary are not strictly speaking· spendthrift trusts!. 
Pomeroy 's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th E., Sec. 989E; note 
beginning at page 19, Vol. 119, A. L. R., Section 152 (2), Vol. 
1, Am. L. Inst. Restatement of the Law of Trusts defines a 
'' spendthrift trust'? as a '' trust in which the terms of the 
trust a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary in-
terest of the beneficiary is imposed". 
I think that the rule laid dowr1 in H1itchinson v. Ros.r;, sitpra, 
controls this case, and that, therefore, altbo~gh the trans-
actions between Halberstadt and the Insurance Company be 
regarded as creating a spendthrift trust, one authorized by 
the New York statute as to insurance funds, that that New 
York law is controlling. Unless it he so much in conflict with 
the public policy of Virginia. that it would not be given recog-
nition in its courts. Albeit, the Virginia statute pertaining· 
to trusts is one of public policy, it does not follow that the 
laws and statutes of another state to which the rights of 
the parties are subject will for that reason be disregarded. 
There must be something immoral, shocking to 
page 151 ~ one's sense of right, in order that comity be de-
nied. lnterna.tional Ha.rvc.~ter Co. v. McAdanis, 
142 Wis. 114, 124 N. "\V. 1042, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 774; 20 
Ann. Cas., 614. It would indeed be a hard rule if the law 
of the forum set at naught the provisions of an agreement, 
valid where made, or to be performed, simply because the 
Tights of the beneficiary of it were drawn in question in its 
jurisdiction and local policy was different from that of the 
place of making or performance. Assuming·, arqirnndo that 
Halberstadt bad received the proceeds of his insurance' poli-
cies as matured endowments in the form of a check mailed to 
him in North Carolina, and had then gone to New York, 
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cashed the check, delivered the currency · to a trustee resid-
ing there to be held and paid to his daug·hter upon the same 
terms, conditions and restrictions as we find here, and the 
laws of New York, statutory, or otherwise formulated, recog-
nized the validity of such a trust, is there any substantial 
difference in the essence of that transaction from what we 
find in this? A trustee co nominee is not. essential. Thornas 
V. House, 145 Va. 742. And let us suppose further that the 
beneficiary of the trust at the time of its creation was not a 
resident of Virginia, but subsequently became a citizen of 
this state, and that fortuitously, or otherwise, the trustee be-
came suable in a Virginia -Court, should that court 
page 152 ~ disregard the law of N cw York and apply its own f 
I think not. However this may be as a question 
of conflict of laws, under the Bankruptcy Act the trustee's 
title depends on the law of that place in which the situs of 
the res is, as to which the bankrupt's right or interest ex-
ists. As to the situs of the res, Rec flutchhison v. Ross, supra, 
also Shannon v. Jrv-ing 1'rtt.st Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2nd) 
792, to the same effect. 
Cross-nian .& Co. v. Raixch, snpra, held that under similar 
circumstances the relationship was that of debtor and creditor. 
·whether the relationship he that of debtor and creditor, 
or one of trust, is a distinction without a difference. The 
New York statute authorizes the parties to give to the chose 
in action and to the debt the essential character and nature 
of a spendthrift trust. The result is the same, reg·ardless of 
terminology. 
It is true as contended by Complainant that exemptions 
to be allo,ved the bankrupt are governed by the law of his 
domicile for six months, or tlw greater portion thereof, im-
mediately preceding the filing of the petition. Sec. 6 Bank-
ruptcy Act; Reiter, ex parte Hanrahan, 58. Fed. (2d) 631. 
Certiorari denied, 287 U. S. 652, 77 L. Ed. 563, 5,3 S. :Ct. 116. 
But this applies to statutory exemptions. Not to conven-
tional limitations or restrictions upon the bank-
page 153 ~ rupt 's interest in or title to the thing· in (luestion. 
Annis v. Pilkewitz, Ea.ton v. Boston-, dfo., Safe De-
posit Co. and S1ttslcin <f: BP-rry, Inc., v. Ritmley, Trnstee, supra. 
One is an incident of citizenship, t.he other of title or owner-
ship. · 
I am not unmindful of the rule to the effect that stipula-
tions against assignment in contrncts where the personal 
equation is not inv?lved, are generally held not to apply to 
transfers by operation of law. Central Trust Co. v. Chicar,o 
Aiulitori1mi, 240 U. S. 581, 60 L. Ed. 811, 36 S. Ct. 412, L. 
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R. A. 1917 B. 580. · But that is where the stipulat~on is e~-
braced in a two party contract. So far as the title or m-
terest of one of the parties in the fruits of the contract is 
concerned there can be no limitation by contractual agree-
ment upon them that will affect their transfer by operation of 
law. But in a contraet such as those in question there are 
three parties involved. The insured, the insurer and 
the beneficiary. If the applicable law permits, the insured 
can dispose of the benefits of his contract, which is the money. 
payable under the policy, upon such terms and subject to 
such restrictions as will preveut its transfer by operation 
of law. The limitations imposed determine the quality and 
nature of the beneficiary's estate or interest. 
page 154 ~ Complainant places great relia1~ce upon the1 
case of Bass, Tritstee, v. Prudential lnsu.rance 
Company ct Willi<11ms, decided ·by the Circuit Court of Pittsyl-
vania County in 1936. To its judgment holding that the Trus-
tee was entitled to recover the installments a writ of error 
was denied. 'l'he judgment of a court of coordinate juris-
diction, until reversed by a. superior court, perhaps should 
be followed by other courts of equal dignity in the same state. 
Am. & Eng. Encyc.. of Law1 Vol. 26, Title, Stare Decisis, page 
165. ,Especially when a writ of error is denied by the ap-
pellate tribunal. This is only true, however, when the facts 
are similar. The denial of a writ. of error may grow out of 
many reasons. And it is only when exact simila.rity of facts 
is beyond a dispute that it is entitled to weight. The facts 
in the case of Bass, T·r-ustee, v. P.rudential, &c., supra, are 
quite different in many respects from those in this case. New 
Jersey law does not seem to have been considered. The rec-
ord fails to show that there was any statute of that state ·such 
as that of New York relied upon fo this case. The Benefici-
aries were residents of Virginia. Indeed, the only point of 
similarity whatever is a term of the policy to the effect that 
installment payments were to be unassignable. Apparently 
the case was tried on the theory that the law of Virgfoia 
was applicable, and under that law even though 
page 155 ~ the transaction was deemed to have created a 
spendthrift trust it would not have prevented the 
payments passinp: to the Trustee, because it was not limited 
to the support of the beneffoia rfos. For these reasons and 
because of my conclusion that the parties in this case con-
tracted with reference to New York law, I do not feel bound 
by the decision in the case ref erre'd to. 
My opinion is that the payments due from the Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. to -the Bankrupt and those to become 
' 
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due during her lifetime do not pass to her Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy. Any installments remaining unpaid at her death 
would. See 811,erid01n v. K ra,11,se, 161 Va. 873. From what 
has been said it follows that in my opinion the purported as-
signment to the American National Bank & Trust Co. passed 
nothing in the payments coming to l\frs. Hain .. A decree may 
be prepared accordingly. 
May 15, 1942. 
HENRY C. LEIGH, Judge~ 
page 156 ~ And now, on this day, to-wit: 
Corporation Court of Danville, on Saturday the 23rd day 
of May, in the year A. D. 1942, being the day and year first 
herein mentioned. 
This cause, which has been properly matured at Rules and 
set down for hearing as to Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, and American National 
Bank and Trust Compru1y of Danville, Danville, Virginia, 
they being all of the def end.ants, came on this day to be heard 
upon the bill of complaint, the separate answer of the de-
f end ant, Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, with general replication 
thereto, the separate answer of the defendant, Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, with general replication thereto, 
the depositions taken on behalf of the complainant, together 
with exhibits therewith, filed in the Clerk's Office of this 
Court on February 7, 1942, and the depositions taken on be-
half of the defendants, Cecelia Halberstadt Hain and Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, and exhibits therewith, filed 
in the Clerk's Of.flee of this Court on March 2, 1942, and 
was argued by counsel. 
On consideration whereof and for reasons set forth in writ-
ten opinion filed with the papers in this cause on May 15, 
1942, which shall be taken and considered as a part of tl1is 
decree, IT IS AD.JUDGED, DECLAR,ED, OR-
page 157 ~ DERED AND DECREED that the monthly in-
stallments of $121.37 e~ch payable to .Cecelia Hal-
berstadt Hain under and by virtue of policies Nos. 830032-A, 
5081321-A, 5815807-A and 5927868-A, issued by the Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company, and the certificate of the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, dated October 1, 1935, is-
sued to the said .Cecelia Halbere:;tadt Ha.in, now due and pay-
able to her and to become due and payable to her during her 
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lifetime, are exempt from voluntary or involuntary transfer 
by her and from subjection to her debts and liabilities by 
judicial process, as to such instalhneuts now due and to be-
come due· during her lifetime, and do not pass to her Trustee 
in Bankruptcy, nor to the American National Bank and Trust 
Company under the writing, dated July 12, 1937, signed by 
Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, and addressed to the said Ameri-
can National Bank and Trust Company. 
IT IS FURTHER AD~TUDGED, DECLARED, OR-
DERED AND DECR,EED that Cecelia Halberstadt Hain by 
her assignment to American National Bank and Trust Com-
pany of Danville, Danville, Virgi11ia, dated July 12, 1937, 
transferred to and vested in it such rights in the commuted 
value of any unpaid remaining payments at her death under 
said policies and said installment certificate which may oth-
erwise have passed upon her death to her executors or ad-
ministrators, and to this extent said Bank is now vested with 
and entitled to claim said rights as security for the payment 
of her indebtedness to it. 
page 158 r IT TS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED 
. AND DECR:E~ED that the complainant Trustee 
in Bankruptcy of Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, by operation of 
the Bankruptcy Act, is vested with and entitled to the rights 
and interests of Cecelia. Halberstadt Hain in the commuted 
value of any unpaid remaining payments under said policies 
and said instalhnent certificate which may otherwise have 
passed upon her death to her executors or administrators, 
subject only to the prior claim and lien of said American Na-
tional Bank and Trust ,Company of Danville, Danville, Vir-
ginia, against said rights and interests as securitv for the 
payment of her indebtedness to it and established in this de-
cree. 
IT IS FUR.THER ADJUDGFJD, ORDER.ED AND DE-
CREED that the complainant pay the costs of this suit, 
and that his bill be and the same is herebv dismissed. 
And to the entry of this decree and the judgment of the 
Court therein embodied the complainant, by Counsel, objects 
and excepts. 
\ 
page 159 ~ State of Virginia, 
City of Danville. 
I, C. Stuart Wheatley, Clerk of t.he Corporation Court of 
Danville, "Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
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true transcript of ·so much of the record and judicial pro-
ceedings of said Court as I have been directed to copy to-
gether with the original exhibits, ma.rked Exhibit ''A'' to 
'' D' ', inclusive, '' Exhibit Bridges Proofs I'', '' Exhibit New 
York Law", "Exhibit Barnes 1 to 4", inclusive, "Exhibit 
Policy 1 to 4", inclusive, hereto annexed, in a certain pro-
ceeding in Chancery wherein T. Bryan Tate, Trustee in 
Bankruptcy of the Estate of Ceceli~ Halberstadt Hain, is com-
plainant, and Cecelia Halberstadt Hain, et als., are defend-
ants. 
And I further certify that the Complainant has filed with 
me a written notice to the defendants of its intention to ap-
ply for a transcript of said record, which notice was duly 
accepted by Messrs. Crews & Clement, Meade & Talbott, At-
torneys of Record for said clef endants and American Na-
tional Bank & Trust Company of Danville, Virginia, in proper 
person. 
Given under my hand this 30th cla.y of June, 1942. 
C. STU.ART WHEATLEY, Clerk. 
Clerk's Fee for copy of record: $27.00. 
of J ~ne, 1939. 
hospital dates, but it was all in that period, the last half 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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